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  ABSTRACT 
 
 In the study of government accountability, there have long been arguments about 
which model is superior.  These arguments, which are largely made by those in the 
performance and political accountability camps, state that their particular model is the 
best, and indeed only legitimate approach to ensuring accountable government.  At the 
same time, there is growing research in policy tools but little in how accountability 
models and policy tools are linked in policy design. 
 This study makes use of the context provided by the critical cases of the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA).  With such large sums of money in play at a time of serious economic downturn 
and mounting federal deficits, government clearly has a responsibility to ensure 
accountability so that the public can be assured not only that its funds are being spent 
properly but also more generally, that accountability as well as policy tool choice is in the 
minds of officials as they formulate, adopt and implement public policy.   
 The intent of this study is to present an argument in two main areas using the 
critical case studies of TARP and ARRA.  First, that no one accountability model fully 
explains most policy tool choices in TARP or ARRA and that the use of multiple models 
is superior.  Second, that we can link policy tool choices and accountability models in 
policy design. The standards used to establish what models explain what tool choices are 
in the models themselves.  Each policy is explored individually in a chapter, and the 
lessons and results of this study are then presented in the final chapter. 
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 The data presented in this study indicate that a single-model approach may 
explain a few, but not most and certainly not all, policy tool choices in TARP and ARRA.  
Indeed, a multiple model approach proves superior to a single-model approach in all but a 
few instances.  As for the connections between policy tools and accountability models, 
the data presented in this study show that they were strongly impacted by the policy 
formulation process itself, specifically the way in which the policy problem was framed 
and the speed with which it was undertaken. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction, the Research Questions and Methodology 
Accountability has been a core concern of American government since the 
country’s founding.  As James Madison famously wrote in Federalist 51: 
  "In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is 
submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are 
guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate 
departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the 
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion 
allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a 
double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will 
control each other; at the same time that each will be controlled by itself 
(Hamilton, Jay, & Madison, 1787-1788).”   
Indeed, the separation of powers system suggested in Federalist 51 and present in 
the US Constitution was designed, in no small part, to help ensure accountable 
government (Hamilton, Jay, & Madison, 1787-1788; United States Constitution, 1787-
1788, pp. Arts. I-III).  Yet, while accountability has long been a core principle of 
American and indeed all democratic governance, there is widespread disagreement on 
what accountability is and how best to ensure it.  This study has found that the literature 
contains no less than eight different and commonly referenced models of accountability, 
each of which has its own decision rules, assumptions and advocates who claim that their 
model is the best, and often, only proper model to utilize to ensure accountability.   
In the study of government accountability, there have long been arguments about 
which model is best.  These arguments are largely made by those in the performance and 
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political accountability camps, who state that their model is the best and indeed only 
legitimate approach to ensuring accountable government.  At the same time, there is 
growing research in policy tools but little in how accountability models and policy tools 
are linked. 
Concerns about accountability have become particularly acute in the policy 
responses to the current economic crisis.  It is easy to see why that has been the case, as 
the federal government has authorized expenditures of over $1.5 trillion between the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (ARRA) alone (ARRA, 2009; Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 
2008).  With such large sums of money in play at a time of serious economic downturn 
and mounting federal deficits, government clearly has a responsibility to ensure 
accountability so that the public can be assured both that its funds are being spent 
properly and, more generally, that accountability is in the minds of officials as they 
formulate, adopt and implement public policy.  However, this study is not really about 
TARP or ARRA but rather about the accountability models themselves, and the policy 
tools they utilize, as ways to help us understand how accountability is defined in both 
theory and practice.   
This study seeks to explore ways to understand policy choices aimed at ensuring 
accountability in a complex context.  It seeks to address limitations in the existing use of 
models of accountability in the existing literature.  More specifically, it asks the question 
of how effectively any of the four most commonly used models of accountability explain 
the policy tool choices selected to address accountability issues in TARP and ARRA.  
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These four models are: (1) political accountability; (2) professional bureaucratic; (3) legal 
and (4) performance.    
 This study consists of five chapters.  This first chapter will explain how the study 
uses a case study analysis of TARP and ARRA to assess how well the most widely used 
models explain the choice of policy tools used in these programs to ensure accountability.  
This chapter will also explain the research strategy and methodology to be used in that 
effort.   
The second chapter will discuss the state of the literature with respect to the 
models’ theoretical assumptions and their decision rules and will identify the most 
important gaps in the modern accountability literature.  It will also discuss policy tools 
literature in order to provide proper framing for this study. 
The third and fourth chapters will describe in more detail the cases of TARP (in 
chapter 3) and ARRA (in chapter 4) and the basic findings related to what policy tools 
were used and which accountability models were used in relation to tho1se policy tools.  
It will focus on description, with analysis saved for the final chapter. 
The fifth and final chapter will then proceed to analyze the data, focusing on what 
the study argues are three primary gaps in the literature.  First, the assumption that a 
single model of accountability is best and that models of accountability are separable.  
For example, Robert Behn writes repeatedly that the only correct way to approach 
government accountability is to utilize “tactics and strategies that seek to enhance the 
performance of the public sector-to improve the ability of government agencies and their 
nonprofit and for-profit collaborators to produce results (emphasis in original) (Behn, 
2001, p. 26).”   
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Second, there is no existing case in which accountability models are tested side by 
side.  Particularly since TARP and ARRA are different approaches to the same 
overarching set of problems caused by the 2008 economic crisis, this should allow us to 
see what impact accountability models have on policy tool choice. 
The third literature gap is that very little literature matches policy tools and 
accountability models in policy design.  Perhaps if certain policy tools and accountability 
models match up, something can be learned about both.  Since this is a critical case study, 
it is necessary to focus on cases which are atypical but important.  It is precisely in such 
cases that models are put to the ultimate test, and it might then be possible to make 
generalizations from these cases, atypical as they are.  If those in the field can start 
thinking of accountability model mixes as the proper way to evaluate accountability 
rather than single models.  This could lead to a deeper examination of previously 
undiscovered facets of government accountability and their connections to policy tools.  
This study focuses on the following research question: How effectively do any of 
the four most commonly used models of accountability explain the policy tool choices 
selected to address accountability issues in TARP or ARRA?  In order to answer this 
question, this study focuses on two research hypotheses.  First, that no one model 
explains all the policy tool choices in TARP or ARRA.  Second, that using multiple 
models will better explain most of these policy tool choices.  Answering this question 
should help us advance accountability and policy tools literature. 
The thesis of this study is that no single accountability model adequately explains 
policy tool choices and that a multiple model approach is superior.  In addition, the 
conditions and problem statement on which a policy is based impact policy tool choice.  
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The background and basis for this thesis will be explored in more detail throughout this 
study. 
THE CASE: TARP AND ARRA AS PUBLIC POLICY 
 In order to understand the appropriateness of TARP and ARRA as a critical case 
study, it is important to understand in more detail what TARP and ARRA are and how 
they came about.  The following section will therefore briefly discuss the history and 
design of TARP and ARRA (both are described in far more detail in chapter three for 
TARP and chapter four for ARRA).  This section will then conclude with a discussion of 
how TARP and ARRA is both an appropriate and feasible critical case study to test how 
accountability models explain policymaker choices.  
In order to solve the problems caused by the collapse of the housing bubble, the 
US Department of the Treasury asserted that it needed to help banks remove so-called 
“distressed assets (US Department of the Treasury, 2008b)” from the financial system in 
order to stabilize banks and other financial institutions.  As the US Department of the 
Treasury stated in proposing the first version of what later became TARP1, “When the 
financial system works as it should, money and capital flow to and from households and 
businesses to pay for home loans, school loans and investments that create jobs.  As 
illiquid mortgage assets block the system, the clogging of our financial markets has the 
potential to significantly damage our financial system and our economy, undermining job 
creation and income growth. (US Department of the Treasury, 2008b).”   
                                                           
1
 The bill was formally titled the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), of which TARP was 
by far the largest component in both the original and final bill (SIGTARP, 2009, p. 43). 
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TARP proposed to do so by adopting an approach similar to that used by the 
federal government in the Savings and Loan crisis of the late 1980s, wherein it provided 
temporary loans to financial institutions in order to ensure their stability (Seidman W. L., 
1996; US Department of the Treasury, 2008b).  Once they were able, these financial 
institutions would then pay back these loans, thus meaning that the cost to the federal 
government would be far less than the initial $700 billion price tag (Seidman W. L., 
1996; US Department of the Treasury, 2008b). 
 While originally intended as a program designed to purchase toxic assets in order 
to stabilize financial institutions, TARP in fact spent very little money purchasing such 
assets ($5 billion as of September 30, 2010) (SIGTARP, 2010b, p. 237).  Instead, it spent 
by far the most funds pursuing three primary tasks: (1) purchasing an estimated $280 
billion in stock in trouble banks and investment institutions such as Citigroup, JP Morgan 
and Bank of America; (2) providing $40 billion in loans to prevent the potentially 
catastrophic collapse of American International Group (AIG) and (3) providing nearly 
$80 billion in loans to American auto manufacturers in order to prevent their collapse 
(SIGTARP, 2010b, p. 237).  An additional $45 billion was appropriated to help prevent 
home foreclosures but as September 30, 2010 only $600 million had actually been spent 
and the administration had yet to come up with a plan to spend the remaining funds in 
this area (SIGTARP, 2010b, p. 237).  As a result, of the total of $387 billion actually 
expended under TARP, greater than 90% of it went directly to assisting banks, 
investment houses, AIG or auto manufacturers, far from the original intent of purchasing 
toxic assets. 
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 Yet even with its hefty price tag, it was clear that TARP alone was not enough 
since it only assisted a small part of the American economy.  Shortly after taking office in 
2009, President Barack Obama proposed an additional stimulus plan entitled the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) (Baker, 2009; Obama, 2009b; US 
GPO, 2009).  ARRA utilized a variety of policy tools such as tax cuts, aid to states and 
local governments to limit their budget cuts, increased unemployment benefits and direct 
federal spending largely on infrastructure projects (Baker, 2009; Obama, 2009b; US 
GPO, 2009).  The Obama administration argued that this direct federal spending where, 
unlike for TARP, the initial cost of the bill was expected to be the final cost as little to no 
repayment was expected, was the best and arguably only way to stabilize the economy 
and promote job growth (Baker, 2009; Obama, 2009b; US GPO, 2009).  Unlike with 
TARP, ARRA had no trouble sailing through the legislative process and was signed into 
law on February 17, 2009, less than a month after President Obama took office (Baker, 
2009; Obama, 2009b; US GPO, 2009). 
ARRA is composed of three primary components (Recovery.gov, 2010c): (1) a 
$288 billion package of tax cuts and tax expenditures for both business and personal 
taxpayers; (2) $224 billion in aid to states to help preserve entitlement programs 
(primarily unemployment benefits), health care and education programs which were 
otherwise in danger of being cut and (3) $275 billion in federal contracts, grants and 
loans to fund a series of projects, from infrastructure to research to environmental 
preservation and beyond (Recovery.gov, 2010c).  It is this last $275 billion that has 
received by far the most scrutiny since it is the portion of ARRA that allows for the 
greatest spending discretion and thus required the closest scrutiny.  
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 Although clearly different, TARP and ARRA share two main characteristics 
which make this study more manageable.  First, they are wide-reaching and together rely 
heavily on spending in both the public and private sector in order to be successful.  
Second, they are short-term policies, with TARP beginning to wind down in late 2009 
and early 2010 and most of the funds in ARRA already spent by mid-year 2010.  This 
short time-frame makes the cases easier to frame and thus manageable for this study.   
TARP and ARRA: A Useful Context to Challenge Accountability Models 
 Now that this study has given a brief overview of the history and design of TARP 
and ARRA, it will briefly discuss why these cases are critical cases.  In order to 
determine if they meet the standards for a critical case study, we must meet the three 
criteria established by Yin and Flyberg: that the case be atypical, critical to theory 
development and testing and have enough data to conduct the study (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp. 
219-225; Yin, 2008, pp. 46-59).  The following section will address each of these points 
in turn. 
 TARP and ARRA are unique policies created to solve the unique problems posed 
by the economic downturn which began in 2008.   The scope of these two policies 
together touched nearly every aspect of both private and public life and thus required two 
uniquely different, if related, responses.  Their combined appropriations of more than 
$1.5 trillion are substantial and rely on both the private and public sector to implement.  
An effort of this size and scope is clearly a unique case and one that cannot be assessed 
using anything but critical case study methodology. 
 TARP and ARRA are also important to theory testing and development.  This is 
because, again taken together, they comprise the two ends of the modern government 
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accountability spectrum, with TARP largely intended to rely on market and performance-
based accountability models while ARRA was intended to rely heavily on a legal 
accountability approach (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009; Recovery.gov, 2009b).  
Inherent in both was political accountability, both in terms of what was in the policy 
when it was designed, passed and then tracked by members of Congress and the public at 
large, and bureaucratic accountability because, in the end, public administration 
professionals had and still have a role in how both policies were designed.  The 
combination of these four accountability models in this atypical and important set of 
circumstances makes clear why a critical case study approach is justified.    
 Third, this study is feasible both because a significant amount of data exists and 
because they are short-term policies and can thus be framed properly.  This second point 
is particularly important since one problem inherent in case studies in general is the need 
to frame them properly in order to limit the number of variables present in a case.  The 
short-term nature of these policies makes that possible.  As for data availability, there is 
arguably more data than needed to conduct this study, rather than too little.  In any case, 
however, TARP and ARRA meet the three criteria established above and therefore an 
appropriate choice for a critical case study methodology.  The following section will 
briefly discuss the research process as well as the data acquisition strategy for this study. 
THE RESEARCH PROCESS AND DATA ACQUISTION 
 As noted above, the empirical setting for this research is the two major stimulus 
bills enacted in response to what has become commonly known as the “great recession 
(Samuelson, 2010)”, which began in 2008 and is arguably still ongoing (Samuelson, 
2010).  In order to allow for the proper framing of this case study, however, the study will 
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consider the time period from September 7, 2008, the day Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
were placed under government control, until February 1, 2010, slightly more than one full 
year into the Obama administration (New York Times, 2009).  This allows for research to 
explore the background, enactment and much of the implementation of both TARP and 
ARRA.   
 The primary sources for this study were the legislation itself as well as the myriad 
of reports produced by the agencies responsible for ensuring accountability in either 
TARP or ARRA. Most of these reports were prepared by the five organizations charged 
with ensuring accountability for TARP and ARRA: (1) the Congressional Oversight 
Panel (COP); (20 the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board (RATB); (3) the 
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP); (4) the US 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and (5) the US Department of the Treasury 
(Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009g; Recovery.gov, 2009c; SIGTARP, 2009e; US 
Department of the Treasury, 2009; Government Accountability Office, 2009; US GPO, 
2009).  In the specified case period, these five organizations alone produced more than 
175 reports on various aspects of TARP or ARRA accountability (Congressional 
Oversight Panel, 2009g; Recovery.gov, 2009c; SIGTARP, 2009e; US Department of the 
Treasury, 2009; Government Accountability Office, 2009; US GPO, 2009).   When added 
with the legislation itself as well as other implementing guidance provided by OMB and 
other federal agencies, there clearly was sufficient data to conduct this research (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2009c; Office of Management and Budget, 2009d).  
 In addition to this content analysis, I conducted interviews in February 2012 in 
Washington, DC with a Senate Finance Committee staffer, the former two top staffers at 
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the COP, a Congressional Research Service employee who worked on ARRA and a 
group of GAO employees led by Chris Mihm who worked on both TARP and ARRA.  
These interviews were semi-structured, with interviewees being sent a set of 10-15 
questions several days in advance.  Interviews began with those questions as a base and 
then flowed from them into the areas deemed appropriate by either the interviewee or 
myself.  These interviews, which took 30-60 minutes each, were not recorded due to the 
request of the interviewees, but copious notes were taken by myself and each interview 
was written up the same day it was conducted to minimize data loss.  These documents 
and these interviews combined to comprise the basis of the data from which this study 
was conducted.  The next section will discuss the data collection strategy for this 
research.  
Data Collection: Care is Needed but there are no Significant Barriers 
 The data collection strategy for this case is straightforward since this case is a 
public event and the emphasis is on the formal selection of policy tools.  The purpose 
here is to see how well the models explain behavior in the form of the ultimate decisions 
taken rather than the motives of any individual participants.  The primary sources of 
evidence are public records such as accountability reports, the legislation itself and other 
implementing guidance/regulations.  These sources were appropriate to use for four main 
reasons: (1) they are easily available; (2) they allow for the creation of a chronology for 
the case in order to allow for the case to be properly framed; (3) these sources, taken 
together, given a fairly complete view of this case and (4) these data come from 
trustworthy sources and thus provide a reliable record of the case.   
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 This data collection approach was not without potential challenges, three of which 
are particularly worth noting (Swanborn, 2010, pp. 76-95; Yin, 2008, pp. 101-123).  First, 
the data available from these documents may not provide all the information one needs to 
understand the accountability systems in this case (Swanborn, 2010, pp. 76-95; Yin, 
2008, pp. 101-123).  While it is certainly true that full understanding of the accountability 
systems in this case may not be possible with this, or any, data source, it is nonetheless 
believed that more than enough data exists to understand how the four accountability 
models were applied here.  Second, the data are largely framed around the results of the 
policy and not the accountability systems themselves (Swanborn, 2010, pp. 76-95; Yin, 
2008, pp. 101-123).  This is where a policy tools approach is useful because, by 
identifying the policy tools inherent in each element of this case, it can help connect them 
to the four models and thus solve the framing issue.  Third, the data may indicate 
causality where none exists, particularly in relation to the impacts the policies had on the 
external environment (Swanborn, 2010, pp. 88-94).  However, since this study was not 
about TARP’s or ARRA’s effectiveness but rather about their accountability models and 
the policy tools that were utilized in their design, this is not really a problem here.  In any 
event, these three problems with the data set are not likely to present significant 
obstacles.  While certainly not perfect, the data collection strategy used in this project 
should provide sufficient data to complete this study. 
Data Analysis: Coding and ATLAS 
 The data analysis strategy for this study is straightforward.  A database was 
created in ATLAS with all 237 documents collected for this study.  The documents were 
then divided into categories based on source (such as GAO, SIGTARP, Treasury, etc.), 
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type of document (such as regulations, legislation, accountability report, etc.) and 
whether they addressed TARP or ARRA.  Codes were then created for each of the policy 
tools listed in the next chapter and for the four accountability models as well.  Each 
policy tool also had one code created for each of the accountability models addressed in 
this study (so, for example, the policy tool “Contracting” has codes that read 
“Contracting-Political”, “Contracting-Legal” and so on).  Each document was evaluated 
on the basis of the criteria listed below with passages coded when they met the standards 
of one or more codes.  Passages were often coded with more than one code because it 
was found in several instances that although only one policy tool was in play, multiple 
accountability models were.  When in doubt, the inclination was to code more passages, 
and use codes more frequently, in order to avoid missing any possible data points. 
 The resulting codes were both summarized numerically and then evaluated 
passage by passage to ensure accuracy.  A decision was then made first as to which 
policy tools were most in use in each policy and second whether and how each of the four 
accountability models were or were not used.  In addition, documents were coded where 
other accountability models appeared to be present so as to evaluate whether the choice 
of the four models for this study was proper.  These codes were then evaluated to see 
where trends existed and these trends comprised the majority of data upon which this 
study was conducted.  These data were then supplemented with input from the interviews 
as appropriate.  The interviews also helped to confirm, add to, or deny the findings made 
in the original data analysis.  For example, without the interviews it would not have been 
known that GAO played such an important role in designing ARRA’s implementing 
regulations.   These two types of data, which constitute the raw findings of the study, will 
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be discussed in chapter three (TARP) and chapter four (ARRA).  Although other 
researchers using with the same documents and conducting the same interviews might 
find slightly different results, it is believed that the robustness of the coding (and the 
evaluation and analysis of the coding), will ensure that such differences are small and not 
significant. 
FRAMING THE MODELS: USING STANDARDS FROM THE MODELS 
THEMSLEVES 
 Perhaps the most important part of this study’s methodology is in how to 
determine when models are or are not present.  This study uses standards from the models 
themselves.  In other words, we ask whether the standards and approaches match those of 
each of the models in their literature. 
Political Accountability: 
For political accountability, we will find that the model is present when at least 
two of three conditions are met.  First, political accountability is utilized in cases where 
authority or responsibility exists for action within a system (Mayhew, 2004, pp. 110-
115).  For example, in the American system, Congress has the responsibility to oversee 
the federal bureaucracy (Finer, 1941, pp. 335-338).  The act of doing so is by itself an act 
of political accountability.  Second, actors utilizing political accountability must consider 
whether their actions are in concert with the interests of political actors and stakeholders 
(Fenno, 1978, pp. 133-138; Mayhew, 2004, pp. 22-25).  If conduct is in not in the 
interests or at the behest of such actors and stakeholders, it is hard to see why the political 
system would undertake any action.  Third, political accountability is called on when a 
problem is perceived as a political, and not a professional or mechanical, problem 
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(Fenno, 1978, pp. 133-138).  If there is a public outcry to respond to a particular problem, 
it almost by definition becomes political (Finer, 1941, pp. 335-338).  Absent such an 
outcry, a problem can often be handled within the existing professional bureaucratic 
system and thus may not rely on political accountability (Finer, 1941, pp. 335-338).   
Professional/Bureaucratic Accountability: 
 For professional or bureaucratic accountability, we shall find it exists when at 
least two of the following three standards are met: First, when a policy requires 
determining what the public needs as judged by a professional assessment of problems, 
contexts and opportunities; second, when the policy calls for professionals determining 
what is in the public’s best long term interests once short term political demands are 
filtered out and professional judgment is applied; and third, when the policy calls for 
determining how best to utilize professional and technical expertise to meet these 
interests (Levitan, 1946, pp. 565-575; Long, 1952, pp. 809-812; Long, 1954, pp. 23-25). 
What separates this from the political model is this essential focus on professionals 
determining how to serve the public interests, rather than responding only to the political 
demands of those in power at any one time.  The reasoning is that while political changes 
may and will occur with some regularity, the day to day administration of the public’s 
business has to able to respond to a range of requirements including representation of the 
long term public interest as viewed by professionals (Levitan, 1946, pp. 565-575; Long, 
1952, pp. 809-812; Long, 1954, pp. 23-25).  Professional administrators are needed to 
ensure that this large body of work, which should not be about politics, can be done and 
that the lower order politics are adjusted by professional knowledge and values 
(Friedrich, Beyer, Spero, Miller, & Graham, 1935, pp. 58-65). 
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Legal Model: 
 When it comes to the legal model, the standards for determining usage of the 
model are inherently broad.  This study will therefore rely on the following dictum, “the 
actions of governmental officials must have their basis in public law, not in the pecuniary 
interests of private entrepreneurs and owners or in the fiduciary concerns of public 
managers (Moe & Gilmour, 1995, p. 138).”  This broad definition is necessary because 
legal accountability can differ in appearance based on the official or organization that is 
taking the action and on the type of situation that is involved (Cooper P. J., 2007; Moe & 
Gilmour, 1995; Rohr, 1986).  It also depends upon the type of legal question that is raised 
for resolution.  For example, legal accountability can depend on whether an issue is 
constitutional, statute-based, procedural or factual (Cooper P. J., 2007; Moe & Gilmour, 
1995; Rohr, 1986).   
As to the official and organization, the choice of rule is based on whether the 
action comes from Congress, an administrative agency or concerns an individual official 
or municipal corporation (Cooper P. J., 2007; Moe & Gilmour, 1995; Rohr, 1986).  These 
decisions are then also informed by case law in an Anglo-American common law system.  
The last is the basic point: legal accountability exists when authority for action and the 
mechanisms for tracking such action lie within the legal system itself. 
Performance-Based Management Accountability: 
This study shall find that performance-based management accountability (often 
called performance accountability) exists when we find that measureable standards are 
used in an attempt to improve government efficiency and effectiveness.  This stems from 
the basic tenet of this approach, which is the assumption that government is inherently 
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inefficient and ineffective.  In order to fix this problem, government should use its 
resources in a way that most efficiently produces “performance” via measureable 
standard, such as those used in the private sector (Behn, 2001, pp. 152-155; DeLeon, 
1998; Kassel, 2008; Radin, 2006, pp. 240-244).  Performance accountability argues that 
waste and ineffectiveness can only be determined by utilizing measureable standards.  
The standards are applied in combination with financial auditing by OMB, the GAO and 
other agencies so that the government and the public will be able to determine how 
effective government is and how government can best utilize its resources 
(ExpectMore.gov, 2009).  Tools such as OMB’s Program Assessment Rating Tool 
(PART) provide examples that have been used to measure whether agencies have met 
these standards (ExpectMore.gov, 2009). 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY: GENERALIZABILITY, TIME FRAME, LIMITED 
MODEL CHOICE AND NO POLICY EVALUATION 
 Every study has its limitations.  In this case, there are four main ones.  First, due 
to the unique nature of both the events that led to the creation of TARP and ARRA as 
well as TARP and ARRA themselves, it might well be that some of the policy tool 
choices are not representative of a typical case.  Alternatively it might be the case that the 
nexus between a particular policy tool and the accountability model that explains it might 
be different than what one might normally see.  This study presents the analysis as a 
critical case study in which the issues are drawn more clearly than normal.  However, the 
strength of critical case studies is that they can isolate key relationships and address 
important questions as well as general hypotheses.  Indeed, it is in such dramatic cases 
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that the relationships among the varied models and their explanations of behavior would, 
or at least should, be particularly clear and significant. 
 A second potential limitation of this study is related to the limited time frame in 
which the case is considered (September 2008-end of January 2010).  It is likely true that 
more data and perhaps more findings would result if this time frame were extended.  
However, in a case study situation, a critical concern is always balancing the value of the 
additional data with the complexity that expanding the case might bring.  While 
additional data will develop over time as to these policies and some data already exists 
for the period after the end point of this study, the emphasis here is on policy formulation 
and not on implementation.  The case already contains more than enough data to examine 
the policy tool choices, their development and implementation. 
 Third, on a related point, a potential limitation is the choice to focus on only four 
of the eight accountability models discussed in the literature review.  It is possible that 
including the four additional models would increase the value of this study at some level.  
Nonetheless, when doing research one must always balance the value of any additional 
findings with the complexity the additional areas of focus add.  It is certainly the case that 
future research to examine the explanatory power of the other four models along with the 
findings of this study could be valuable.  A further discussion of this point is contained in 
chapter two. 
 Fourth, a potential limitation of this study is that it does nothing to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the policy tools choice or the resulting policy. It might well be 
interesting, for example, to see whether there might be a difference between the 
effectiveness of particular policy tools and whether the accountability model that best 
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explains the tool choice is a factor in their effectiveness.  That is another study for 
another day, however, and does not fit within the bounds of this study.  The question of 
the choice of any particular policy tool is not a statement about whether it was the best 
choice or even a good choice.   
Conclusion: 
 This chapter has introduced the study, described the methodology and standards 
of analysis as well as the data collection method and some limitations of the study.  The 
next chapter will discuss the state of the accountability and policy tools literature and 
more fully explicate the literature gaps this study intends to address.    
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Chapter 2: Framing Policy Tools and Accountability Models  
Introduction: 
 While the first chapter focused primarily on laying out the basic groundwork for 
the study as well as the methodology and research strategy, this chapter will focus on the 
state of the literature.  It will do so in three parts.  First, it will explain the state of policy 
tools research in order to frame that essential part of this study.  Second, it will explain 
the state of the accountability literature as well as discuss why this study chooses to focus 
on four particular accountability models.  Third, it will describe in greater detail the 
literature gaps and how this study intends to address them.  This chapter will thus make 
clear the state of policy tools and accountability research, the existing literature gaps, 
why these gaps are important and how this study will address them. 
FRAMING THE ANALYSIS: ACCOUNTABILITY MODELS, POLICY TOOL 
CHOICES AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISMS 
As discussed in the introduction, this proposal asks how effectively accountability 
models explain the policy tool choices chosen to address accountability issues in TARP 
and ARRA.  In order to best explain the policy tool choices in TARP and ARRA, the 
study will focus on the explanatory power of the four main accountability models most 
commonly discussed in the accountability literature.  These are: (1) political; (2) 
professional bureaucratic; (3) legal and (4) performance.  While the other four models 
discussed below might well add some value to this study, they are not as important to 
either the practical or theoretical development of the accountability literature.  The 
following paragraphs will discuss policy tools literature so that one can understand what 
is meant when policy tool choices are discussed. 
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Public administration scholars Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram define policy 
tools as, “techniques the government uses to achieve policy goals (Schneider & Ingram, 
1990, p. 527).”  The study of such tools represents one of the most important fields of 
new research in modern public administration (Salamon, 2001; Salamon, 2002).   As 
Lester Salamon writes, “A massive proliferation has occurred in the tools of public 
actions, in the instruments or means used to address public problems.  Whereas earlier 
government action was largely restricted to the direct delivery of goods or services by 
government bureaucrats, it now embraces a dizzying array of loans, loan guarantees, 
grants, contacts, social regulations, economic regulations, insurance, tax expenditures, 
vouchers and more (Salamon, 2002, pp. 1-2) (emphasis in original).”   
 Salamon argues that there are thirteen different policy tools that government 
generally uses when designing public policy (Salamon, 2002, p. 21).  They are: (1) direct 
government; (2) social regulation; (3) economic regulation; (4) contracting; (5) grants; 
(6) direct loans; (7) loan guarantees; (8) insurance; (9) tax expenditures; (10) fees and 
charges; (11) liability law; (12) government corporations and (13) vouchers (Salamon, 
2002, p. 21).  Each of these tools has three primary characteristics: (1) a product/activity 
in which it engages, (2) a vehicle it uses to implement this product/activity and (3) a 
delivery system to carry out the specific implementation of the product/activity (Salamon, 
2002, p. 21).2   
Yet, not all policy tools are created equal.  As Cooper writes, “there are two types 
of devices involved in the general category that is termed “policy tools” and that should 
                                                           
2
 Salamon has a chart of each of his thirteen policy tools and their product/activity vehicle and delivery 
system on page 21 of his book. (Salamon, 2002, p. 21).   
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be recognized as distinct (Cooper P. J., 2009, pp. 230-231).”  Cooper titles these two 
groups “policy mechanisms (Cooper P. J., 2009, p. 231)” and “policy instruments 
(Cooper P. J., 2009, p. 231).”  Policy mechanisms are “devices that operate on the basis 
of some identifiable mobile force that makes them attractive to use in certain 
circumstances (Cooper P. J., 2009, p. 231).”  These policy mechanisms are, in Cooper’s 
view, well encapsulated in Salamon’s list of policy tools (Cooper P. J., 2009, p. 231; 
Salamon, 2002, p. 21). 
By contrast, policy instruments are the “authoritative policy documents and 
processes that put those devices into operation (Cooper P. J., 2009, p. 231).”  They are, in 
short, the actual resulting policies themselves, such as statutes, regulations, treaties and 
executive orders (Cooper P. J., 2009, pp. 230-231).  Cooper argues that is important to 
recognize this distinction because policy mechanisms and policy instruments operate on 
“different principles (Cooper P. J., 2009, p. 231)” and thus must be considered to be 
distinct, if closely related, phenomena. 
For the purposes of this research, we focused primarily on what Cooper would 
call policy mechanisms (Cooper P. J., 2009, p. 231) .  This is because while the 
overarching policy itself is clearly a policy instrument, the main level at which 
accountability models operate is believed to be at the mechanism level.  Although it is 
certainly true that exploring the intersection of policy instruments and accountability 
models might well be a future research topic worth pursuing, it was not pursued here. 
 Since these policy tools lend themselves so well to comparison with our 
accountability models, and since they are well accepted within the field, this study will 
frame the study of each of its accountability models in policy tools literature.  This will 
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allow for the analysis of this case and these four models to be doubly grounded in the 
established literature of both policy tools and accountability models.  The following 
section will discuss in more detail the research process and data collection strategy this 
study proposes to utilize. 
THE ACCOUNTABILITY LITERATURE: DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
PROBLEM AND HOW TO ADRESS IT:  
British scholar Peter Barberis wrote that, “the main components of accountability 
are set out under five headings: who is accountable; for what; to whom (or what); through 
what mechanism; and with what kind of accountability outcome (Barberis, 1998, p. 
466).”  Each model of accountability discussed in the literature answers these questions 
in different ways.  Eight primary models of accountability are commonly discussed in the 
literature: (1) political accountability; (2) professional bureaucratic; (3) legal 
accountability; (4) performance-based; (5) ethical; (6) market; (7) 
managerial/organizational and (8) contract.  All of these accountability models provide a 
different answer to the five questions posed by Barberis and thus address different ways 
of ensuring accountable governance.   
Yet for all the accountability literature that exists, there still exist three major gaps 
in the literature.  First, there is the false assumption that there is one universally best 
model of accountability; second, there is a lack of side by side testing of accountability 
models, third, there is lack of literature matching policy tools and accountability models 
in policy design.  This study seeks to address these gaps. 
  This chapter will provide a description of each model, as well as a discussion of 
policy tools, including its leading figures, theoretical bases and primary approaches 
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(sometimes called decision rules). While only the first four models discussed will be 
examined in full due to the fact that they dominate the accountability literature, it is 
important to examine the full state of the literature before continuing. The study develops 
these models more fully when they are applied in the following chapters; the purpose 
here is primarily to introduce them so as to explain the varied approaches and the 
problems that remain despite these approaches.   
Political Model: Accountability through Representation and Oversight 
The oldest and most established accountability model in the literature is political 
accountability.  It traces its roots back to Aristotle’s politics, through Locke’s treatises on 
government, then through the federalists and beyond to modern political scientists such 
as Fenno and Mayhew (Aristotle, 350 BCE; Fenno, 1978; Finer, 1941; Hamilton, Jay, & 
Madison, 1787-1788; Locke, 1689; Mayhew, 2004).  It ranges in scope from broad 
treatments of political theory, to the relationship between politics and administration, and 
to contemporary debates about the operation of political systems.  Yet while the way 
authors have described political accountability has differed throughout the model’s long 
history, the guiding theoretical bases and decision rules are all grounded in the political 
as the core focus of accountability judgments. 
There are three basic theoretical bases for political accountability that are 
commonly employed in this literature:  First and foremost, political accountability 
focuses on pursuing the public good, whether narrowly defined in terms of a single 
member of Congress or broadly defined as the nation as a whole or in terms of what has 
been called the “virtuous life (Aristotle, 350 BCE, pp. Book I-2)”.  While the definition 
of public good in any case can be problematic, the principle on which is based is doing 
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what is in the best interest of the public, or at least the best interest of most of the public 
(Finer, 1941, pp. 335-338; Storing, 1964, pp. 40-42).  Second and perhaps most 
importantly, political accountability relies on being within a legitimized and accepted 
system in order to be effective (Mayhew, 2004, pp. 110-115).  Thus, political 
accountability is commonly thought to require a formally accepted political system since 
it draws its power from the legitimacy of the system itself.  Third, political accountability 
relies on following the political processes of its system in order to ensure accountability 
(Mayhew, 2004, pp. 110-115).  In other words, political accountability is defined as 
primarily based on process and not necessarily outcomes.   
There are three primary approaches that those who utilize political accountability 
often employ in their decision of how policymakers who operate from the political 
perspective actually make their decisions.  First, political accountability is utilized in 
cases where authority or responsibility for action exists within a system (Mayhew, 2004, 
pp. 110-115).  In the American system, for example, Congress has the responsibility to 
oversee the federal bureaucracy (Finer, 1941, pp. 335-338).  The act of doing so is by 
itself an act of political accountability.  Second, actors utilizing political accountability 
must consider whether their actions are in concert with the interests of other political 
actors and stakeholders (Fenno, 1978, pp. 133-138; Mayhew, 2004, pp. 22-25).  This is 
particularly true in the modern context, with its focus on interest groups and on building 
coalitions.  Third, political accountability is called on when a problem is perceived as a 
political, and not a professional or mechanical, problem (Fenno, 1978, pp. 133-138).  If 
there is a public outcry to respond to a particular problem, it almost by definition 
becomes political.  Lacking such an outcry, a problem can often be handled within the 
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existing professional bureaucratic system and thus may not rely on political 
accountability (Finer, 1941, pp. 335-338).  Scope does not matter to this last point as a 
political problem can be either large or small in scope.  It is the fact that it is or becomes 
a political problem that counts. 
The Professional Bureaucratic Model: Trusting the Professional Expertise of 
Administrators to Act in the Public Interest  
The history of professional bureaucratic accountability (more commonly called 
professional or bureaucratic accountability) is largely the history of modern public 
administration, and it traces its roots back to Woodrow Wilson’s well-known 1886 
treatise on public administration (Wilson W. , 1886).  The professional bureaucratic 
model evolved during the progressive era reforms that sought to borrow skills in 
administration of public programs and institutions from the emerging professions, 
including the scientific management movement.  The model thus developed as it was 
becoming increasingly apparent that “the amount and complexity of specialized skill 
required in connection with every kind of human enterprise (has) vastly increased 
(Urwick, 1937, p. 51)” and that technically skilled public administrators were needed 
order to handle these complexities.  Wilson’s famous article made clear that one needed 
to get beyond mere discussions of the political aspects of public work to look at the 
techniques by which it was carried out.  Indeed by the 1930s when Gulick and Urwick 
edited “The papers on the science of administration,” the focus had shifted almost 
completely to the political aspects (Friedrich, Beyer, Spero, Miller, & Graham, 1935; 
Urwick, 1937; Wilson W. , 1886).  The more complex aspect to come was a discussion 
started by Fredrich and Finer and further developed by authors like Long and Levitan 
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about the role that professional public administrators would play in accomplishing tasks 
professionally within a political setting (Levitan, 1946, pp. 565-575; Long, 1952, pp. 
809-812; Long, 1954, pp. 23-25).  This argument is more commonly known as the 
professional vs. political balancing act, and it remains one of the more enduring debates 
in public administration to this day. 
The theoretical basis of the professional bureaucratic model is the assumption that 
the best way for government to remain accountable is by utilizing the technical expertise 
of professional administrators (Friedrich, Beyer, Spero, Miller, & Graham, 1935, pp. 58-
65).  Accountable governance should therefore concern itself primarily with doing what 
is in the long-range interests of the public (Friedrich, Beyer, Spero, Miller, & Graham, 
1935; Jackson, 2009, pp. 66-70; Mulgan, 2000, pp. 555-560).  This is intended to help 
counterbalance the political leadership of many government branches and to help make 
sure that governance is both responsive to the political needs and wants of the day and 
mindful of long-term goals and responsibilities (Friedrich, Beyer, Spero, Miller, & 
Graham, 1935; Jackson, 2009, pp. 66-70; Mulgan, 2000, pp. 555-560).  In short, the role 
of public administrators is to be a steadying force to help ensure accountable and 
effective governance and delivery of services, even as the political winds invariably shift 
over time. 
 Approaches utilizing this model primarily focus on determining three items: (1) 
what the public needs as judged by a professional assessment of problems, contexts and 
opportunities; (2) what is in the public’s best long term interests once short term political 
demands are filtered out and professional judgment is applied; and (3) how best to utilize 
professional and technical expertise to meet these interests (Levitan, 1946, pp. 565-575; 
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Long, 1952, pp. 809-812; Long, 1954, pp. 23-25). What separates this from the political 
model is this essential focus on professionals determining how to serve the public 
interests rather than responding only to the short term political demands of those in power 
at any one time.  The reasoning is that while political changes may and will occur with 
some regularity, the day to day administration of the public’s business has to able to 
respond to a range of requirements including representation of the long term public 
interest as viewed by professionals (Levitan, 1946, pp. 565-575; Long, 1952, pp. 809-
812; Long, 1954, pp. 23-25).  Professional administrators are needed to ensure the quality 
of the large body of work that is not political and to assure that  longer term matters have 
their lower order politics adjusted by professional knowledge and values (Friedrich, 
Beyer, Spero, Miller, & Graham, 1935, pp. 58-65). 
The Legal Model: The Core Role of Law as a Basis for Governance, Judicial Review, 
Monitoring and Consistent Processes 
 Legal accountability enjoys a long and storied history, and it is probably the 
oldest model of accountability other than political accountability.  It is based on the 
principal that, as Robert Christensen writes, “the essence of public administration is the 
detailed and systematic execution of the public law (Christensen, 2009, p. 602).”   More 
specifically, it operates from the assumption that we operate under the rule of supremacy 
of law, which makes public administration and questions of accountability very different 
from the private sector.  This topic has been discussed by many authors over the years, 
including Moe, Gilmour, Cooper and Rohr among others, and it is also often implied, if 
not also expressly discussed, in many legal decisions (Cooper P. J., 2007; Moe & 
Gilmour, 1995; Rohr, 1986). 
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The theoretical basis of legal accountability is that, “the actions of governmental 
officials must have their basis in public law, not in the pecuniary interests of private 
entrepreneurs and owners or in the fiduciary concerns of public managers (Moe & 
Gilmour, 1995, p. 138).”  Indeed, what makes government different from the private or 
even the non-profit sector is that in the end, responsibility is due to the system of laws 
itself and not to any individual.  Those who argue for legal accountability argue that this 
reliance on legal systems is essential for effective governance (Gilmour & Jensen, 1998; 
Moe & Gilmour, 1995; Rosenbloom & Piotrowski, 2005).  This explains why those who 
rely strongly on legal accountability are deeply troubled by trends such as government 
privatization, which can result in a “wholesale loss of government accountability 
(Gilmour & Jensen, 1998, p. 247).” Legal accountability additionally serves as the basis 
for legitimate governance according to these authors since those who govern must have 
the authority to act and do so within the limits of the law.  These authors believe that it is 
the departure from this approach that has created difficulty in contemporary governance 
(Moe R. C., 1987, pp. 453-454).  As Ronald Moe wrote, “a line must separate that which 
is public or governmental (while other meanings of public are important, these terms are 
used here interchangeably), and that which is private.  The configuration of the line may 
vary over time and with circumstances, but it is a vital line nonetheless and the 
fundamental basis of the line is to be found in public law, not in economic or behavioral 
theories (Moe R. C., 1987, p. 454).”  This connection between government action and 
public laws is thus viewed as the core of American governance and therefore of 
accountability. 
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Legal accountability has a number of well-established approaches based on the 
official or organization that is taking action and on the type of situation that is involved 
(Cooper P. J., 2007; Moe & Gilmour, 1995; Rohr, 1986).  Legal accountability also 
depends upon the type of legal question that is raised for resolution.  Thus, decisions 
about which rules to apply and how to apply them depend on whether the issue is 
constitutional, statute-based, procedural or factual (Cooper P. J., 2007; Moe & Gilmour, 
1995; Rohr, 1986).  As to the official and organization, the choice of rule is based on 
whether the action comes from Congress, an administrative agency or concerns an 
individual official or municipal corporation (Cooper P. J., 2007; Moe & Gilmour, 1995; 
Rohr, 1986).  These decisions are then also informed by case law in an Anglo-American 
common law system.  What follows are the five main situations in which legal 
accountability applies and how it is implemented in each case. 
   First, legal accountability can be used as a check to ensure that government 
action has legal authority to support it, is exercised within an appropriate jurisdiction and 
does not violate other provisions of law.  In this kind of situation, courts must decide 
whether the agency’s actions exceed this standard or, if not, whether they violate 
someone’s constitutional rights (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 1984; US Code, 2007, p. 5 USC. 706(2)(A).  In the 2007 Supreme Court 
decision Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, for example, the US 
Supreme Court found that the EPA’s decision not to regulate carbon dioxide emissions 
was arbitrary and capricious and thus invalid (Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2007).  There are many such legal decisions that have helped define the reach 
and therefore the limits of government discretion and authority. 
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 The second type of situation in which the legal accountability model applies is 
when an agency official is accused of violating criminal or civil law (Cooper P. J., 2007, 
pp. 247-250).  In such a case, the agency itself or a designated individual such as an 
inspector general or prosecutor investigates the complaint and then determines who may 
have violated the law and what administrative, criminal or civil sanctions to recommend 
(Cooper P. J., 2007, pp. 247-250; US Code, 2008, pp. PL 110-409).  The focus is on 
individual guilt or innocence, not necessarily on the problems of the system itself, as in 
the inspector general system (US Code, 2011).  This focus on a single case and not on the 
system as a whole is in fact a hallmark of legal accountability since, at least in the 
American context, the focus is on a case by case basis and not on the whole. 
 The third type situation involving legal accountability concerns contract disputes 
in which the court’s role is both to supervise the dispute and then decide, as a matter of 
fact or law, how the dispute should be resolved (Cooper P. J., 2003, p. 145).  The focus is 
on a case-specific application of the law without any necessary referral to the public 
interest.  For example, in the case of Hughes Aircraft v. United States, the US Supreme 
Court decided that a contractor was not subject to punishment for filing a false claim 
since such filings were not against the law at the time they were made (Hughes Aircraft 
Company v. United States, 1997).  This decision was reached because even though the 
prevention of false claims is in the public interest, upholding the law itself, and not the 
public interest, is the core value of the legal model (Cooper P. J., 2003, p. 145). 
 Fourth, legal accountability is used as a way of ensuring compliance with 
government obligations and standards.  For example, under ARRA, any state agency that 
has “received a Notification of Award (NOA) of $25,000 or greater for American 
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Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) fund (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 
2010)” is required to do full reporting of all expenditures of funds on a quarterly basis 
(Recovery.gov, 2009; Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2010).  The standards for 
whether these reports are considered acceptable are the legal standards laid out in the 
language of ARRA itself.  Thus, legal accountability can be used, on a case by case basis, 
to ensure that legal standards are met. 
 Fifth, legal accountability is used to help ensure that the processes, if not 
outcomes, are consistent (Breyer, 2005, pp. 17-21).  Every person might not receive the 
same outcome, but they should receive the same process (Breyer, 2005, p. 18).  This 
might seem to be more of a bureaucratic problem, since, after all, government 
bureaucracies are formed with the intent of standardizing procedures but it is indeed a 
legal one because it has its very roots in that most fundamental of American legal 
documents, the US Constitution and specifically the 5th and 14th amendments (Breyer, 
2005).  Cases in this area prove that legal accountability is essential to ensuring that due 
process, and perhaps more importantly, consistent process, are applied in cases of 
government action.   
The Performance-Based Management Model: Measureable Standards for Success 
 If one reads the literature of performance accountability, one might get the 
impression that it is a new model.  It is not and instead traces its history back to the 
scientific management movement of the 1920s and 30s.  As Harvey Walker wrote in 
1937, “the objective of administration is to secure the maximum beneficial result 
contemplated by the law with the minimum expenditure of the social resources (Walker, 
1937, p. 8).”  The way to do this, Walker suggested, was via performance measures 
33 
 
(Walker, 1937, p. 8).  Indeed, the famous “Papers on the Science of Administration” 
spend a great deal of time discussing how to apply scientific management to government 
work (Gulick & Urwick, 1937).    This model’s authors tend to come from a mix of 
private and public sector backgrounds and include Gore, Ostrom, Radin and Behn among 
others (Behn, 2001; Gore, 1995; Ostrom, 2008; Radin, 2006). 
Performance-based management starts with the assumption that government is 
inherently inefficient and ineffective.  In order to fix this problem, government should 
use its resources in a way that most efficiently produces “performance” via measureable 
standards, such as those used in the private sector (Behn, 2001, pp. 152-155; DeLeon, 
1998; Kassel, 2008; Radin, 2006, pp. 240-244). This philosophy was well expressed by 
President Obama in a speech to Congress in 2009 when he said, “My administration has 
also begun to go line by line through the federal budget in order to eliminate wasteful and 
ineffective programs (Obama, 2009c).”  Such waste and ineffectiveness, performance 
accountability argues, can only be minimized by utilizing measureable standards. 
 The approaches used by performance-based management combine application of 
these performance standards with financial auditing by OMB, the GAO and other 
agencies, government and the public will be able to determine how effective government 
is and how government can best utilize its resources (ExpectMore.gov, 2009).  Tools 
such as OMB’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) have been employed to 
measure whether agencies have met these standards (ExpectMore.gov, 2009).  Programs 
that perform well under these standards should in theory be rewarded with increased 
funds while those that do not should either reform to meet these standards or face cuts, or 
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even possibly elimination (Behn, 2001, pp. 152-155; ExpectMore.gov, 2009).  Whether 
this actually happens in practice, however, is open to much debate. 
Market Accountability: Public Choice and a Private Sector Approach 
Market accountability is, for some, the parent of performance accountability and 
carries echoes of one of the more constant refrains in modern American political 
discourse: government needs to run more like a private business (Crawford & Bryce, 
2001; DeLeon, 1998, p. 2; Ostrom, 2008, p. xii).  Nevertheless, the lines between the 
models are not as clear as that even though some of the main proponents of this model 
are also advocate a performance approach.  
The theoretical basis of market accountability is that government needs to think of 
itself less as a regulator and more as a market participant (Ostrom, 2008, p. xii).  
Proponents of this model assert that the market will monitor itself and thus maintain 
accountability because it is in the interest of the market to do effective work in much the 
same way that government does (Ostrom, 2008, p. xii).  Market accountability can be 
defined fairly broadly, much like a continuum.  Those on one end of the continuum argue 
that the basis should be usage of efficiency criteria in the way that private sector actors 
would use them while the those on other end argue that government should use the type 
of decentralized decision making employed in the marketplace (Moe T. M., 2002; 
Ostrom, 2008).   
Market accountability’s approaches therefore follow a private-sector efficiency-
based model for determining success.  This is a model in which efficiency is determined 
in market terms, either in respect to cost, market comparisons or market choice as in 
public choice models, such as vouchers (DeLeon, 1998, pp. 539-542; Ostrom, 2008, pp. 
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47-54).  Often, the model boils down to the basic decision rule that whatever produces 
the most for the least is superior, whether or not it is a private sector or government 
approach and regardless of the area being discussed.  Whether this is true is a matter of 
debate (Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 40-46). 
Unlike performance accountability, market accountability does not regard any 
function of government as necessarily needing to be performed by the government itself 
(Chubb & Moe, 1988, pp. 1067-1070; Ostrom, 2008, p. 16; Savas, 2000, pp. 237-258).  
If, for example, public safety services could be provided more efficiently by the private 
sector, market accountability would suggest that this path be taken even though public 
safety is viewed by virtually every other accountability model as an inherently 
governmental function.  Also unlike performance accountability, the standards for 
determining success under market accountability come from the marketplace and, at 
most, include limited input from the public sector (Ostrom, 2008, pp. 47-54).  Whereas in 
performance accountability, agencies such as the OMB and GAO play a key role in 
setting and enforcing standards, market accountability does not believe their input should 
matter much, if at all. 
Ethical Model: Subjective Standards Based on Various Ethical Norms 
Even though the law may mean different things in different contexts, decisions 
arising in cases of legal accountability still begin from the rules and laws as they are 
written.  Ethical accountability is not so clearly defined.  Instead it is based on value 
choices which are then framed as accountability rules.  A number of theorists have 
approached ethical accountability from different perspectives, including Terry Cooper, 
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John Rohr, Anthony Downs and Joseph Fletcher (Cooper T. L., 2006; Downs, 1965; 
Fletcher, 1965; Rohr, 1989) 
There are three primary considerations with regard to the theoretical basis for 
ethical accountability.  First, ethical accountability is based in the fundamental belief 
system of a group, culture or person (Fletcher, 1965; Rohr, 1989).  In short, they are the 
morals or values of different individuals or groups.  Second, ethical accountability is 
unchecked by any formal system (Fletcher, 1965; Rohr, 1989).  While formal systems 
may certainly rely on ethical accountability, the essential check with regard to ethical 
systems is through informal systems in which group norms may result in pressure for 
conformity but not in the same manner as formal rules.  Third, ethical accountability 
changes relatively slowly because it is typically based on closely held values which are 
not themselves easily changed (Rohr, 1989, pp. 65-75).  This is unlike legal 
accountability, where change in the legal system can happen much more quickly since it 
does not rely on changing closely held values. 
Although many types of ethical accountability that exist within modern 
government, three are particularly important.  First, the regime ethics approach relies on a 
society’s values for determining what the correct path to follow is.  As John Rohr writes, 
“Regime values refer to the values of that political entity that was brought into being by 
the ratification of the Constitution that created the present American republic. (Rohr, 
1989, p. 68)”   Government should therefore be accountable on the basis of the regime’s 
values expressed formally through its law and informally through society at large (Rohr, 
1989, pp. 68-75).   
37 
 
The second approach to ethical accountability is known as the personal ethics 
model and asserts that professionals are best able to determine whether their actions are 
ethical (Cooper P. J., 2007, p. Ch. 13).  This is similar to the professional bureaucratic 
model in that professionals make the key decisions.  The key distinction is that there is no 
necessary check on the exercise of individual ethical decision-making, arguably leading 
to a hodgepodge of disparate ethical choices (Cooper P. J., 2007, p. Ch. 13; Downs, 
1967).   
The third approach to ethical accountability is situational ethics and involves the 
substitution of personal or organizational principles or criteria in place of what would 
otherwise be regarded as recognized or accepted legal and moral criteria (Fletcher, 1965; 
Price, 2006).  As Joseph Fletcher writes in his classic "Situation Ethics", this kind of 
ethics, “calls upon us to keep law in a subservient place, so that only love and reason 
really count when the chips are down (Fletcher, 1965, p. 31). (Emphasis in original)”  
Situational ethics are oftentimes referred to in other literature as “groupthink (Janis, 1972, 
p. 9)” since they often result from justifications of otherwise unethical actions taken by 
groups.  This is particularly important for public administrators since they must often 
balance not only legal but ethical concerns as well (Cooper T. L., 2006, pp. 66-84).  As 
Terry Cooper’s well-known decision making model shows, the appropriate decision for a 
public administrator requires balancing moral rules, considering alternatives that fit 
within an organization’s norms, consulting ethical principles and then finally seeing if the 
resulting decision fits within a person’s moral framework (Cooper T. L., 2006, p. 20).  
This application of situational ethics is not easy to do but is nonetheless essential to 
effective and accountable public administration. 
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Managerial/Organizational Accountability: Looking at Accountability from a Leadership 
Point of View 
Closely related to the professional/bureaucratic model is the so-called managerial 
model.  What differentiates the two is that this model focuses on managerial decisions 
rather than on day to day decisions by professional public administrators.  This model 
relies on the work of organizational theorists such as Mintzberg, Perrow and Romzek and 
Ingraham. 
 The theory behind this model is that accountability is ensured primarily by 
balancing formal and informal systems in an organizational setting from a management 
perspective (Mintzberg, 1983, pp. 23-28; Perrow, 1986; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000, pp. 
242-243).  This model is most concerned with what drives management decisions, with 
the model positing several considerations that managers balance based on the situation 
(Romzek & Dubnick, 1987, pp. 227-230).     
As for its decision rules, Romzek and Ingraham provide one approach by positing 
that there are four main types of accountability--two formal and two informal (Romzek & 
Ingraham, 2000, pp. 242-243).  They are: (1) traditional hierarchical accountability, 
which relies on maintaining accountability via formal top-down organizational methods; 
(2) legal accountability, which relies on formal compliance with external legal constraints 
and laws; (3) professional accountability, which relies on informally allowing 
professional discretion to play a role in key day to day decisions; and (4) political 
accountability, which relies on informal responsiveness to external stakeholders, whether 
they are politicians, interest groups or simply the public at large (Romzek & Ingraham, 
2000, pp. 242-243).  Under this model, those at the top begin the formal decision-making 
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process by setting basic goals about what an organization can and should do (Mintzberg, 
1983, pp. 23-28; Perrow, 1986; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000, pp. 242-243).  Internal, often 
hidden, processes then influence how these decisions are actually implemented.   
Contract Accountability: Negotiated Relationships in the Public Eye 
While legal accountability focuses primarily on vertical relationships within the 
legal system, contract accountability focuses on the horizontal relationships that exist 
throughout the entire contracting process.  Since modern government contracts out so 
much of its work, contracting accountability has become a primary concern for modern 
governance.  It relies heavily on the work of theorists such as Cooper and Keyes (Cooper 
P. J., 2003; Keyes, 2000)   
From a theoretical perspective, contracting accountability focuses on how best to 
manage contractual relationships in order to get a good deal for the public (Cooper P. J., 
2003, pp. 1-13).  This relationship is essentially negotiated and yet must operate in a 
public setting (Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 1-13).  This requires that accountability operate at 
the intersection of both the private relationship between multiple parties and the public 
nature of government work (Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 1-13).  At its root, contracts are 
individual sets of relationships, each with its own rules of operation and requirements for 
accountability.   
The decision rules of contracting accountability rely on a complex balance of six 
main factors: (1) economy or cost; (2) efficiency; (3) effectiveness; (4) responsiveness to 
the public; (5) responsibility or accountability to the government and (6) equity (Cooper 
P. J., 2003, pp. 1-7) .  Contracting choices inevitably involve trade-offs between these 
criteria (Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 1-7).  For example, a focus on economy, which typically 
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means a lower-priced contract, will often require a higher level of continuing 
governmental oversight and thus may cost more to make accountable than a low-cost 
contract (Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 143-155; Strayhorn, 2006, pp. 28-38).  
As noted above, a focus on contract accountability throughout the process is 
essential because, among other things, a contract is a negotiated agreement that can be 
changed at any time.  Particularly with longer-term contracts, one must assume that 
conditions will change and that there will be a need for what are known as change orders 
(Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 106-108; Keyes, 2000, pp. 14-22).  Although some contractors 
may have a history of abusing change orders, most change orders are necessary parts of 
the contracting process due to changing market conditions, such as an increase in fuel or 
steel prices (Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 106-108; Keyes, 2000, pp. 474-476).   
WHY THESE FOUR MODELS? IMPORTANCE TO THE LITERATURE, 
APPLICABILTY TO THE CASE AND DELINEATION OF DIFFERENCES 
The question has been asked why this study chose to focus only on political, 
performance, professional and legal accountability.  While there is certainly a case to be 
made that other models have value, the choice of these four models is proper for three 
primary reasons.  First, the four selected models are all important to contemporary 
accountability literature.  Political accountability is foundational to understanding both 
how politicians act to serve their own constituents as well as their role in overseeing the 
government.  Professional accountability is important to understanding how and why 
professional administrators act as they do.  Legal accountability is important to 
understanding how the legal system and the rule of law impact government action.  
Finally, performance accountability is important to understanding the value of numerical-
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based data in ensuring government efficiency and effectiveness.  Indeed, one could make 
an argument that the other four models highlighted in this chapter flow from these four 
basic models and there is strong evidence in the literature to suggest that.  The bottom 
line is that the literature review shows that these four models are more prominent and 
important than the other alternatives. 
Second, the four models chosen are clearly present in the cases chosen.  One does 
not have to look far to find examples of each of these models in both TARP and ARRA.   
In relation to TARP, for example, Congress authorized creation of both a special 
inspector general, which focused primarily on legal accountability, as well as a 
congressional oversight panel, which focused primarily on professional, performance and 
political accountability.  In relation to ARRA, the Recovery.gov website alone contains 
data such as “jobs created or saved (a classic exercise of political accountability as well 
as performance accountability) and the implementing regulations from OMB rely heavily 
on legal accountability and professional accountability in order to ensure their 
effectiveness (Recovery.gov, 2010).  Since these models are present in the case, they are 
clearly appropriate models for this case. 
Third, choosing these four models allows for fairly clear lines to be drawn 
between the models.  This is particularly important for legal and performance 
accountability.  If ethical accountability were added, the lines between what is a matter of 
legal accountability and what is a matter of ethical accountability could get blurred and 
make clear findings difficult.  In relation to performance accountability, were market 
accountability added, it could be difficult to distinguish between what is a market 
accountability-type standard and what is more traditional performance accountability 
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standard.  Therefore, to avoid this needless confusion, only these four models have been 
chosen. 
In the end, it is likely that including all eight of these models, instead of only four, 
could increase the value of this study in some respects.  However, the purpose here is to 
test individual models that are more widely used in the field and more importantly 
perhaps, are clearly at use in this case.  It is certainly the case that future research to 
examine the explanatory power of the other four models along with the findings of this 
study could be valuable. 
LITERATURE GAPS; SEPARABLE MODELS, LACK OF TESTING OF MODELS 
SIDE BY SIDE, LACK OF CONNECTION BTWEEN POLICY TOOLS AND 
ACCOUNTABILTY MODELS IN POLICY DESIGN  
 While the eight accountability models described above cover much of what 
government needs to consider in terms of accountability, there are three areas where the 
current literature falls short.  The first is that the literature posits that these models of 
accountability are separable and that there is generally one right way to ensure 
accountability.  The second is a lack of side by side testing of accountability models.  The 
third is a lack of connection between policy tools and accountability models in policy 
design.  These gaps will be briefly discussed in the section below. 
As stated above, the first literature gap this study will address is that the literature 
posits that these models of accountability are separable and that there is generally one 
right way to ensure accountability. For example, Ostrom argues that the best way to view 
accountability is a private-sector market-based approach while Mayhew argues that the 
best way is via a political approach (Mayhew, 2004, pp. 22-25; Ostrom, 2008, p. xii).  
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The fact of the matter is that there is no one right way to ensure accountability and that no 
accountability model exists in a vacuum by itself.  Instead, these accountability models 
are best applied in concert with one another.  For example, while it is clear that TARP is 
primarily concerned with performance-based accountability as one can see through its 
limited rules on the expenditure of funds by TARP recipients, TARP also utilizes at least 
three other models: (1) political accountability (through the creation of the Congressional 
Oversight Panel (COP)), (2) legal accountability (through the monitoring of the Special 
Inspector General for TARP (SIGTARP) and (3) to a certain extent, professional 
accountability (as a result of the fair amount of discretion given to the US Treasury in 
dispersing TARP funds) (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009; SIGTARP, 2009).    It is 
this study’s assertion that any one model alone only explains, at best, part of the policy 
tool choices in either of these two cases. 
 Second, the literature consists largely of authors who advocate their particular 
model and thus do not present side by side applications with other models.  For example, 
Robert Behn writes repeatedly that the only correct way to approach government 
accountability is to utilize “tactics and strategies that seek to enhance the performance of 
the public sector-to improve the ability of government agencies and their nonprofit and 
for-profit collaborators to produce results (emphasis in original) (Behn, 2001, p. 26).”  
Behn is but one example of the accountability literature’s refusal to utilize a comparative 
side by side approach.  It is this study’s belief that utilizing a multi-model approach will 
explain significantly more than a single-model approach. 
 Third, there exists a lack of literature connecting accountability models and policy 
tools are applied together in policy design.  This is somewhat understandable as policy 
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tools are a relatively new field and the literature as a whole is still relatively small.  This 
study believes addressing this gap is important because if we are to be able to design 
accountable policies, knowing which accountability models match up best with which 
policy tools will help us do.   While this study will not by itself fill this gap, it may go a 
fair distance to start to fill it. 
 These are not the only literature gaps present in the accountability literature.  
However, they represent three of the most important issues in accountability literature 
today.  Filling these gaps will significantly help improve the state of the literature. 
Conclusion: 
 Now that this study has outlined the study as a whole, its methodology and 
research strategy and the status of the literature, it will now proceed to discuss the two 
specific cases at hand.  In the next two chapters, first TARP and then ARRA will be 
described as a case and findings will be presented as to what the top policy tools were 
and the accountability models they appeared to rely upon.  This will set the stage for the 
final chapter where we will discuss what it all means for both the cases specifically and 
the literature as a whole. 
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Chapter 3: The Story of TARP 
 The following two chapters will discuss the background, policy tools and 
accountability models present in each of the two cases, beginning with TARP in this 
chapter.  This chapter will first describe the background of TARP and the history that led 
to the need for TARP.  Next, this chapter will describe how the policy was designed 
relative to policy tools and accountability models.  This chapter will then move on to 
discuss the top four policy tools used in TARP and which accountability models were 
applied in relation to each policy tool.  It will also discuss additional models that were 
expected to be used or asserted as being used but were not, in fact, utilized, such as 
economic regulation. 
 This chapter will reveal that there were four main policy tools used in relation to 
TARP and that three of the four policy tools (the exception being grants) can be at least 
partially explained by more than one accountability model.  This reveals that for the most 
part, the contention that multiple accountability models better explain policy tool choice 
is correct. 
This chapter will begin however, with a discussion of how TARP became 
necessary in the first place since this crisis was a long time coming.  As one 
Congressional Research Service report put it, “The roots of the crisis go back much 
further (Jickling, 2010, p. 2)” than just 2007-2008.  This chapter will then discuss how 
credit default swaps and derivatives work so as to explicate may understand the main 
factors that led to this crisis. 
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A PROBLEM LONG COMING: HOW DEREGULATION AND IGNORING 
WARNING SIGNS LED TO A FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 
 The financial crisis of 2008 did not come out of nowhere.  Something like it had 
been predicted for years but little was done to stop it.  Instead, the mantra of the 
beneficial effects of deregulation had been going since at least the Carter administration 
(Cooper P. J., 2009, pp. 15-21).   This section is divided into four components: first, the 
savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s, second, the deregulation of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, third, the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 and fourth, the corporate 
governance scandals of 2001-02.  Each of these events was a watershed moment in 
deregulation that helped lay the groundwork for the 2008 financial crisis.  
The Savings and Loan Crisis: 
 Savings and loans, also known by their original name of “thrifts”, trace their roots 
back to 1831, as a community-based, not-for-profit way to loan and save funds (Mason, 
2010, p. 1).  Before the creation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac after World War II, 
savings and loans were perhaps the primary way by which middle and lower income 
people were able to buy homes (Mason, 2010, pp. 1-2).  Savings and loans dealt 
primarily with what is known as an “amortizing mortgage”, in which a person paid back 
both the principal and the associated interest at the same time over an extended period 
(originally eight to ten years) (Mason, 2010, pp. 1-2).   This type of mortgage is the 
model for most home mortgages in the modern marketplace.  Indeed, a broad expansion 
in home ownership was exactly what the savings and loans wanted; they “believed they 
were part of a broader social reform effort and not a financial industry (Mason, 2010, pp. 
4-5).”   
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Savings and loans also had a specific advantage in that they could afford to 
provide higher interest rates to depositors since their loans were generally considered 
safer and it was much harder to withdraw funds because only limited amounts could be 
withdrawn at any time.  That, combined with longer term loans, led to rapid growth in the 
industry.  In 1945, savings and loans held about $8.7 billion in assets; by 1965 that sum 
had exploded to more than $129 billion.  By 1965 savings and loans controlled 26 percent 
of consumer savings and provided 46 percent of loans for single-family homes (United 
States Savings and Loan League, 1966, p. 92).    This threatened the established 
commercial banking sector, which engaged in rate wars in which banks and savings and 
loans would periodically increase interest rates for depositors (Mason, 2010, pp. 8-10).  
These rate wars became so severe that they ultimately prompted Congressional action.  
 In 1966, Congress passed laws setting specific rates for both banks and savings 
and loans, with savings and loans only being allowed to provide marginally higher rates 
than commercial banks (Mason, 2010).  This put dramatic limits on the industry’s growth 
and ended up leading to the consolidation of smaller savings and loans into larger ones.   
Although the assets held by savings and loans increased to $579 billion by 1979, the 
number of savings and loans plummeted from 6,071 in 1996 to 4,709 in 1979 (United 
States Savings and Loan League, 1980, pp. 48-51).  Even with increasing size, many in 
the savings and loan industry still argued that regulation was holding them back.  With 
demand rising to deregulate the industry and a favorable attitude towards deregulation set 
by President Carter, Congress passed laws removing rate controls in 1979 (Mason, 2010, 
pp. 7-8).  This proved not to be enough to help savings and loans as the doubling of oil 
prices led to both higher interest and inflation, threatening the savings and loan industry 
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as a whole (Mason, 2010, pp. 7-8).  In response, Congress passed two laws, the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. 
Germain Act of 1982, which together allowed savings and loans to act like banks and not 
just home lenders, but without the oversight that was a part of normal commercial banks 
(Mason, 2010, pp. 9-10).    
 For a while, this appeared to work.  Even though some savings and loans failed, 
the industry grew as a whole.  Nonetheless, problems quickly emerged.  Lender fraud and 
corruption became epidemic, with the failure of Empire Savings in Texas costing 
taxpayers nearly $300 million in 1984 (Mason, 2010, pp. 9-10).  In addition, and 
although most deposits were insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation (FSLIC), many were insured by far less financially stable state systems 
(Mason, 2010, pp. 9-10).  These systems began to crack as deregulation led to unwise 
lending, runaway growth and investments in industries other than traditional home loans.  
In a tale that seems all too familiar today, this led the savings and loan industry to the 
brink of insolvency.  In 1987, GAO declared the FSLIC insolvent, although Congress 
delayed resolution of the problem for a few years by replenishing FSLIC’s funds.   In 
1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act, 
which regulated and bailed out the industry (Cooper P. J., 2009; Mason, 2010; Barth, 
1991).  By the time the smoke had cleared, the savings and loans crisis had resulted in the 
loss of more than $600 billion in assets previously held by savings and loans--a warning 
that deregulation was perhaps not the panacea it was often said to be.   
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 Privatizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: 
 The Federal National Mortgage Association, better known as Fannie Mae, was 
created in 1938 to provide federal funds to banks in order to allow for greater home 
ownership (Pickert, 2008, p. 1).  Fannie Mae effectively created what is known today as 
the secondary mortgage market, which allows banks to make more loans by buying 
Federal Housing Agency (FHA) insured mortgages (Alford, 2003).  This policy worked 
especially following World War II as more and more people bought homes (Alford, 
2003).   
 For nearly thirty years, Fannie Mae was effectively the only player in the 
secondary mortgage market.  In 1968, however, Fannie Mae was split into two entities, a 
publicly financed organization on the one hand and a private corporation on the other 
(Koppell, 2001, pp. 469-470).  The publicly financed organization, colloquially known as 
Ginnie Mae, continued to guarantee the value of mortgages to veterans and government 
employees while the original Fannie Mae no longer guaranteed the value of mortgages to 
most of the market (Reiss, 2008, pp. 1027-1033).  In 1970, and in order to increase the 
size of the home loan market, Congress passed the Emergency Home Finance Act of 
1970, which created the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, better known as 
Freddie Mac (Alford, 2003).  Freddie Mac took the secondary mortgage market to a new 
level by creating “mortgage backed securities”, under which mortgages would be pooled 
and sold as a group.  This increased the amount of funds available for home loans and 
once again increased home ownership. As with the post-1968 Fannie Mae, there was no 
actual guarantee that the government would back failed loans, but there was an assumed 
guarantee of sorts (Reiss, 2008, pp. 1042-1045).  Specifically, it was assumed that the 
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government would bail out Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac if it was ever needed so that the 
risk was far lower than might otherwise be thought.  In fact, CBO director Daniel 
Crippen told Congress in 2001 that “debt and mortgage-backed securities of GSEs are 
more valuable to investors than similar private securities because of the perception of a 
government guarantee. (Crippen, 2001).”  This implicit but not actual guarantee 
contributed much to the 2008 financial crisis.  The assumption was why worry if Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac were going to be bailed out if there was ever a problem.  This 
assumption would also be sorely tested in the 2008 financial crisis. 
Repealing the Glass–Steagall Act: 
 When the economy crumbled during the great depression, one of the greatest 
governmental concerns was ensuring the stability of the remaining banks.  A major 
concern at the time was that banks were engaging in both deposits/loans and investments, 
thereby putting depositor funds at risk in the case of market downturns (Freidman & 
Schwartz, 1993, pp. 71-77).  Many in Congress argued that this had to change and that 
banks should be split into two categories.  The first would be commercial banks, with 
deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which would be 
able to engage in short-term loans and accept deposits (Burns, 1974, pp. 77-90; Kennedy, 
1973, pp. 140-145).  The second were investment banks, which would be allowed to take 
funds and invest them in the broader marketplace (Burns, 1974, pp. 77-90; Kennedy, 
1973, pp. 140-145).  These changes were codified into the Banking Act of 1933, better 
known as the Glass-Steagall Act after its chief sponsors, Senator Carter Glass (D-VA) 
and Representative Henry Steagall (D-AL).   The law overwhelmingly passed Congress 
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and was signed into law by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on June 16, 1933 (Burns, 
1974, pp. 77-90; Kennedy, 1973, pp. 140-145). 
 The most important, and for some problematic, aspect of the act was the creation 
of so-called firewalls which separated the commercial and investment halves of banks 
(Hendrickson, 2001, pp. 849-852).  This meant that they could not coordinate with each 
other and would in effect have to operate as separate entities.  By ensuring that there were 
two distinct parts to banks that had to operate as separate entities, this would, it was 
thought, decrease the risk of bank failure by providing for a separation of different 
activities with different sets of incentives.  Although it restricted bank growth in the short 
term, the long term effect on stability of the system was considered more important by 
those behind Glass-Steagall (Burns, 1974, pp. 77-90; Kennedy, 1973, pp. 140-145).  
 Although constant attempts were made to repeal it, the law largely stood 
untouched for more than sixty years.  In the early 1990s, however, pressure built to 
change the law as commercial banks complained that their growth was hurt by limits on 
their investment opportunities (Hendrickson, 2001, pp. 849-852).  Reform was broadly 
supported by many in Congress as well as the administration.  President Clinton himself 
argued that the Glass-Steagall Act needed to change and pushed strongly for its repeal 
(Glater, 1995, p. C1).  President Clinton argued that the act was no longer appropriate to 
the current environment (Clinton, 1999b).  As he said when a repeal was eventually 
signed “It is true that the Glass-Steagall law is no longer appropriate to the economy as it 
was presently formed. It worked pretty well for the industrial economy, which was highly 
organized, much more centralized and much more nationalized than the one in which we 
operate today. But the world is very different (Clinton, 1999b).”   
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In 1995, an attempt to repeal the act, led by Representative Jim Leach (R-IA) 
failed.  After the 1998 elections, Leach chose to try again.  In 1999, the Senate passed a 
law repealing the separation of commercial and investment activities on a party line vote 
(Hendrickson, 2001, pp. 849-852; US Senate, 1999).  The House took a far more 
generous view and passed the repeal by a vote of 343-86 (Clerk of the US House, 1999).  
Shortly thereafter, President Clinton willingly signed the repeal (Clinton, Statement on 
Signing the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, 1999).  The firewalls were gone and the banking 
sector was now allowed to openly engage in both commercial and banking activities as a 
single unit.  This action has been widely credited with being perhaps the single largest 
regulatory change that allowed the financial crisis of 2008 to occur (Cooper P. J., 2009, 
pp. 67-68, 73-74; Markham, 2010; White, 2010) 
The Corporate Governance Scandals of 2001-02, the Case of Enron: 
 In 1979, the Northern Natural Gas Company was reorganized as the largest 
subsidiary of a holding company known as InterNorth, a company which specialized in 
investments in energy industries and plastics (BBC, 2002).  In 1985, InterNorth 
purchased the Houston Natural Gas Company, a leader in the growing natural gas 
industry (BBC 2002).  InterNorth was reorganized and renamed Enron later that year 
(BBC 2002). 
 For approximately the first eight years of its new existence, Enron was a growing 
company specializing in delivering power and natural gas (and later water as well), 
growing comfortably but not spectacularly (Gilliam & Martin, 2007, p. 930).  In 1993, 
however, Enron began to engage in “limited liability special purpose entities (Gilliam & 
Martin, 2007, p. 931)” (SPE), which allowed it to tout its profits but hide its liabilities 
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from public view.  This allowed Enron to grow rapidly and it quickly became the darling 
of the corporate world--even being named “America’s Most Innovative Company” for six 
straight years by Fortune Magazine (Gilliam & Martin, 2007, pp. 930-932).   
 Unfortunately, Enron’s profits were not real and the company was increasingly 
teetering on the brink of collapse for three reasons (Gilliam & Martin, 2007, pp. 930-
933).  First, Enron was using these SPEs to hide losses and was, in addition, lying about 
its profits.  As one analysis wrote “Contrary to the perception that leverage disciplines 
management (Jensen 1986), it appears Enron used leverage to manipulate reported 
earning (Gilliam & Martin, 2007, p. 931).”  Second, Enron’s auditor, the well-respected 
firm Arthur Andersen, failed to detect and report potential problems (Gilliam & Martin, 
2007, pp. 930-933).  Third, Enron incentivized short-term gains, which were often 
illusory, over long-term sustainability (Gilliam & Martin, 2007, pp. 930-933).  This set 
Enron up for a collapse, and collapse it did-- declaring bankruptcy in November 2001. 
 In response to the corporate governance and regulatory failures of Enron and 
similar cases such as WorldCom, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 
(Kimmel, Kieso, & Weygandt, 2009, p. 337).  Among other things, the act created the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, required additional auditor independence, 
made corporate executives more responsible for accurate reporting, increased required 
financial disclosures and tried to limit conflicts of interest between stock analysts and the 
industries they analyzed (Kimmel, Kieso, & Weygandt, 2009, p. 337).   However, the law 
was attacked as too restrictive almost immediately upon its passage, and many in 
Congress sought to limit the funds provided for its enforcement (Kimmel, Kieso, & 
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Weygandt, 2009, p. 337).  The result was that the increase in regulations was largely 
illusory. 
Derivatives: A Largely Unregulated and Large Marketplace 
One of the main financial instruments that led to the 2008 crisis was derivatives.  
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency defines derivatives as follows “A 
derivative is a financial contract whose value is derived from the performance of 
underlying market factors, such as interest rates, currency exchange rates, and 
commodity, credit, and equity prices. Derivative transactions include an assortment of 
financial contracts, including structured debt obligations and deposits, swaps, futures, 
options, caps, floors, collars, forwards, and various combinations thereof (Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, 2013).”  Derivatives are largely not traded on public 
exchanges.  As the Economist notes, the total derivative market in 2012 was estimated at 
$700 trillion, with only $83 trillion traded on public exchanges (The Economist, 2012, p. 
83).  The result was that the market was, and remains, largely unregulated, and is an 
extremely high risk environment in which to operate. 
 In 2008, these derivatives were a huge part of the financial crisis.  As Professor 
Michael Greenberger said before a hearing of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
“What you have is a $600 trillion notional value market that is completely unregulated 
and dark; therefore regulators don't know what's happening out there, market observers 
don't know what's happening out there, and that led to a belief that we needed to rescue 
the entire market in the fall of 2008 (Greenberger, 2010).”  This unregulated market of 
derivatives presented a huge potential pitfall for the economy and was problematic to 
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rescue as well.  After all, how can something be rescued if the value of the item being 
rescued isn’t specifically established?   
Credit Default Swaps: Private Loan Insurance 
 There is an old saying on Wall Street that if allowed to do so, the financial 
markets will find a way to make money on anything.  Such is the case with credit-default 
swaps (CDS), which were created by Blythe Masters of JP Morgan Chase in 1994 
(Simkovic & Kaminetzky, 2011, pp. 118-124).  A CDS is essentially another form of 
loan insurance.  Specifically, someone issuing a loan will sell a CDS to a buyer who 
purchases a loan with the assurance that if the loan defaults, the buyer will receive the 
value of the loan (Simkovic & Kaminetzky, 2011, pp. 118-124).  The cost of the swap is 
typically determined by the risk of the loan.  It works even if the loan defaults as long as 
the asset on which the loan is based does not substantially decline in value (Simkovic & 
Kaminetzky, 2011, pp. 118-124) 
 Credit default swaps were largely unregulated.  Even though some investment 
entities, most notably AIG, sold insurance for credit default swaps, they were not 
required to hedge such insurance in case the value of the assets behind these credit 
default swaps decreased.  When it did decrease during the 2008 financial crisis, AIG was 
in trouble and something like TARP was needed (Economist 2009).  TARP, and the 
events leading up to it, are explained more fully in the next section. 
Conclusion: 
These actions set the stage for what would become the financial crisis of 2008.  
Decades of deregulation and the ethos that the private sector worked best when it was 
least watched by the government left the door wide open to abuse.  Abused it was, with 
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the greatest financial crisis since the great depression as a result.  This chapter will now 
discuss the specific legislative history and design of TARP. 
THE CASE OF TARP, ATTTEMPTING TO STEM A FINAN CIAL SECTOR CRISIS: 
The specific policy that became TARP developed as a result of four sets of 
events, all of which took place between September 7 and October 3, 2008.  These were: 
(1) the initial collapse and the resulting events it triggered, (2) the immediate policy 
reactions, (3) the initial failure of the first version of TARP in the US House and (4) the 
final design and passage of the bill.  These stages represent both the crisis itself and the 
initial attempts to respond, first by executive action and then via Congress. 
The Initial Collapse: 
There had been mounting signs for years that the US housing market was at a 
breaking point.  Lack of regulation, overbuilding in growing markets and risky loans had 
made the housing industry very vulnerable.  Economist Robert Shiller foresaw the 
housing market collapse in 2005, arguing that "The home-price bubble feels like the 
stock-market mania in the fall of 1999, just before the stock bubble burst in early 2000, 
with all the hype, herd investing and absolute confidence in the inevitability of continuing 
price appreciation (Laing, 2005, p. 1)."  Yet unlike the economic collapse of 2000, the 
housing market and the industries that relied on it, such as construction and the financial 
services industry, were far more integral to the overall economy than the tech companies 
had been.  Indeed, the Bureau of Economic statistics estimates that the housing market 
directly, in and of itself, accounts for about 18% of GDP, with the financial services 
industry adding another 8% of GDP (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009).   
Things came to a head on September 7, 2008, when the US Treasury seized 
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control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which had become unable to continue providing 
the financing needed to properly collateralize the loans (Paulson, 2008).  This action 
wiped out the investors who had bought stock in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in order to 
attempt to save the company.  This response was, in the words of Federal Housing 
Financing Agency director James Lockhart "one of the most sweeping government 
interventions in private financial markets in decades (Lockhart, 2008). “  Yet given the 
alternative--that loans would be unable to be issued for many individual home 
purchasers--the action was seen as necessary (Goldfarb, Cho, & Appelbaum, 2007).   As 
several members of the House Financial Services committee noted in a September 2008 
hearing, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac posed such “systemic risk (US House Financial 
Services Committee, 2008, p. 58)” to the financial system as a whole that action had to be 
taken to keep them from collapsing (US House Financial Services Committee, 2008, pp. 
58-60). 
For all the doom and gloom that the collapse of the housing market foretold, it 
was dwarfed eight days later by the dual collapse of both Merrill Lynch (which was 
purchased by Bank of America) and Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 (Goldfarb, 
Cho, & Appelbaum, 2007; US House Financial Services Committee, 2008).  This caused 
widespread panic in the financial markets for one major reason.  If the crisis could take 
down two of the most respected investment firms in the country, nothing appeared to be 
safe (US House Financial Services Committee, 2008).  As Secretary Paulson said in the 
House Financial Services Committee hearing noted above, “We must do so in order to 
avoid a continuing serial of financial institution failures and frozen credit markets that 
threaten American families’ financial wellbeing, the viability of businesses both small 
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and large, and the very health of our economy (US House Financial Services Committee, 
2008, p. 26).”  Sadly this was nowhere near the worst for the economy.  Indeed, things 
would get worse for the government and the country rather quickly, as events forced the 
US Treasury into further action the next day. 
The Immediate Federal Response: 
On September 16, 2008, only 24 hours after the dual collapse of Merrill Lynch 
and Lehman Brothers, the financial market was rocked by another dual set of blows.  The 
first related to American International Group (AIG) and the second was the money 
markets “breaking the buck.” 
AIG had long been a leader in the insurance industry, amassing some $81 billion 
in assets by early 2005, making it one of the largest financial services companies in the 
world (Zuill, 2009).  AIG typically specialized in providing insurance to larger 
companies, and was very successful.  However, after years of having grown comfortably 
but within established rules, AIG began to take some serious risks in the early 2000s, 
moving into areas such as derivatives and credit default swaps (Insurance Journal, 2004).  
These largely unregulated areas provided problematic for AIG as it was hit with a series 
of penalties from 2002-2005, which totaled nearly $2 billion for violating regulatory 
protocols and as a result of “steering” business to insurers from whom AIG received 
illegal kickbacks (Woehr, 2010; Insurance Journal, 2004; Zuill, 2009).  Unfortunately, 
these penalties (which amounted to a fraction of AIG’s next worth), did not do much to 
change their behavior as they sunk a lot of money into credit default swaps, which would 
prove to be AIG’s downfall (Woehr, 2010; Insurance Journal, 2004; Zuill, 2009).   
 Early on September 16, 2008, AIG’s credit rating was downgraded (Morgenson, 
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2008).  The downgrade led to the requirement that AIG post additional collateral when 
looking to make credit default swaps.  The company did not have the cash on hand to 
fulfill this requirement (Morgenson, 2008).  This led to a 95% drop in AIG's stock price 
in little more than a week, and it raised the fear that the company was about to collapse 
(Morgenson, 2008).  This was a serious problem since “AIG was so interconnected with 
many large commercial banks, investment banks, and other financial institutions through 
counterparty credit relationships on credit default swaps and other activities such as 
securities lending that its potential failure created systemic risk (Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, 2011, p. 352).” This had been allowed to happen because AIG took 
advantage of the loose regulatory infrastructure to increase its business in largely 
unregulated markets, including credit default swaps (Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, 2011, pp. 350-354). 
 Moving quickly, the Federal Reserve acted late on September 16, 2008 and 
authorized $85 billion to purchase nearly 80% of AIG in an attempt to stave off this 
collapse (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2008).  This was necessary 
because, in the Board’s own words "The Board determined that, in current circumstances, 
a disorderly failure of AIG could add to already significant levels of financial market 
fragility and lead to substantially higher borrowing costs, reduced household wealth, and 
materially weaker economic performance (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 2008).”  In other words, if AIG collapsed it was feared it might take the whole 
financial system with it.  Indeed, “Without the bailout, AIG’s default and collapse could 
have brought down its counterparties, causing cascading losses and collapses throughout 
the financial system (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, p. 352)."   
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The second shock to hit the markets on September 16 was the money markets 
"breaking the buck", meaning that investors lost money on essential transactions needed 
to finance short term debt and operations (Condon, 2008).  This historic failure was 
principally caused by the Lehman Brothers collapse. The oldest money market in the US, 
the Reserve Primary Fund, broke the buck and dropped to 97 cents after writing off 
Lehman's debt (Condon, 2008).  This was only the fourth time (and the first since 1994) 
in the 37 year history of the money market system that a fund had broken the buck 
(Condon, 2008).  After this drop in value, there was nearly a run on the money market 
system as a whole, with net outflows outpacing net inflows by nearly 20 to 1, threatening 
to collapse this key source of funding for normal business operations (Investment 
Company Institute, 2008).  Moving quickly, the Federal Reserve announced on 
September 19 the creation of an optional program to extend financing to help lenders 
purchase commercial paper and to eliminate fears of the money market's collapse 
(Gullapalli & Annand, 2008).  This approach, which required a fee paid by participating 
funds, would essentially insure that the federal government would back the fund's value.  
It worked and the immediate panic was averted (Gullapalli & Annand, 2008).  
In order to prevent additional failures, the SEC also took a key additional step by 
banning so-called “naked short selling” on September 17, 2008.  As the SEC wrote in its 
press release that day "In an ordinary short sale, the short seller borrows a stock and sells 
it, with the understanding that the loan must be repaid by buying the stock in the market 
(hopefully at a lower price). But in an abusive naked short transaction, the seller doesn't 
actually borrow the stock, and fails to deliver it to the buyer. For this reason, naked 
shorting can allow manipulators to force prices down far lower than would be possible in 
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legitimate short-selling conditions. (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008)” 
The fear was that if naked short selling was allowed to continue unabated, stock markets 
would collapse.  The SEC's actions both banned naked short selling and provided stiff 
penalties for violators (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008). 
 Yet for all the federal government was able to do by executive action, it wasn’t 
nearly enough.  The crisis grew and it was readily apparent to all involved that there 
would have to be far more significant actions.  The focus turned to Congress. 
The Initial Stages of TARP’s Development and its Failure in the US House: 
On September 20, 2008, the federal government circulated the first draft of the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), of which TARP was the biggest 
part.  In order to resolve the problems caused by the collapse of the housing bubble, the 
US Department of the Treasury asserted that it needed to help banks remove so-called 
"distressed assets (US Department of the Treasury, 2008b)” from the financial system in 
order to stabilize banks and other financial institutions.  As the US Department of the 
Treasury stated in proposing the first version of what later became TARP, “When the 
financial system works as it should, money and capital flow to and from households and 
businesses to pay for home loans, school loans and investments that create jobs.  As 
illiquid mortgage assets block the system, the clogging of our financial markets has the 
potential to significantly damage our financial system and our economy, undermining job 
creation and income growth. (US Department of the Treasury, 2008b)."  TARP proposed 
to do so by adopting an approach similar to that used by the federal government in the 
savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s, when the government had provided temporary 
loans to financial institutions in order to ensure their stability (Seidman L. W., 2000).  
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Once they were able to do so, these financial institutions would then pay back these 
loans, thus meaning that the cost to the federal government would be far less than the 
initial $700 billion price tag (Seidman L. W., 2000; US Department of the Treasury, 
2008b) 
 The proposal developed and expanded over time, growing from an only three 
page bill designed to give the Treasury Secretary nearly unlimited authority to do what he 
wished with TARP funds.   The initial proposal, which was kept short in order to allow 
for and force quick Congressional action, was strongly panned by many in Congress and 
public.  The proposal then expanded from one that focused almost entirely on purchasing 
failing mortgage-backed securities in order to stabilize the market.  Yet, even that wasn't 
enough since it only addressed US-based banks.  On September 21, foreign financial 
institutions with a presence in the United States were included (Paulson, 2008).   On 
September 23, the Senate Banking Committee rejected this plan (Ahrens, 2008).  Echoing 
the comments of many, Senator Dodd said, “After reading this proposal, I can only 
conclude that it is not only our economy that is at risk, Mr. Secretary, but our 
Constitution, as well (Mullins, 2008).”  Criticism of the plan came from both the left and 
the right and in both the House and the Senate. 
The tumult against the plan continued to grow both outside and inside the beltway 
in the coming days.  On September 24, 2008, a letter from over 100 leading economists 
was released critiquing the plan for three primary reasons (Wolfers, 2008).  First, the 
letter asked whether it was fair to in effect bail out those institutions for their own bad 
choices.  Second, the letter challenged the plan's ambiguity, as its writers were concerned 
that it granted too much authority to Secretary Paulson.  Third, the letter was concerned 
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whether the infusion of cash would have unintended consequences and weaken the 
financial markets far beyond the current crisis due to moral hazard (Wolfers, 2008). 
Indeed, one of the biggest concerns that many had in relation to TARP was the 
problem of “moral hazard.”  Paul Krugman defined the problem of moral hazard as “any 
situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, while 
someone else bears the cost if things go badly (Krugman P. R., 2012, p. 37).”  More 
simply put, moral hazard exists when businesses are willing to take risk that might 
otherwise be deemed unwise because they will be assisted and saved by others if they 
fail.  This was certainly the case in the great depression, as those institutions which were 
insured failed at a rate significantly higher than those that were uninsured (Grossman, 
1992, pp. 817-819).   Further buttressing the claim that moral hazard is real is the fact that 
the World Bank reports that all 100 of the largest banking crises prior to the year 2000 
were resolved in substantial part by government bailouts (Boyd, Gomis, Kwak, & Smith, 
2000, pp. 1-3).  This shows that there is a wide-spread perception that government will 
save financial institutions if they fail (Boyd, Gomis, Kwak, & Smith, 2000, pp. 1-3). 
 Moral hazard has been a big concern in American financial bailouts, perhaps most 
notably in the response to the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s (Shoven, Smart, & 
Waldfogel, 1991, p. 3).   Due to the fact that savings and loans knew they would likely be 
bailed out if they failed, they were willing to take more risks, increasing the need for 
government intervention and leading to more reckless behavior (Hellman, Murdock, & 
Stiglitz, 2000, p. 147).  Not only was this a problem in this specific case, as noted above, 
but it was seen as setting a dangerous precedent for future crises (Cole, McKenzie, & 
White, 1995, pp. 30-32).  This would be proven true, as is discussed below. 
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 The concern over moral hazard was one of the primary criticisms of the design of 
TARP.  As Harvard economist Jeffrey Mirron wrote, “Government purchase of bank 
stock, therefore, is a transfer from taxpayers to people who took huge risks and lost. . . . 
[This] will generate even greater problems down the line (Mirron, 2008). ”  Indeed, many 
who supported TARP agreed with this point, arguing that economic regulation was 
necessary.  As Secretary Paulson said in November 2008, “it is already clear that we must 
address a number of significant issues, such as improving risk management practices, 
compensation practices, oversight of mortgage origination and the securitization process, 
credit rating agencies, OTC derivative market infrastructure and regulatory policies, 
practices and regimes in our respective countries (Simons, 2010, pp. 43-44).”  Yet the 
argument was that such work could wait.  As Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke 
said in late 2008, “You want to put the fire out first and then worry about the fire code. 
(Simons, 2010, p. 46)”  So the decision was made to focus on bailing out the banks and 
other financial institutions that were in danger of failure, without focusing on economic 
regulation, since the risk of inaction was too great.  The result is that, as John Cochrane 
wrote, “As long as some firms are considered too big to fail, those firms will take 
outsized risks. (Cochrane, 2010, p. 34)” 
In spite of these and other misgivings, there was a realization by many in 
Congress that they could not simply do nothing.  As Congressman Bauchus (R-AL) said, 
the proposal was "a gun to our head" (Wilson K. , 2008) but many in Congress believed 
they had to act. There was widespread concern, largely from the President's own party, 
that the plan gave too much power to Secretary Paulson on how to disperse the funds 
appropriated under this measure (Vekshin & Rowley, 2008).  The original proposal had 
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even exempted the secretary's actions from judicial review, something which was 
reversed in the final proposal (Washington Post, 2008) 
This accountability concern was no small thing as, in fact, one of the biggest 
problems with TARP was that programs were announced for political reasons without 
full consideration of how to implement them (Baum, 2013).  The federal government 
would often announce a program such as with housing or foreclosure relief and would 
then set up measures on the fly (Baum, 2013).  The result was little to no accountability 
measures and no penalties in programs to make them accountable or mandatory (Baum, 
2013). 
In the wee hours of September 28, 2008, Congressional leaders and the White 
House reached a deal on a final proposal.  President Bush expressed confidence the plan 
would pass Congress and a vote was scheduled for the next day, September 29 even 
though media reports suggested that many in the President’s own party were opposed 
(Washington Post, 2008).  Underestimating the opposition, the plan failed 205-228, with 
133 Republicans and 95 Democrats voting against it (Clerk of the US House, 2008).  The 
immediate response to this was panic, as the stock markets dropped 8% the following 
day, the largest drop since Black Monday in 1987 (Isidore, 2008).  Congressional leaders 
scrambled to find something that could pass and thus the stage was set for the final 
passage of TARP. 
The Final Passage of TARP: 
Recognizing that the bill must pass in order to ensure the stability of the US 
financial system, media reports suggested that the US Senate chose to combine the bill 
with one that proposed tax breaks for renewable energy usage (in order to garner 
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Republican votes), mental health parity (in order to garner some reticent Democratic 
votes) and a series of earmarks (in order to garner the support of several other members 
of Congress) (Hulse, 2008).  This earmark-laden measure easily passed both houses of 
Congress and was signed into law by President Bush on October 3, 2008 (US Senate, 
2008; Clerk of the US House, 2008b; Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 
2008) 
While originally intended as a program designed to purchase toxic assets in order 
to stabilize financial institutions, TARP in fact spent very little money purchasing such 
assets ($5 billion as of September 30, 2010) (SIGTARP, 2010, p. 237).  Instead, TARP 
spent by far the most funds pursuing three primary tasks: (1) purchasing an estimated 
$280 billion in stock in trouble banks and investment institutions such as Citigroup, JP 
Morgan and Bank of America; (2) providing $40 billion in loans to prevent the 
potentially catastrophic collapse of American International Group (AIG) and (3) 
providing nearly $80 billion in loans to American auto manufacturers in order to prevent 
their collapse (SIGTARP, 2010, p. 237).  An additional $45 billion was appropriated to 
help prevent home foreclosures but as September 30, 2010, only $600 million had 
actually been spent and the administration had yet to come up with a plan to spend the 
remaining funds in this area (SIGTARP 2010, 237).  Of the total of $387 billion actually 
expended under TARP, greater than 90% of it went directly to assisting banks, 
investment houses, AIG or auto manufacturers, far from the original intent of purchasing 
toxic assets (Mihm & al, 2013). 
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ACCOUNTABILITY IN TARP: CONGRESS, GAO, TREASURY, SIGTARP AND 
COP: 
Despite what many might assert, TARP was very concerned with accountability. 
In fact, TARP used a five-pronged accountability approach, with Congress leading the 
process and relying on four other organizations to ensure overall accountability. Two of 
these organizations previously existed (the GAO and the US Department of the Treasury) 
and two were created specifically by the law, the Special Inspector General for TARP 
(SIGTARP) and the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP).  This section briefly 
introduces the role and approaches that each of these five organizations were given. 
Congress’s Role: Political Accountability, Systemic Stability and Avoiding Abuse 
Congress took the lead role in ensuring accountability for TARP (and later on 
ARRA), holding constant hearings and keeping the pressure on both the Bush and Obama 
administrations in order to ensure that the program remained effective and accountable.  
Congress focused on three primary things.  First, accountability for the money, where it 
was going and to whom, to which specific banks and businesses.  Second, avoiding, or at 
least limiting, potential waste, fraud and abuse.  Third, and perhaps most importantly, 
stopping the crisis and ensuring overall system stability (Green, 2013).  
In this vein, many in Congress were concerned about lack of staffing in the US 
Treasury’s Office of Financial Stability (OFS).  This was due to the transition between 
Bush and Obama and what many in Congress saw as a lack of concern for accountability 
(Green, 2013).  Treasury’s relationship with Congress was strained because it wasn't 
staffed up to deal with the program.  Programs weren't well designed in the view of many 
in Congress and were often left up to agencies to design them, or perhaps most 
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worryingly, to the banks that were receiving the funds themselves (Green, 2013).  This 
was a point echoed by other organizations.  Many in Congress also had large concerns 
about how the law was structured to favor larger firms.  The government was unwilling to 
use the full authority the law gave provided for fear that it would be seen as running 
private organizations.  The government did not want to be seen as doing that because it 
smacked of over-reach of government in private sector (Green, 2013).  As a result, a lot 
of light touch was used, with the hope being that incentive would encourage private 
parties to do the right thing.   
Congress had strong relationships with COP, SIGTARP and GAO.  They 
frequently used the work of these organizations to amplify their own findings (Green, 
2013).  Congress would also use their investigations to set the issues on which Congress 
would hammer away.  Congress also used these organization’s reports to stir political 
outrage, largely as to who was benefiting from the law.  This strong formal and informal 
interplay played a key role in ensuring TARP accountability (Green, 2013). 
GAO: A Broader Quicker Mission Than Before 
 The GAO has a long and distinguished history as the nation’s premier government 
accountability organization, dating back nearly 90 years to the Progressive Era (Mihm & 
al, 2013).  Typically, GAO has been a slower-moving organization, very deliberately 
considering every report it produces and taking about 3-6 months to produce each report.  
However, in the case of TARP (and later ARRA), GAO was asked to produce reports 
both quickly and in larger number, with the first reports due less than 2 months after 
TARP was enacted into law (Mihm & al, 2013).  All indications are GAO was up to and 
met this task with its customary professionalism and quality. 
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The GAO undertook this task with a focus on institutions, choosing to focus more 
on the banking and financial sectors rather than on any one organization.  GAO focused 
primarily on the internal controls and oversight of the process as a whole (Mihm & al, 
2013).  In order to complete this work, GAO primarily reassigned people internally, 
hiring only two new people whom were experts in the market and valuation.   
GAO started off by focusing the Office of Financial Stability (OFS), especially 
since OFS was heavily staffed by contractors at the start of the process.  GAO had to 
report every 60 days.  This was a challenge at first but once GAO got in the rhythm of 
writing these reports, it was able to get the job done (Mihm & al, 2013). 
GAO had strong coordination with SIGTARP, COP and Congress. SIGTARP, 
COP and GAO were given identical mandates but had different approaches.  GAO was 
more or less objective, while SIGTARP and COP were more aggressive, albeit in 
different ways.  This allowed the three organizations to approach the same issues with 
different lenses and thus more fully ensure accountability from many different angles 
(Mihm & al, 2013). 
 During the study period, GAO produced 40 different reports related to TARP and 
also testified before Congressional committees numerous times (Mihm & al, 2013).  
These reports were both descriptive and analytical, focusing in one specific aspect of 
TARP or another.  They would both describe the situation as it existed and then provide 
recommendations to improve both the tracking of money and programmatic effectiveness 
overall.  GAO took a broader and deeper view than any of the other organizations to 
ensure accountability. 
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The US Department of the Treasury: Tracking Money and Reporting Results 
 In the beginning, the US Department of the Treasury (DT) asked had basically 
asked for a blank check, which it did not get, although what it got was not far removed 
(Paulson, 2008).  In order to track the funds as they were going out, the DT established an 
Office of Financial Stability, within the existing Office of Domestic Finance, that would 
be headed by an Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability.  In theory, this person was 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, although no such appointee was 
confirmed until June 2011, meaning that the Office was headed by an interim director 
during this study period (US Office of Financial Stability, 2012).  This office was 
responsible both for expending and then tracking and recovering TARP funds. 
 The DT produced and still produces daily and monthly reports on the status of all 
investments made as a result of TARP.  These reports consist of lists of transactions as 
well as any holdings or loans the government has made under TARP.  Beyond these 
numerical reports, the DT produced 14 monthly reports related to overall TARP 
spending/loans and 13 “tranche” reports related to the expenditure of funds as well.  
These reports help us understand how the agency primarily responsible for expending 
TARP funds actually spent, tracked and recovered them. 
The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP): An 
Inspector General to Ensure Compliance 
 In order to ensure that funds were expended, tracked and recovered in concert 
with existing laws, Congress authorized creation of SIGTARP as part of the overall 
TARP law (SIGTARP, 2013c).  The special inspector general who would head SIGTARP 
would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  The person initially 
71 
 
chosen (and who remained in charge during the entire study period) was Neil Barofsky.  
Barofsky had a long distinguished career as a prosecutor of financial crimes in the 
Southern District of New York, which includes all of Manhattan and thus Wall Street 
(Associated Press, 2008).   
 SIGTARP produced 22 full length reports during the study period as well as 
sending out numerous letters to agencies and businesses handling TARP funds, asking 
them to report information on how they spent, tracked and recovered these funds 
(SIGTARP, 2013).  These reports concerned themselves primarily with two things.  The 
first was general auditing of funds and ensuring that all senior individuals who handled 
these funds, whether in a public or private organization, were acting in concert with the 
law.  The second was management structure and effectiveness, specifically from a legal 
perspective.  In other words, that they tracked whether these structures met legal 
standards and whether individuals were operating in concert with the law (SIGTARP 
2013).  This legal individual perspective stands in stark contrast to the work done by 
other organizations and was a key part of ensuring accountability for TARP. 
The Congressional Oversight Panel (COP): The Overall View of the Legislation and Its 
Programs 
 The second oversight body created specifically to ensure accountability for TARP 
was the Congressional Oversight Panel or COP.  COP consisted of five members, one 
each appointed by the Speaker and the Minority Leader of the US House, one each 
appointed by the Majority and Minority Leaders of the US Senate  and one appointed 
jointly by the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate (Wilkerson, 
2013).  Now-Senator Elizabeth Warren was selected by the five members as COP’s chair, 
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with associate AFL-CIO general counsel Damon Silvers selected as vice-chair.  COP was 
given a broad mandate to track both TARP overall as well as individual programs, and it 
was asked to produce reports on at least a monthly basis (Baum, 2013). 
 COP saw its primary role as overseeing Treasury’s use of its authority.  COP 
focused on ensuring money was being tracked and assessing its use.  This was especially 
important when TARP programs crossed over different federal departments and 
preexisting programs (Baum, 2013).  COP’s decision on what to report was determined 
primarily by two factors.  Most importantly, what the panel wanted to focus on, with the 
input of the professional staff being paramount.  The panel would listen to what Congress 
wanted but wouldn’t necessarily respond to every request.  This was necessary in order to 
establish COP’s independent credibility, by showing that COP was not just reacting to 
what Congress wanted. The other factor that determined what COP focused on was what 
the law required it to focus on, specifically the later legislative requirement that COP 
focus on farm loans (Baum, 2013).   
COP enjoyed a close relationship with Congress, SIGTARP and GAO.  They 
would often consult formally and informally on what each other was working on.  This 
was so they would complement and not duplicate each other’s work.  Sometimes COP 
would lead the way with an initial report.  They would then let SIGTARP and GAO 
follow up with other more detailed work (Baum, 2013).  COP would also hold joint 
Congressional hearings with GAO/SIGTARP and would communicate informally with 
Congress on a regular basis (Baum, 2013).  COP was able to be more flexible than other 
two organizations because it was not beholden professional audit standards while 
SIGTARP and GAO had to deal with established standards.  By contrast, COP was an 
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audit body with a political purpose, rather than a more typical auditing or accountability 
one. 
 COP produced 21 reports on TARP during the study period (Wilkerson, 2013).  
They began first as analyses of TARP as a whole and then moved down to individual 
programs, such as the aid to AIG and to the auto companies.  These reports were largely 
descriptive but also included recommendations on how to improve both the tracking of 
funds and programmatic effectiveness.  On more than one occasion, the members of COP 
disagreed on some points and so minority recommendations (nearly always those by the 
GOP-appointed members) were appended to those of the majority.  COP also testified 
before Congress numerous times on its findings.  COP’s findings proved invaluable in 
giving Congress yet another way to ensure TARP was effective and accountable.   
 Now that this chapter has described the organizations responsible for ensuring 
accountability in TARP, the next section will tell more of the story of how it came about 
and what it consisted of.  This chapter will then describe the policy tools used for TARP 
and the accountability models used to evaluate its usage. 
POLICY TOOLS IN TARP: DIRECT GOVERNMENT, LOAN GUARANTEE, 
DIRECT LOAN AND GRANTS 
The remainder of this chapter will discuss the policy tools utilized in TARP in the 
following manner.  First, this section will identify the top policy tools used in TARP, 
recognizing that while there were certainly other policy tools being used, four were 
paramount: (1) direct government, (2) loan guarantees, (3) direct loans and (4) grants.  
Each of these tools will be discussed first in terms of how the tool is defined in the 
literature as discussed in chapter two.  Second, each tool will be discussed in the context 
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of where each is utilized in the legislation.  Third, this section will discuss the extent to 
which the four accountability models appear to be used in relation to these policy tools.  
In some cases all four were present, while in others only one or two were.  Fourth, this 
section will briefly discuss three policy tools that were expected to be present, or 
arguably should have been, but were not in fact present.  They are (1) economic 
regulation; (2) government as a corporation and (3) public information.  Identifying these 
tools will help us begin to answer the question how policy tools and accountability 
models may line up.  These tools will then be further analyzed in chapter five as this 
study will attempt to uncover the significance of what has been learned to the literature 
and to the practice of either accountability models or policy tool usage. 
Direct Government: 
Direct government is defined as “the delivery or withholding of a good or service 
by government employees (Lenan, 2002, p. 49).”  Direct government is utilized when the 
government directly provides a service or undertakes an activity (Lenan, 2002, pp. 41-
43).  This is as opposed to indirect government, where government provides such a 
service via a third party, as is the case in contracting (Lenan, 2002, pp. 41-43).  Direct 
government services are highly visible and the spending for them is easily apparent in the 
government’s budget (Lenan, 2002, pp. 41-43). 
In the case of a major economic collapse such as this, one of the first things that 
often comes up in legislation is the need for direct government action.  Such was the case 
with TARP.  Direct government action was utilized by TARP in one major way.  As 
already noted the US Department of the Treasury created the “Office of Financial 
Stability (OFS)” to ensure the long-term financial market sustainability and to manage 
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TARP ( (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 2008; US Office of Financial 
Stability, 2012).  As also noted, this office was to be headed by an Assistant Secretary for 
Financial Stability, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  However, 
such a person was not confirmed until 2011, so for the purposes of this study period this 
office was run by an interim director.  Nonetheless, the creation of this office was a usage 
of the “Direct Government” policy tool. 
All four types of accountability were utilized in regards to this policy tool.  
Political accountability was utilized in two ways.  First, Congress had a role in approving 
the director of the new Office of Financial stability (Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008, 2008; US Office of Financial Stability, 2012).  In fact, the decision not to 
approve this director immediately is a form of political accountability because it 
represents a potential form of disapproval for this choice.   Second, Congress had a key 
role in holding oversight hearings related to the money market policy.  It did so on 
several occasions (Green, 2013; Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009e, pp. 52-62; 
Doardo G. , 2009, pp. 4-10); the act of holding these hearings is a form of political 
accountability. 
Legal accountability existed in the oversight of SIGTARP in ensuring that the 
Treasury correctly implemented its duties under this law.  SIGTARP played a key role in 
double-checking the results of the OFS’s actions and also ensuring that individual 
persons followed the law as directed (SIGTARP, 2009d, pp. 3-8).  This legal 
accountability was essential in ensuring that the actions of individuals were in concert 
with the law as it existed.  Especially given the concerns in TARP’s design over having 
too much authority placed in the hands of a few individuals, this was essential.  
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Professional accountability was present in two ways.  First, OFS’s work was 
evaluated based on established professional standards related to tracking of funds (Mihm 
& al, 2013).  Second, OFS had a key role in ensuring that the money market actions were 
undertaken in concert with professional standards (Mihm & al, 2013).  These actions 
represent a key usage of professional accountability.  This is important in terms of 
counterbalancing the political accountability of the policy itself, especially as it was a 
concern that TARP was going to be overly controlled by political appointees (Mihm & al, 
2013). 
Performance accountability was present in relation to the money market actions.  
Specifically, such actions were designed to avoid “breaking the buck” and performance 
metrics, however informal, were utilized to ensure that this standard was met (Baum, 
2013).   This was not necessarily the most important usage of performance accountability 
but it certainly was one such usage. 
Loan Guarantees: 
Loan guarantees exist when “the government enters into a contractual agreement 
to make full or partial payment to the lender in case the borrower defaults on the agreed 
loan.  The private lender originates the loan, secures the government guarantee and 
services the loan according to government regulations or minimum standards (Stanton, 
2002b, p. 381).”  In effect, loan guarantees allow the government to provide stability to 
the marketplace without expending as much in funds as would be needed if the 
government made direct loans (Stanton, 2002b, pp. 381-383).   
In order to ensure skittish markets that it was safe to invest, the federal 
government had to both give loans directly and guarantee loans as well.  Loan guarantees 
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were a key part of TARP, particularly in relation to the housing market (Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 2008; Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009b, pp. 3-
8).  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were given loan guarantees in order to ensure the 
overall market that it was safe to invest and that the federal government would ensure 
that the housing market wouldn’t collapse (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008, 2008).  Loan guarantees were also attempted in relation to individual foreclosures, 
but concerns about how this was going to be implemented kept them from being fully 
utilized. 
All four accountability models were present in relation to this policy tool.  
Political accountability was present in two ways.  First, loan guarantees were given to 
secure the future of politically important (as well as financially important) institutions 
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009d, pp. 3-8; 
SIGTARP, 2009b, pp. 5-12).  This represents a usage of political accountability because 
these institutions were seen as important to political stakeholders.  Second, political 
accountability existed in the oversight of such guarantees through Congress, both directly 
and through the creation of both the COP and SIGTARP (Congressional Oversight Panel, 
2009d, pp. 3-8; SIGTARP, 2009b, pp. 5-12).  These congressional organizations were 
classic examples of political oversight accountability. 
Legal accountability was not particularly present in relation to this tool except in 
one important respect.  SIGTARP ensured that these loan guarantees were properly 
administered in concert with the law (SIGTARP, 2009b).  Beyond that, legal 
accountability was limited. 
78 
 
Professional accountability existed in two main ways.  First, the US Treasury 
played a key role in deciding where and when to issue loan guarantees (United States 
Department of the Treasury, 2008).  This discretion, in concert with established 
professional standards, is a classic usage of professional accountability.  Second, 
SIGTARP audited the decisions on where and how loan guarantees were given 
(SIGTARP, 2010, pp. 8-11).  GAO additionally utilized professional standards from the 
federal government’s “green book” and “yellow book” to determine how and whether 
these loan guarantees were properly administered (Mihm & al, 2013).   This focus on best 
practices and on meeting the standards established in the federal auditing guidelines was 
crucial to successful tracking of these policies. 
 Performance accountability was utilized because the success of this particular 
policy tool was, at least partially if not substantially, evaluated on the basis of market 
outcomes and performance.  For example, in the case of the money market loan 
guarantees, the performance standards were whether the market no longer “broke the 
buck” and was therefore stabilized (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, pp. 353-
365; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2008).  In many cases, the 
guarantees of possible loans, rather than the loans themselves, were enough to move the 
needle to show adequate performance improvements as a result of TARP.  While this is 
more of a market accountability standard than a performance one, performance 
accountability is certainly a model which borrows from market accountability, and what 
it borrows clearly applies here. 
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Direct Loans: 
Direct loans are utilized when “the government makes a direct loan…(and) after 
making the loan, the government then services the loan (Stanton, 2002b, p. 381).”  Direct 
loans, simply put, are loans which are given out directly by the government for which the 
government earns interest and expects repayment (Stanton, 2002b).  They have been 
commonly used for decades to help provide needed financing when private funding is not 
forthcoming.  
Direct loans were utilized in four primary areas.  First, as part of an attempt to 
stop individual foreclosures, the program was set up and funds appropriated (although it 
was not fully implemented) (Federal Housing Authority, 2009; Baum, 2013).  Second, 
direct loans were given to AIG in order to prevent its collapse (SIGTARP, 2009f, pp. 3-
9).  Third, direct loans were given to the so-called big three auto manufacturers in order 
to avert their collapse (SIGTARP, 2009h, pp. 11-15; Government Accountability Office, 
2009e, pp. 5-10). Fourth and finally, many banks and other financial institutions were 
given loans, in addition to having other assets purchased, to help stabilize the financial 
system (SIGTARP, 2009h, pp. 11-15; Government Accountability Office, 2009b, pp. 5-
10). 
The accountability models that applied in relation to direct loans were mainly 
political, professional and performance, with only a tiny usage of legal accountability.  
Political accountability was present in three major ways.  First, political accountability 
exists in the decision to focus on loaning funds to politically important institutions, most 
notably Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Baum, 2013; Green, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).   
Given the important role Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac play in the home loan business, 
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this was no small thing.  Second, political accountability existed in the decision to 
provide loans to politically important businesses, most notably the automobile industry 
(Green, 2013; SIGTARP, 2009f, pp. 3-9).  While once again, there clearly are plenty of 
policy reasons to avoid this industry’s collapse, the political cost of losing such a key 
industry could have been immense.  Indeed, the fact that TARP saved this industry 
arguably was one of the key factors in Obama’s 2012 reelection.  Third, political 
accountability existed in the oversight of such loans through Congress both directly and 
through the creation of both the COP and SIGTARP (Mihm & al, 2013; SIGTARP, 
2009h, pp. 11-13) .  These congressional organizations were classic examples of political 
oversight accountability. 
Legal accountability was not particularly present in relation to this tool except in 
one important respect.  SIGTARP had the responsibility to track these loans and ensure 
that none of the parties violated the law.  Beyond that, legal accountability was limited. 
Professional accountability existed in two main ways and was very similar to that 
in relation to loan guarantees.  First, the US Treasury was responsible for deciding where 
and when to issue loans (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, p. Ch. 22; Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2008).  Although they were guided by the 
policy itself, the decision of how to issue loans, and at times where to issue them, was 
one left to professional discretion and thus professional accountability. Second, 
SIGTARP audited these loans based on professional standards (SIGTARP, 2009h, pp. 5-
11).  As with loan guarantees, GAO utilized professional standards from the federal 
government’s “green book” and “yellow book”; to determine whether these loans were 
properly given and administered (Mihm & al, 2013).   This focus on best practices and 
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meeting standards established in the federal auditing guidelines was crucial to successful 
tracking of these policies (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009c, pp. 2-6) 
As with loan guarantees, performance accountability was utilized because the 
success of this particular policy tool was, at least partially if not substantially, evaluated 
on the basis of market outcomes and performance.  For example, in the case of loans to 
AIG, the basis for evaluation was whether AIG survived as a result of getting these loans 
from the federal government (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2008).    
Direct loans were necessary when combined with the loan guarantees in order to prevent 
this collapse.  They were, in effect, a tandem approach.  While, as with loan guarantees, 
this is more of a market accountability standard than a performance one, performance 
accountability is certainly a model which borrows plenty from market accountability, and 
what it borrows clearly applies here. 
Grants: 
 A grant is defined as a “gift that has the aim of either ‘stimulating’ or ‘supporting’ 
some sort of service or activity by the recipient (Bean & Conlan, 2002, p. 341).” Grants 
do not disabuse the government of responsibility for a service but they transition 
responsibility for actually undertaking it to a third party, whether private, nonprofit or 
government (Bean & Conlan, 2002).  They are commonly used to help achieve either 
political or policy goals.  
 While by no means a major part of TARP, grants were included in TARP in order 
to get the bill through Congress after it failed the first time.  The federal government 
issued grants in areas ranging from county and forest payments, to transportation 
subsidies and to research in order to ensure that individual members of Congress would 
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vote to approve TARP (Green, 2013).  This sort of action is, of course, extremely 
common in relation to bills with a significant dollar value, and it is therefore not 
surprising that this was the case here. 
 The accountability model utilized in this case was almost entirely political--so 
much so that it does not make sense to discuss the use of other models.  While one can 
argue that professional accountability was used to track these grants, the real motivation 
was political (Green, 2013; Mihm & al, 2013).  These grants were given to specific 
persons or groups that were politically important or well-connected.  The grants were a 
necessary political evil to get an essential bill passed.   
Policy Tools Expected or Asserted but Not Utilized: 
For a variety of reasons, TARP might have been expected to contain some 
elements that were in fact absent.  The policy tools described below were either 
supposedly part of TARP according to its proponents or are surprising exclusions from 
TARP.  For example, while economic deregulation led to the crisis, no real effort was 
made to include economic regulation in the actual TARP law.  On another track, there 
were constant assertions that public information about those getting funds would be 
provided in order to impact the behavior of actors in the marketplace.  Finally, there was 
a mistaken assumption that government was acting as a corporation.  This section 
describes these tools, why they were assumed or thought to be present and how they were 
not. 
Economic Regulation: 
 Economic regulation is defined as something that “imposes formal limitations on 
activities considered undesirable (Salamon, 2000, p. 1652).”  Economic regulations 
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“intervene directly in market decisions such as pricing, competition, market entry, or exit. 
(OECD, 1997, p. 11).”  The point of economic regulation is to restrict undesirable 
activity, to prevent marketplaces from being monopolized or to provide a fair and free 
playing field to consumers.  While many argue that economic regulation restricts 
economic growth, others argue that proper economic regulation ensures growth is 
balanced across the system. 
 Given the history of deregulation as described in the early part of this chapter, one 
could well assume that TARP would reverse this trend.  As Federal Reserve Chairman 
Ben Bernanke said in a September 2008 hearing before the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, “the shortcomings and weaknesses of our financial 
markets and regulatory system must be addressed if we are to avoid a repetition of what 
has transpired in our financial markets over the past year (Bernanke, 2008, p. 4).”  Others 
at the same hearing agreed, including SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, who said “the last 
six months…have made abundantly clear that voluntary regulation doesn’t work.  This is 
a fundamental flaw in the statutory scheme that must be addressed, as I have reported to 
the Congress on prior occasions (Cox, 2008, pp. 5-6).”  There was clearly broad 
understanding that financial regulation needed to increase to help resolve the problems 
that necessitated TARP’s creation. 
 However, no further regulation actually happened at the time.  There are two 
principal reasons why.  First, and as expressed by Bernanke, “the development of a 
comprehensive proposal for reform would require careful and extensive analysis that 
would be difficult to compress into a short legislative timeframe now available 
(Bernanke, 2008, p. 5).”  Stated another way, it was felt that although additional 
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regulation was going to be necessary, increasing regulations would be too time 
consuming and money instead needed to flow immediately to recipients who were in 
trouble at the time. Second, some in the Bush administration argued that, while some 
further regulation was warranted, it was not, in fact, the root cause of the problem.  As 
Secretary Paulson told a Senate Committee “that root cause (of the crisis) is the housing 
correction (Paulson, Testimony by Henry Pauslon Before the Senate Banking Committee, 
2008b, pp. 1-2).”  While Paulson and others later admitted that further regulation was 
necessary, they believed that regulation was not the root cause of the market’s failure.  
Thus, economic regulation was not a part of TARP, even though many assumed it would 
or should be. 
Public Information: 
 “Information is a tool for eliciting desired policy outcomes (Weiss, 2002, p. 
218).”  The public information policy tool can be said to exist when the government 
attempts to use public information in an attempt to change behavior by one or more 
targeted groups.  Perhaps the simplest example is food labels, which are intended the 
buying choices of the general public. 
 Part of the case for TARP was that the amount of money being allocated and put 
into the marketplace made it was necessary to disseminate information on these policies 
as widely as possible.  If the public was going to trust that the government was 
responsibly going to responsibly send out funds at this magnitude, constant and complete 
information to the public was required (Baum, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).  To that end, OFS 
created a database, updated daily, which contained information on any transactions using 
TARP funds and the present value of any assets held by the government that were 
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purchased with such funds (Wilkerson, 2013).  This database was used both by the public 
and by those evaluating the policy’s accountability and effectiveness.  In addition, any 
company that had a loan or had stock purchased a result of TARP funds was required to 
reveal significant information publicly (Green, 2013).  This information was intended to 
force the companies to be accountable and more responsive to the public, which, it was 
thought, would surely use this information to decide which companies to support.  
However, this did not occur (Mihm & al, 2013; Baum, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).  Instead, 
and as SIGTARP commonly stated, this public information did not appear to change the 
behavior of market actors and was not provided as such (SIGTARP, 2010, pp. 2-5). 
Government as a Corporation: 
Government corporations exist when “a government agency, owned and 
controlled by the government (is) set up as a separate corporate entity legally distinct 
from the rest of government (Stanton & Moe, 2002, p. 81).”  Government as a 
corporation does not exist simply when government is a market participant, although 
many assume it does.  Instead, there must be a more business-like, yet government 
owned, activity, such as Fannie Mae. 
 It might appear that government as a corporation was perhaps the biggest tool in 
TARP in that governments have the funds to make purchases and infuse cash into a cash-
starved marketplace (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009d; Government Accountability 
Office, 2009c).  The OFS purchased and held billions of dollars in stocks, preferred 
assets and other private assets of companies ranging from AIG to banks to auto 
manufacturers (US Office of Finanical Stability, 2010; Congressional Oversight Panel, 
2009f).  The government has, and still is, attempting to sell of all of these assets as it took 
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the dominant position in some companies.  However, despite the intentions to act as a 
corporation, there was no separate government corporation created as a part of this law, 
just government purchasing private assets as a market participant.  Consequently, the 
government as a corporation model was not actually utilized  
Conclusion: 
This chapter has shown that in three of four cases multiple accountability models 
explain the policy tool choices.  This tends to prove that the research hypotheses are 
correct and a multiple-model approach has greater explanatory power than a single-model 
approach in almost all cases. 
Nevertheless, it is also clear that TARP was notably complex but also 
significantly different than what was either originally intended, as stated by the 
proponents of the law, and that TARP contained different tools than we might expect.  
Much of this doubtless stemmed from the decision to focus on the outcomes of the crisis 
rather than fixing the system as a whole. As stated above, this was an understandable 
choice.  Whether or not it was the “right choice” is not for this study to say.  This study 
will now turn to the design of ARRA and the accountability models and policy tools it 
utilized. 
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Chapter 4: The Story of ARRA 
 This chapter will first tell the story of how ARRA was designed and how its 
review was intended to be undertaken.  It will then discuss the main policy tools used in 
ARRA and which accountability models were applied in relation to each policy tool.  
This chapter will reveal that all but one of the policy tools (the exception being tax 
expenditures) are at least partially explained by more than one accountability model.  
This reveals that for the most part, the contention that multiple accountability models 
better explain policy tool choice is correct.   
 Before we go any further, however, this chapter will set the stage for ARRA by 
discussing additional aspects of the roots of the crisis.  As with TARP, the events that led 
to the need for ARRA did not begin in 2008 or 2009.  Instead, they began at least as far 
back as 1995 with the beginning of the cycles of jobless recoveries as well as 
deregulation.  The following section will describe that trend in greater detail. 
THE ROOTS OF THE CRISIS: 
 As with TARP, the roots of the crisis that led to ARRA have existed since at least 
1995.  In 1995, the mean income of the American family was about $80,000, which was 
up about $20,000 from the early 1980s (Krugman P. R., 2012, p. 74).  Since 1995, 
however, the mean income has actually dropped slightly, even without adjusting for 
inflation (Krugman P. R., 2012, p. 74).  In that same time period, from the early 1980s to 
2012, the income of the top 1% of American earners has more than doubled (Krugman P. 
R., 2012, p. 74).  Why did this happen?  The root cause lies in the cycle of jobless 
recoveries and deregulation.  The following section will describe the two recessions that 
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occurred in the early 90s, as well as the tech bubble burst of 2000-2001, both of which 
were precursors to the so-called “Great Recession” of 2008.   
The Recession of the Late 1980s/Early 1990s: 
 On October 19, 1987, known in the financial community as “Black Monday 
(Carlson, 2007, p. 7)” the stock market dropped 22% in one of the biggest single day 
declines in US history (Carlson, 2007, pp. 5-9).  There were many causes, not least of 
which was the savings and loan crisis discussed in chapter 3, but one of the major causes 
was deregulation, and perhaps most importantly, rampant borrowing and margin calls 
that allowed traders to buy stocks with money they did not have (Carlson, 2007, pp. 12-
14).  When these margin calls could not be met, as rules of the time required, the bottom 
fell out of the market (Carlson, 2007, pp. 12-14).   
This market crash immediately sent the worldwide economy into recession, with 
the United States and the rest of the developed world particularly affected (McKnees, 
1992, pp. 1-3).  However, it quickly looked like the economy was going to recover quite 
well, as government spending ahead of key elections in the United States and other 
developed nations provided a brief moment of respite, with both consumer spending and 
consumer confidence rising quickly.  Unfortunately, this rise was short-lived as by 1989 
inflation had spiked to 5.9% and economic growth had slowed to a crawl, a factor further 
exacerbated by the Federal Reserve’s decision to raise interest rates in order to avoid run-
away inflation (McKnees, 1992, pp. 3-6).  The problem was then further exacerbated by 
the 1990 Gulf War and the resulting spike in the price of oil from $17 a barrel to $36 a 
barrel in just a few months (Taylor, Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice, 1993, pp. 
197-202).  This sent the US economy into recession, with unemployment rising from 
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5.5% in 1991 to 8% two years later (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013).   The effects were 
widespread, economic, cultural and political.  For example, this recession was most likely 
directly responsible for the defeat of President George HW Bush and the election of 
President Bill Clinton in 1992. 
This recession was followed by the greatest economic expansion since World War 
II.  Although this growth was based on part on technological changes, it was at least 
somewhat illusory.  As Joseph Stiglitz wrote, “The Internet was rightly judged to be a 
transformative innovation.  But the irrational exuberance on the part of investors went 
well beyond anything that could be justified (Sitglitz, 2012, p. 84).”  Leaders and 
investors pumped money into companies they knew, or should have known, were 
probably losers and the legions of tech companies that received funding and had high 
stock prices even though they never made a dime in profits created a bubble that although 
it helped dig the US out of one recession, set the stage for the next one ten years later 
(Sitglitz, 2012, pp. 83-86). 
The Tech Bubble Bursts: 
In the run-up to the 2000 election, the US economy was widely perceived as 
booming.  The average standard of living had risen substantially, the government was 
actually running a surplus and the world was relatively peaceful.  However, trouble 
lurked just below the surface as the massive bubble that had fueled much of the tech 
bubble threatened to burst (Lowenstein, 2003, pp. 114-115).   
Some in the US government had seen this day coming.  For example, the Federal 
Reserve raised interest rates six times between 1998 and 2000, raising the prime interest 
rate from 4.5% to 6.5% in an attempt to control run-away growth and ease the US 
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economy into a soft landing (Federal Reserve Board, 2013; Lowenstein, 2003, pp. 114-
115).  Unfortunately, this did not work as banks continued to lend to companies that had 
never made a profit, with the mantra of growth over profit ruling the day.   
The first tremors of the upcoming bursting of the bubble began to occur in March 
2000 as NASDAQ dropped from a high of around 5000 to just 1700 a year later 
(Willoughby, 2000, pp. 1-2).  Companies began crashing left and right as profits finally 
became more important than growth.  The list of major tech firms that crashed in that 
period is full of names that many Americans would recognize, such as Pets.com, 
Broadcast.com and Geocities (Economist, 2000).  These failures, referred to by some as 
“.Dot Bombs (Economist, 2000)” represented the collapse of the tech sector.  Yet, 
matters were about to get far worse. 
The September 11, 2001 attacks provided an economic shock that exacerbated the 
already existing problems.  These effects were primarily felt in three industries: 
insurance, tourism and the airline industry.  Insurance was impacted both directly by the 
crisis and indirectly by how it changed future practices.  As a Congressional Research 
Service report noted, “The loss of life and property gave rise to the largest 
property/casualty claim in history, estimated at $40 billion (Makinen, 2002, p. 4).”  In 
addition, this report noted that future insurance for terrorist attacks was more expensive, 
limited and harder to come by (Makinen, 2002, pp. 3-4).  The airline industry was 
obviously directly affected by the crisis but it also helped push over the edge an industry 
that had been teetering (Makinen, 2002, pp. 3-6).  Not only was overall airline use down 
but a drop in tourism due to fears related to travel was a dual blow to both industries 
(Makinen, 2002, pp. 3-6).   
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 Nonetheless, the impact of the economic crisis began to abate in 2002, with GDP 
rising as the economy dug itself out of its tailspin (Bureau of Ecnomic Analysis, 2013).  
Even as the growth of GDP continued and the jobless rate dropped, however, much more 
of the growth was in GDP than in jobs, making this largely a “jobless recovery (Krugman 
P. R., 2012, pp. 228-229).”  More to the point, the jobs that were created were at lower 
income levels, even as productivity continued to climb (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2013b).   
What does all this have to with the 2008 financial crisis?  The growth of income 
inequality and the jobless recovery were part of the overall economy and thus became a 
key factor in the 2008 economic crisis.  In fact, income inequality in 2007 was about as 
bad as it was in the years leading up to the great depression of the 1930s (Krugman P. R., 
2012, pp. 79-84).   
Yet, others argue that while income inequality might be a part of the problem the 
main cause of the downturn was the government’s own failures.  Taylor, Rogoff and 
others instead argue that, for example, government’s policy decisions to encourage home 
ownership among those that could not reasonably be expected to afford a home played a 
role in the crisis and that the government’s interference in the marketplace generally does 
more harm than good (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009; Taylor, 2008; Rose & Spiegel, 2009).  
As a result of this, they argue that government should not act to try and fix these 
problems but instead largely leave it to the private sector to sort them out. 
THE CASE OF ARRA: ATTEMPTING TO KICK START A STALLED ECONOMY 
Let us now fast forward to late 2008.  The following section will provide the 
background behind ARRA and describe the need for, development of, passage and 
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components of this critical piece of legislation. First, this chapter will describe the initial 
need for a further stimulus package.  Second, this chapter will describe the development 
of the proposal between the Obama White House and Congress.  Third, this chapter will 
describe the final passage and design of ARRA.  The case history is far less complex and 
more straightforward than with TARP but it is no less important. 
The Initial Need for a Further Stimulus Package: 
Keynesian economics is based on the fundamental assertion that when economic 
times are slow, the best way to move forward is for government to spend more in order to 
fill the gap in demand not being filled by the private sector (Keynes 1936).  As Keynes 
himself wrote to FDR in 1933, “The United States is ready to roll towards prosperity if a 
good hard shove is given in the next sixth months. (Keynes, 1933).” During the great 
depression, FDR listened to such advice and created programs such as the Works 
Progress Administration to provide jobs to citizens in order to decrease, at least slightly, 
the huge unemployment problems of the times.  Similar problems, although not nearly as 
widespread, beset the United States during the 2008 economic crisis. 
Even with TARP’s hefty price tag, it was clear to the incoming Obama 
administration that TARP alone would not avoid further economic deterioration since, 
among other things; it only assisted a small part of the American economy.  Specifically, 
TARP attacked the problems in the financial markets but did nothing to stop the jobs 
crisis that had put millions of Americans out of work.  Moreover, TARP was never 
intended to attack the jobs problem (Baum, 2013). 
The need for an additional stimulus bill was perhaps best highlighted in a national 
radio address aired by then President-elect Obama on January 8, 2009, in which he spoke 
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of the need for a sweeping stimulus bill (Obama, Obama's Speech on the Econmy, 2009). 
Obama set out six goals that any stimulus legislation should accomplish: (1) creating 
three million new jobs-80% in the private sector, (2) doubling renewable energy 
production and renovating old buildings, (3) rebuilding infrastructure, (4) updating and 
computerizing the health care system, (5) building “21st century classrooms” and (6) 
providing tax relief to 95% of Americans (Obama, Obama's Speech on the Econmy, 
2009).  As Obama said in the same speech, "I don't believe that it's too late to change 
course, but it will be if we don't take dramatic action as soon as possible. If nothing is 
done, this recession could linger for years. The unemployment rate could reach double-
digits. (Obama, 2009). “To help prevent such a jump in unemployment, Obama proposed 
a broad counter-cyclical stimulus designed to create jobs, both directly and indirectly as 
much to prevent further job losses in areas such as education and healthcare (Obama, 
2009) .  Obama's team then predicted that its proposed stimulus plan would keep 
unemployment under 8% and that unemployment could otherwise be expected to reach or 
exceed 10% (Romer & Bernstein, 2009, p. 4).   
Yet, there was not broad agreement among all economists that spending and tax 
expenditures would actually help.  As Kenneth Rogoff wrote in 2008, “A large expansion 
in debt will impose enormous fiscal costs on the US, ultimately hitting growth through a 
combination of higher taxes and lower spending (Rogoff, 2008).”  Despite this and other 
concerns, Obama pushed ahead with his plan and began development of it in earnest 
shortly thereafter as described in the next section. 
Proposal Development Between the Obama White House and Congress: 
Even before he took office, President-elect Obama met constantly with leaders 
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from both houses of Congress so that a stimulus bill could be designed and voted on as 
quickly as possible.  Obama set a goal of getting the law to his desk for signature by 
February 16, less than a month after he took office (Obama, 2009).  The basis for the 
bill’s design was the framework Obama set out in his January 2009 speech (Obama, 
2009). 
Many economists agreed that a stimulus bill was necessary and that the only 
question was how big and how to design and approach it.  Yet this feeling was far from 
universal.  In a January 2009 ad published in the Wall Street Journal by the Cato 
Institute, several leading conservative economists argued that, “it is a triumph of hope 
over experience to believe that more government spending will help the U.S. today. To 
improve the economy, policymakers should focus on reforms that remove impediments to 
work, saving, investment and production. Lower tax rates and a reduction in the burden 
of government are the best ways of using fiscal policy to boost growth. (Cato Institute, 
2009).”  These economists argued that Obama had it all wrong and that the proposed plan 
would therefore do far more harm than good. 
 On the other side, some, such as Paul Krugman, thought the proposed stimulus 
bill was too small to achieve the hoped for outcomes (Krugman P. , 2009).  As Krugman 
wrote, “Whatever the explanation, the Obama plan just doesn’t look adequate to the 
economy’s need. To be sure, a third of a loaf is better than none. But right now we seem 
to be facing two major economic gaps: the gap between the economy’s potential and its 
likely performance, and the gap between Mr. Obama’s stern economic rhetoric and his 
somewhat disappointing economic plan (Krugman P. , 2009).”  While some agreed with 
Krugman that the bill was too small, many others thought either that the bill was well 
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designed and of the right size (Center for American Progress Action Fund, 2009) or that 
the bill should focus more heavily on tax relief and cutting the size of government as 
noted above (Cato Institute, 2009).   
The initial version of ARRA was introduced as HR 1 on January 26, 2009, 
sponsored by Appropriations Committee Chair Rep. David Obey (D-WI) (HR 1, 2009).  
The House bill focused on three broad categories of spending (HR 1, 2009).  The first, 
was tax expenditures, primarily focused on helping those who were unemployed or 
middle or low income (HR 1, 2009).  Second, the act proposed a “state stabilization fund’ 
in order to backfill lost revenue in state and local budgets (HR 1, 2009).  Third, the act 
proposed broad direct federal spending in areas such as infrastructure and health care in 
order to provide jobs and to fill gaps not currently being filled by the struggling private 
sector (HR 1, 2009).  The House version of ARRA was priced at approximately $827 
billion (Congressional Research Service, 2009c, pp. 1-4).  206 amendments were 
scheduled for floor votes but were combined into only 11 so as to ensure quick passage 
(Congressional Research Service, 2009c, pp. 1-4).  On January 28, the House passed HR 
1 by a vote of 244-188, with 11 Democrats and the entire House GOP caucus voting 
against the bill (Clerk of the US House, 2009).   
The Senate had already introduced its own version of ARRA on January 1, 2009, 
S. 1, with the lead sponsor being Senator Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) (S 1, 
2009).  There were three major differences between the House and Senate bills.  First, 
Senate Democrats proposed a one year extension of revisions to the Alternative 
Minimum Tax (AMT), which added $70 billion to the bill's cost (Congressional Budget 
Office, 2009, pp. 4-5).  Second, Senate Democrats proposed cutting aid to states and 
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providing additional aid to the elderly (Congressional Budget Office, 2009, pp. 2-5).   
Third, Senate Democrats favored spending on health care and renewable energy while the 
House favored spending on education, infrastructure and aid to the unemployed 
(Congressional Research Service, 2009b, pp. 1-4; Congressional Budget Office, 2009, pp. 
2-5).   The final Senate version was priced at approximately $820 billion (S 1, 2009).   
In spite of these differences, the Senate still realized it had to move quickly.  The 
results of failing to act were seen as potentially catastrophic by many in Congress, 
especially by those on the President’s side of the aisle (Associated Press, 2009).   As 
Congressman David Obey (D-WI) said on the US House floor on January 28, 2009, “This 
bill is hugely expensive. But it is not nearly as costly as continuing business as usual. It 
has a big price tag because we are dealing with a big problem (Congressional Record, 
2009, p. H620).”  The Senate took up the bill on February 6 and debate moved quickly.  
The Senate invoked cloture on February 7 by a vote of 61-36 (US Senate, 2009).  The 
Senate then passed its version of the bill on February 10 by a vote of 61-37 with Senators 
Snowe and Collins of Maine and Specter of Pennsylvania being the only Republicans to 
vote in favor while all Senate democrats voted in favor of the amended HR 1 (US Senate, 
2009b).   
A conference committee was created immediately upon the Senate's passage of 
HR 1.  A conference report was quickly agreed on and largely stuck to the Senate version 
of the bill when it came to bridging the gap. (Conference Commtitee on HR 1 (2009), 
2009)  Specifically, the conference report kept the Senate’s AMT changes, although it 
slightly raised the level at which relief was provided (Conference Commtitee on HR 1 
(2009), 2009, p. Part 2).  The conference report also increased the so-called "Making 
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Work Pay" tax credit (Conference Commtitee on HR 1 (2009), 2009, pp. Part 1-Sec 
1001).  It also provided COBRA subsidies for workers who had been laid off in order to 
make it easier for them to afford health care, as well as other provisions (Conference 
Commtitee on HR 1 (2009), 2009, pp. Part VI, Sec. 1889F).  The cost of the conference 
report bill was lower than either the Senate or House bills, primarily because the 
conference committee chose to provide less direct aid to individuals than had been 
proposed by either chamber (Congressional Research Service, 2009).  The final bill 
proposed a $250 onetime payment to low income workers/retirees instead of the $300 
proposed by the Senate and the $450 proposed by the House (Congressional Research 
Service, 2009). 
The conference report was completed on February 11.  The House voted on the 
revised bill on February 13, approving the conference report by a vote of 246-183, again 
without a single Republican “yes” vote (Clerk of the US House, 2009b).  The Senate 
approved the conference report later that same day by a 60-38 vote, with the same three 
republicans in favor and every Democrat voting in the affirmative (US Senate, 2009c).  
President Obama signed the bill into law on February 17, 2009 (ARRA, 2009). 
The Design of ARRA: 
 ARRA is composed of three primary components (Recovery.gov, 2010c): (1) a 
$288 billion package of tax cuts and tax expenditures for both business and personal 
taxpayers; (2) $224 billion in aid to states to help preserve entitlement programs 
(primarily unemployment benefits), health care and education programs which were 
otherwise in danger of being cut; and (3) $275 billion in federal contracts, grants and 
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loans3 to fund a series of projects, from infrastructure to research to environmental 
preservation and beyond (Recovery.gov, 2010c; Congressional Budget Office, 2009).  It 
is this last $275 billion that has received by far the most scrutiny since it is the portion of 
ARRA that allows for the greatest spending discretion and thus required the closest 
scrutiny.  Projects often had to be shovel-ready.  As a result, money wasn't necessarily 
going to be used where it might arguably have been most needed.  This concerned many 
members of Congress since it meant that only governments already prepared to spend 
funds actually got them. 
This was no WPA-style approach like that seen back in the Great Depression 
(Krugman P. R., 2012, pp. 118-123).  Although direct spending to create jobs occurred in 
addition to amounts used to backfill state budgets, this was a very small part of the 
overall picture (Krugman P. R., 2012, p. 121).   Much of this spending on infrastructure 
projects was also designed from the start to utilize contractors rather than direct spending, 
further adding to the costs of the programs since the contractors had to make a profit 
(Krugman P. R., 2012, pp. 121-124; Sitglitz, 2012, p. 271).  Even if all the money that 
had been designed to be spent on direct job creation was in fact spent, this would have 
amounted to two percent of total economic activity during the three year period over 
which many, including Krugman, expected the crisis to last (Krugman P. R., 2012, p. 
122).  As a result, there could be no fundamental fix here. 
Adding to the problem was the fact that during this time, there was no approved 
head of the office of federal procurement policy (OFPP) (Office of Management and 
                                                           
3
 According to Recovery.gov, as of late 2010, 174,195 grants were issued under this section of ARRA, along 
with 34,191 contracts and 1,600 loans (Recovery.gov, 2010c). 
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Budget, 2011).  In fact, a head of OFFP was not appointed and confirmed until October 
2009, several months after ARRA’s passage (Office of Management and Budget, 2011).  
This meant that there was no one in charge of policy changes needed to implement this 
large amount of government spending.  This likely had an impact on ARRA’s 
implementation, but may also have affected its design since there was no person at OFPP 
to help design or implement these regulations. 
OMB took a very unusual approach for ARRA by being very open to comments 
and by getting the initial regulations out and then constantly adapting them (Mihm & al, 
2013).  OMB is usually far more insular, more willing to dictate what will happen than 
being willing to listen to how it should happen.  This was due to the accountability 
community insisting on involvement from the start (Mihm & al, 2013).  Attempts were 
made to involve state and local auditors, but they left out many cities and smaller 
governments (Mihm & al, 2013).  Most notably, the accountability systems set up in 
ARRA responded to the concerns of entities with the capacity to respond to these 
requirements but did not allow for smaller cities to be able to take advantage of ARRA 
funds as they could not afford the staff time to account properly for their expenditures as 
the law required (Mihm & al, 2013). 
SETTING THE STAGE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: GAO AND RATB 
In order to ensure accountability for ARRA, the law relied primarily on two 
organizations, one of which previously existed (the GAO) and one which was created by 
the legislation (the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board or RATB).  This 
section briefly introduces the role and approaches that each of these two organizations 
took in carrying out their responsibilities in this case. 
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GAO: A Broader and Quicker Mission 
 Since the GAO was already introduced in chapter 3, this chapter will move 
immediately to describe its role in this case.  During the study period, the GAO produced 
49 different reports related to ARRA and also testified before congressional committees 
numerous times.  These reports were of three primary types.  First, reports which 
summarized ARRA more generally and considered its overall effectiveness. Second, 
reports which analyzed specific aspects of ARRA and made suggestions, primarily 
concerning how to better manage aspects of its implementation (Mihm & al, 2013).  
Third, reports tracking state level spending of ARRA funds in select states.  Simply put, 
GAO created a select group of representative states and tracked the spending of ARRA 
funds in them (Mihm & al, 2013).  Regardless, GAO took a broader and deeper view than 
any of the other organizations established to ensure accountability under ARRA. 
GAO’s primary focus was on the 11 mandates it had under the law (ARRA).  
GAO particularly focused on two main ones, state and local government spending and 
job numbers (Mihm & al, 2013).  GAO encouraged Congress to focus on how many jobs 
were funded rather than created or saved since this was seen as a more reliable metric.  
GAO also sought to help Congress’s own internal controls and reporting.  GAO reported 
constantly but their main reports came out on a bimonthly basis (Mihm & al, 2013).  
In order to track state and local funds, GAO placed teams in 16 different states. 
GAO picked states to focus on based on money and population.  GAO started with big 
states and then looked to fill the gap in what was not represented, such as the South and 
Midwest.  GAO ended up with teams in states representing about two thirds of the money 
and people.  GAO was given $25 million to help track ARRA and hired over 100 new 
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employees, many of whom were former auditors or GAO employees,, most of whom 
were sent to one of the new field offices (Mihm & al, 2013).  The field teams would 
observe and send data back to GAO’s DC headquarters where topic experts would 
confirm it, as is normal GAO procedure.  When the money ran out to fund GAO's ARRA 
operations in late 2010, all of the temporary offices were closed.  GAO then continued 
reporting on those states, albeit from afar instead of on the ground (Mihm & al, 2013). 
GAO focused on four primary measures.  First, was the money sent out?  Second, 
was the money tagged properly?  Third, where did the money actually go?  Fourth, how 
many jobs were created or saved? This led to a focus on real time reporting and maps 
(Mihm & al, 2013).  This was not something GAO was used to.  Accountability is usually 
reactive and this was more proactive.  Nonetheless, it was a useful approach and one the 
GAO asserts will help improve work processes in the future.  As one GAO employee said 
“Tracking money in real time will help us learn better what we should be alert for during 
the normal report-writing process, even as it remains mostly after the fact and not real-
time (Mihm & al, 2013).” 
GAO viewed ARRA as a pure political calculus.  This was because a lot of focus 
was on being able to brag about projects locally.  In the GAO’ s view, ARRA  ended up 
becoming almost a grant program, providing temporary aid to distressed governments in 
order to help replace revenue lost by the recession (Mihm & al, 2013).   
The RATB: Inspector Generals Tracking ARRA’s Implementation 
 In order to ensure that the funds expended in ARRA were spent in an efficient, 
effective and legal manner, ARRA created an 11-member board, known as the RATB, 
which oversaw ARRA’s implementation.  This board consisted primarily of inspectors 
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general from federal agencies which received funds under ARRA.  They were 
responsible for tracking funds, receiving reports from those that spent ARRA funds 
(specifically from any organization that spent more than $25,000 in ARRA funds) and for 
running the Recovery.gov website, which was the primary public portal for information 
on ARRA (Office of Management and Budget, 2009, p. 14). 
 Unlike the other organizations that were part of ensuring accountability for TARP 
or ARRA, RATB did not write many reports.  In fact, RATB only wrote six fairly general 
reports on ARRA implementation and accountability during the study period.  Instead, 
RATB’s role was to track expenditures of funds, ensure proper utilization of metrics such 
as “jobs created or saved” and ensure compliance of individual actors with the law 
(Recovery.gov, 2010).  Given the inspector general style under which the RATB 
operated, this was not surprising.  Reports by inspector generals are rarely public. 
Now that this chapter has described the organizations responsible for ensuring 
accountability in ARRA, the next section will describe the policy tools used for ARRA 
and the accountability models designed to evaluate their usage. 
POLICY TOOLS IN ARRA: TAX EXPENDITURES, CONTRACTING, GRANTS 
AND PUBLIC INFORMATION: 
 While TARP was focused on making sure key institutions did not collapse with 
most funds expected to be returned to the taxpayers, ARRA was a more typical 
countercyclical stimulus bill.  There was nothing new or different about how ARRA 
undertook its work; the tools were used in ways they had commonly been used before.  
They were just used on a larger and broader scale. 
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 This section focuses on the main policy tools used in ARRA.  Each policy tool 
will be described as to its definition in the literature, usage in ARRA and the 
accountability models relied upon.  The main tools were (1) tax expenditures, (2) 
contracting, (3) grants and (4) public information.  These are by no means an exhaustive 
list of the policy tools used in ARRA but they are the main ones and are in agreement 
with those listed in OMB’s initial ARRA guidance, which listed the rules for each 
program by policy tool (Office of Management and Budget, 2009; Office of Management 
and Budget, 2009b). 
Tax Expenditures: 
 A tax expenditure is defined as “a provision in tax law that usually encourages 
certain behavior by individuals or corporations by deferring, reducing or eliminating their 
tax obligation (Howard, 2002, p. 411).”  Tax expenditures, in effect, “expend” funds 
through the tax code indirectly rather than through direct spending.  The cost may be the 
same, but the tool and approach are different.  Tax expenditures are broadly used by 
government to encourage behavior in a number of areas (Howard, 2002, pp. 410-415).  
Some classic examples include those designed to encourage home buying by allowing 
taxpayers to deduct mortgage costs, as well as targeted tax credits/deductions to 
encourage purchase of energy-efficient vehicles or home items.    
Of the three main parts of ARRA, tax expenditures were arguably the least 
controversial.  Although there was debate over which tax expenditures made the most 
sense, there was widespread agreement that significant tax expenditures were necessary 
for any stimulus bill.  Tax expenditures in ARRA totaled $288 billion, more than any 
other single part of the bill (Government Accountability Office, 2010, pp. 2-6).  They 
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were split into several parts, with $237 billion earmarked for individuals, mainly in 
Alternative Minimum Tax and Payroll Tax changes and $51 billion for corporations 
(ARRA, 2009, p. Title I).  These tax expenditures, most of which were temporary, 
constituted 37% of ARRA’s total cost (ARRA, 2009, p. Title I; Recovery.gov, 2010b). 
 In spite of the high cost of these tax expenditures, there was almost no 
accountability for how the funds were spent and how effective they were.  Only the 
political model of accountability was really put into effect here.  While there are certainly 
many legitimate policy reasons why tax expenditures were the right choice to make, there 
was no tracking by GAO, RATB or anyone else in determining the impact these tax 
expenditures had on the economy or on jobs created or saved (Government 
Accountability Office, 2010, pp. 2-6).  They were, as GAO’s Chris Mihm stated “purely 
political (Mihm & al, 2013).”  For example, and given the administration’s stated goal of 
assisting those most directly affected by the economic downturn, reducing FICA taxes in 
particular was both a political and policy win for the Obama team.  Members of Congress 
had to be able to bring something tangible home to their districts in order to sell ARRA to 
a public already skeptical about bailing out the financial sector a few months earlier. 
As Senator McCain (R-AZ) said in the Senate’s final debate on ARRA, “We are 
on a spending spree of unprecedented and historic proportions. We are committing what 
some of us have called generational theft because we are laying this debt on our children 
and our grandchildren (Congressional Record, 2009b, p. S2311).”  However, this does 
not mean that there was a lot of accountability; beyond political accountability there was 
not (Government Accountability Office, 2010, pp. 4-5; Mihm & al, 2013).    
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Contracting: 
 Contracting is defined as a “business arrangement between a government and a 
private entity in which the private entity promises, in exchange for money, to deliver 
certain products or services to the government agency or to others on the government’s 
behalf (Kelman, 2002, p. 282).”  Contracting is one of the most pervasive tools utilized in 
government today, with many services formerly directly provided by government being 
contracted out (Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 1-20).  It is important to note, however, that, even 
when services are contracted out, government is still responsible for ensuring the quality 
of contracted goods and services, and should take due care to ensure they are efficiently 
and effectively provided (Cooper P. J., 2003, pp. 1-20). 
While many ARRA funds went directly to state and local governments to help fill 
their budget holes, most new projects were contracted out.  These funds, mainly in the 
areas of infrastructure and energy efficiency, were designed to give business directly to 
the private sector.  Most of these funds were dispersed via “pass through” methods which 
involved giving state and local governments the balance of the funds to distribute with a 
smaller amount distributed by the federal government itself (Government Accountability 
Office, 2010b, pp. 1-5).  GAO identified more than 28,000 contracts that had been issued 
by late November 2009, only nine months after ARRA’s passage (Government 
Accountability Office, 2010b, pp. 1-5).    
 The accountability models in place for contracts were primarily legal and 
professional, with some political and performance accountability thrown in.  The political 
accountability is fairly straightforward.  The signs that were everywhere after ARRA’s 
passage were intended to allow both the federal government and local representatives to 
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make clear where the money was being spent in each community (Mihm & al, 2013).  
Without those signs, political accountability for these contracts would likely have been 
more difficult to achieve. 
 Legal accountability existed because of the personal and institutional 
responsibility of those signing such contracts to avoid waste, fraud and abuse.  The rules 
set out by the RATB and OMB made clear that those receiving funds as a result of a 
contract would be held personally responsible for the proper expenditure and service 
delivery required under those contracts (Office of Management and Budget, 2009, p. Sec. 
2; Office of Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec 2 and 3).  As the updated guidelines 
on implementing contracts under ARRA stated, “The critical importance of the Recovery 
Act, and the funds it will make available to stimulate the American economy, require 
heightened management attention on acquisition planning. (Office of Management and 
Budget, 2009b, p. 52)”  Agencies were required to provide heightened scrutiny to all 
contracts and to ensure that they were undertaken with full transparency and dollar for 
dollar accountability (Office of Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 6).  As Acting 
Comptroller General Gene Doardo noted in testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, RATB also had a key role here, as it was required to 
“review grants and contracts, to ensure they meet applicable standards, follow 
competition requirements and are overseen by sufficient numbers of trained acquisition 
and grants personnel (Doardo G. L., 2009b, p. 3).”  The RATB was thus responsible for 
ensuring that contracts followed all standard protocols and were in concurrence with 
existing contracting laws, rules and regulations, a clear usage of legal accountability. 
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 Professional accountability existed in the evaluation of with whom to contract, 
where to contract and evaluation of contract success.  Where to contract out was a 
decision based on exiting federal standards (Mihm & al, 2013; Office of Management 
and Budget, 2009, p. Sec. 6) and the best professional judgment of those in the state or 
agency administering these contracts.  With pressure to act in order to encourage private 
sector job growth, there was doubtless pressure to contract out as much as possible, but 
the decisions made were still fundamentally based on professional standards.  In fact, 
even though there was pressure to get funds out quickly, ARRA did not authorize usage 
of expedited emergency contracting procedures (Office of Management and Budget, 
2009b, p. Sec. 6.2.1).  Instead, agencies were required to follow normal procedures, 
which are based on professional standards, in order to ensure the best outcome for each 
contract.  GAO reports that nearly all of the contracts issued under ARRA were issued 
competitively, meaning that a professional determination was made as to who was the 
best to contract with (Government Accountability Office, 2010b, pp. 1-10).  Evaluation 
of contract success would then be based on established professional standards, even if the 
ultimate responsibility for any shortcomings was more of a legal accountability approach.  
Regardless, these three areas represent a clear usage of professional accountability as it 
relates to contracts under ARRA. 
 Performance accountability was present as well.  According to OMB’s ARRA 
regulations, agencies were required to produce performance plans both for ARRA 
generally and for specific contracts and to ensure that these were met (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 6).  Specifically, “Agencies must provide for 
appropriate oversight of contracts to ensure outcomes that are consistent with and 
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measurable against agency plans and goals under the Act (Office of Management and 
Budget, 2009b, p. 59).”  Put briefly, agencies had to show, every step of the way, that 
they were making progress towards measurable outcomes.  This requirement that 
performance and measurable outcomes be a direct part of any contracting decision was a 
clear usage of performance accountability. 
Grants: 
 As explained in the last chapter, a grant is a “gift that has the aim of either 
‘stimulating’ or ‘supporting’ some sort of service or activity by the recipient (Bean & 
Conlan, 2002, p. 341).” Grants do not excuse the government from responsibility for a 
service but they transition responsibility for actually undertaking it to a third party, 
whether private, nonprofit or government (Bean & Conlan, 2002, pp. 340-343).  They are 
commonly used to help achieve either political or policy goals.  
 In addition to contracts, ARRA included many grants in areas ranging from 
education to technology development to community health.  The idea behind these grants 
was twofold.  First, to use the available funding under ARRA to jumpstart research in 
areas that either hadn’t been funded to the new administration’s satisfaction or had seen 
the economy sap available grant funds (Office of the Inspector General for the USDA, 
2009, pp. 2-7).  Second, to help backfill state or local funding that had dried up as a result 
of the recession (Green, 2013; Government Accountability Office, 2009k, pp. 3-8).  
While contracts and grants are often confused with one another, including, at times, on 
Recovery.gov, this study makes a clear distinction between contracted services, where 
something tangible like a road or a direct service is to be delivered, and grants for 
research or technological development that are meant to be temporary and do not 
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necessarily result in a tangible outcome (Green, 2013; Government Accountability 
Office, 2009k, pp. 3-8). 
 There was a problem, however, with issuing grants since during this period 
grants.gov, the federal government’s primary grant application system, was undergoing 
serious problems.  For example, it was extremely difficult to submit applications to 
grants.gov due to technical problems, including problems uploading needed attachments 
and logging in to the system at all (Government Accountability Office, 2009l, pp. 18-22).  
While this issue deals with primarily implementation and not design, the fact that 
grants.gov was not fixed when it was known to be a problem before ARRA is nonetheless 
worth noting. 
 As with contracts, the accountability models in relation to grants are primarily 
legal and professional but with some performance and political accountability as well.  
Unlike contracts, and since grants are not often as visible, there is not as much political 
accountability except inasmuch as politicians may brag about a specific grant for their 
specific districts. Legal accountability existed, as with contracts, in the tight control and 
responsibility that grant recipients had for funds (Government Accountability Office, 
2009k, pp. 3-8).  For example, USDA Inspector General Phyllis Fong stated that the 
inspectors general, both independently and as a result of ARRA, would be focusing on 
monitoring all “grant planning activities (Fong, 2009, p. 7)” and would focus their efforts 
on those grants deemed high-risk given their experience with the agency, recipient and 
the grant in question (Fong, 2009, p. 7).  Every penny had to be recorded and reported 
and constant reports were required in order to discourage and hopefully avoid waste, 
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fraud and abuse.  As with contracts, this approach, placing a personal or organizational 
onus for reporting and accountability, is a clear usage of legal accountability. 
 Also as with contracts, professional accountability was utilized in the grant 
process.  Where to issue grants was certainly directed by the legislation but broad leeway 
was given within program areas.  For example, although much grant funding was 
designated for new renewable energy technologies, there was plenty of leeway for 
professional standards to determine which technologies deserved grant funds (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 5).  The same was true when it came to deciding 
who should get the grants.  As was the case with contracts, expedited award procedures 
were generally not authorized under ARRA (Office of Management and Budget, 2009b, 
p. Sec 5.2).  Instead, standard federal grant rules were used, based on professional 
standards, to choose among grant applicants (Office of Management and Budget, 2009b, 
p. Sec. 5.2).  In fact, the actual standards were even higher, since, as OMB wrote in the 
implementing regulations, “Agencies must take steps, beyond standard practice, to 
initiate additional oversight mechanisms in order to mitigate the unique implementation 
risks of the Recovery Act. (Office of Management and Budget, 2009b, p. 49)”   As for 
evaluation of grants issued, professional standards as laid out by GAO and OMB were 
once again the focus for evaluation (Government Accountability Office, 2010b; Office of 
Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 5).  These represent a clear usage of 
professional accountability as it relates to the grants policy tool. 
 The implementing regulations for grants under ARRA require that “Agencies 
must adapt current performance evaluation and review processes to include the ability to 
report periodically on completion status of the program or activity, and program and 
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economic outcomes, consistent with Recovery Act requirements. (Office of Management 
and Budget, 2009b, p. 49)”  Agencies were required to show that each grant not only met 
specific performance goals but also that the overall grants structure in the agency met the 
general performance goals of the required ARRA performance plan (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 5.4.1)  Agencies were also required to validate 
their performance measures with the relevant Inspector General’s Office, to ensure that 
they were sufficient to ensure measureable outcomes (Office of Management and Budget, 
2009b, p. Sec 5.4.1). 
Public Information: 
As defined in the last chapter, the public information policy tool can be said to 
exist when government uses public information as a way to encourage a change in 
behavior, largely by private actors but possibly by public ones as well.  Public 
information was utilized in relation to ARRA in the broad publication of all data on those 
sending and receiving funds on recovery.gov, most notably by placing all recipients on a 
map with these details of the funds they were awarded clearly displayed (Recovery.gov, 
2010b).  These steps represent public information policy because they are intended to 
influence the behavior of decision-makers on where to send funds, contracts and grants.  
Knowing that their decisions will be immediately subject to public scrutiny was intended 
to change the behavior of these actors since they might tend to make different decisions 
knowing that their work was clearly public.  
Political and performance accountability were present in relation to this tool.  
Political accountability was present in two ways.  First, the map-based reporting system 
allowed members of Congress to demonstrate where funds were being spent locally 
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(Green, 2013).  This was then used to help encourage support, by some at least, for 
ARRA.  Second, congressional oversight was based on this localized approach and 
Congress chose to evaluate ARRA’s public information based on this standard (Green, 
2013). 
 Performance accountability was present due to the usage of the jobs created/saved 
versus funds expended as based on the map-based localized approach.   The focus here 
was on ensuring that each community got equal, or close to equal, help from their share 
of ARRA funds in various forms. This type of local approach to ensuring that each 
community recovered its “fair share” of funds and that the funds were to be spent 
properly is an example of performance accountability. 
Conclusion: 
 Unlike TARP, ARRA was fairly close to what was originally intended: a broad-
based stimulus bill focused primarily on direct government spending (albeit via indirect 
means such as grants and contracts) and tax expenditures.  Whether or not this is the right 
policy mix is not for this study to say.   This study will now proceed to analyze what this 
all means relative to the initial research questions posed and analyze the extent to which 
each accountability model does, or does not, explain policy tool choice. 
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Chapter 5: Analyzing Trends and Meanings for Current and Future Research 
 In chapters 3 and 4, this study described the cases of TARP and ARRA.  This 
chapter will analyze these cases and describe what they mean for both theory and 
practice.  This chapter will explain the answers to the questions posed by the literature 
gaps in chapter one.  It will do so by focusing first on the two primary research 
hypotheses, that a single model approach is insufficient to explain policy tool choice and 
that a multiple model approach is superior.  This chapter will then proceed to describe 
what this means in relation to theory and practice, to explain what this study has added to 
the literature and to provide some guidance for future research. 
ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION: SINGLE MODELS INSUFFICIENT, 
MULTIPLE MODELS SUPERIOR, TOOL MATCH NOT AS CLEAR 
The research question for this study was how effectively any one of the four most 
commonly used models of accountability explains the policy tool choices made to 
address the accountability issues in TARP and ARRA.  To answer this question, the study 
posed two hypotheses.  First, that no one model explains the policy tool choices in either 
TARP, ARRA or both.  Second, that using multiple models will better explain these 
policy tool choices.  This section will analyze both of these hypotheses before moving on 
to answer the main research question. 
Single Models Insufficient to Explain Policy Tool Choice: 
The first hypothesis was based on the assumption that tool choices are complex 
and therefore that none of the four accountability models would, by themselves, fully 
explains most policy tool choices.  In all but two cases, the tax expenditure tool for 
ARRA and grants for TARP, the data supported this hypothesis.  In order to demonstrate 
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that the data back up this assertion, this section will go through each of the pertinent 
policy tools in turn, beginning with the policy tools used in TARP and then moving on to 
the policy tools used in ARRA, attempting to explain them using only one policy tool. 
Direct Government in TARP: 
Direct government was used in TARP in the creation of OFS.  Political 
accountability explains this choice in the requirement that the Senate approve the director 
of OFS and that OFS had a key role in managing treasury’s investments in relation to 
TARP (Office of Financial Stability, 2014).  It might even explain the creation of 
SIGTARP as a body to monitor and provide oversight, but it does not explain the 
standards SIGTARP used, which focused on standard inspector general auditing 
standards and procedures (SIGTARP, 2009f, pp. 1-10).  SIGTARP evaluated OFS’s 
decisions of where to invest its funds and how it monitored them based on the principle 
of individual legal responsibility, a typical legal accountability approach (SIGTARP, 
2009f, pp. 1-10).  The legal accountability used in SIGTARP along with political and 
professional accountability mean that the data shows that a single model does not explain 
the tool choice. 
Loan Guarantees in TARP: 
Loan guarantees existed in TARP’s provisions guaranteeing that the government 
would ensure that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be solvent so as to avoid their 
(and arguably the housing market’s) collapse.  Professional accountability explains part 
of this choice as the US Treasury was given a role in determining where and when to 
issue loan guarantees in concert with established professional standards, which after all is 
the basis for professional accountability (Baum, 2013).  However, professional 
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accountability does not explain the performance metric by which these loan guarantees 
were based on, that the areas in which they were being given remain stable and that, for 
example, the money market not break the buck (Condon, 2008).  Once again, therefore, a 
single model approach does not fully explain tool choice. 
Direct Loans in TARP: 
Direct loans were utilized in TARP in the form of loans given to the big three auto 
manufacturers as well as to AIG.  Political accountability explains part of this tool choice 
in that the institutions chosen to get loans were not only economically important but also 
politically important (Wilkerson, 2013).  As the two former top staffers in the COP said 
in interviews, the reason why the auto manufacturers in particular had to be rescued was 
as much politics as it was policy (Baum, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).   Underscoring this 
point, President Bush said in relation to the auto bailout “The American people want the 
auto companies to succeed, and so do I (Neuman, 2008).”  However, while they were 
politically important, professional accountability also demanded that these loans be made 
in a way that would serve the public interest.  Similarly, and in relation to AIG, the 
Federal Reserve board said “a disorderly failure of AIG could add to already significant 
levels of financial market fragility and lead to substantially higher borrowing costs, 
reduced household wealth, and materially weaker economic performance (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2008b).”  The loans given were therefore 
evaluated by GAO and the COP on the basis of whether they were in the public interest 
in concert with professional standards in place at the agencies giving the loans (Baum, 
2013; Mihm & al, 2013).  While a case could be made for these loans being politically 
important and thus representative of political accountability, the reason behind the choice 
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of direct loans can be better explained by professional accountability and thus a single 
model approach once again fails. 
 Contracting in ARRA: 
This chapter will now address the policy tools used in ARRA, beginning with 
contracting.  Under ARRA, thousands of contracts were issued by all levels of 
government.  In fact, GAO noted that 28,000 contracts had been issued under ARRA as 
of November 2009, only nine months after ARRA’s passage (Government Accountability 
Office, 2010b, pp. 1-5).  Legal accountability explains part of this choice in that the 
contracts were evaluated on the basis of contract law and other related legal standards, 
most notably by GAO (Government Accountability Office, 2009f).  An individualistic 
legal standard was used, as was described in chapter four.  However, professional 
accountability explains this tool choice more fully as the decisions on when, with whom 
and how to contract were designed to be made on the basis of professional judgment and 
were evaluated as such (Mihm & al, 2013).  More specifically, while the evaluation of the 
contract was based on legal standards and legal accountability, the choice of with whom 
to contract was based on professional accountability.  Therefore, once again, a single 
model approach is insufficient to explain this policy tool choice 
Grants in ARRA: 
As already noted, grants and contracts are not the same.  They have a different 
control mechanism, with the issuing agency holding more control over the funds and their 
dispersal, than contracts, which are typically more of a partnership (Cooper P. J., 2003).  
In addition, grants and contracts utilize different bodies of law and must therefore be 
considered separately (Cooper P. J., 2003).  Grants were also broadly utilized in ARRA 
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in relation to a number of areas, such as research and development of new energy 
technologies (Mihm & al, 2013).  The decision on where and how to issue grants can be 
partially explained by professional accountability as ARRA granted broad discretion for 
agencies to expend funds earmarked for grants as they saw fit to meet policy goals, such 
as energy efficiency (Mihm & al, 2013).  However, OMB’s requirement that all grants be 
evaluated on the basis of performance accountability makes it apparent that performance 
accountability is also necessary to explain this policy tool choice (Office of Management 
and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 6).  Therefore, no single accountability model can fully 
explain this tool choice. 
Public Information in ARRA: 
Public information was utilized in relation to ARRA in the broad publication of 
all data on those sending and receiving funds.  These steps represent public information 
policy because they are intended to influence the behavior of decision-makers on where 
to send funds, contracts and grants.  Knowing that their decisions will be immediately 
subject to public scrutiny was intended to affect the behavior of these actors since they 
might tend to make different decisions knowing that their work was clearly public.  
 This was partly representative of political accountability as members of 
Congress, and the public, could then use this data to ensure that funds were being spent 
evenly across districts as well as properly within them  (Mihm & al, 2013).  However, 
performance accountability explains some additional reasoning behind this tool choice as 
the jobs created/saved metric, as well as where those jobs were created/saved, was a key 
part of the pitch for ARRA (Mihm & al, 2013).   Once again, a single model approach is 
insufficient to explain this tool choice. 
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The Two Exceptions: Tax Expenditures in ARRA and Grants in TARP 
This chapter will now discuss the two cases where a single model approach is 
sufficient to explain policy tool choice.  The first is tax expenditures in ARRA.  As noted 
in chapter four, tax expenditures totaled $288 billion, more than any other single part of 
the bill (ARRA, 2009, p. Title I; Recovery.gov, 2010b).  They were wide-ranging, 
although mostly directed towards those at the lower end of the income scale (ARRA, 
2009, p. Title I; Recovery.gov, 2010b).  There are sound policy and, of course, political 
reasons for these tax expenditures but no metrics or other evaluations were put in place to 
determine the effectiveness of these tax expenditures (Mihm & al, 2013).  No part of 
ARRA assigned any responsibility for tracking these tax expenditures to any of the 
bodies tracking the broader law (Mihm & al, 2013).  The accountability, therefore, was 
purely political (Mihm & al, 2013).  This was intentional.  As one Senate staffer said, 
members of Congress wanted something tangible to bring home to their districts and tax 
expenditures were an easy way to do so (Green, 2013).  Therefore, and as stated in 
chapter four, this is an instance in which only one model explains the tool choice. 
In relation to grants in TARP, most of the grants were given to those whom were 
politically powerful in order to secure important votes (Pope, 2011).  For example, 
money for timber payments was included in order to get the votes of some members of 
Congress in the Pacific Northwest (Pope, 2011).  This decision could be explained on 
other grounds but it is mostly explained by politics as a classic example of “vote-buying” 
(Fenno, 1978) since it resulted in members of Congress who had voted against the bill the 
first time voting in favor the second when these grants were included (Pope, 2011).  
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These vote-switches were necessary to pass TARP.  Thus, grants in TARP represent a 
second case in which a single model approach is sufficient to explain tool choice. 
Nevertheless, while there are two instances in which a single model approach 
explains tool choice, the data from the rest of the policy tools indicate that a single model 
approach is insufficient.  In all other case, utilizing at least two models explains the other 
policy tool choices more fully than one model alone.  As a result, the data support the 
hypothesis that a single-model approach is generally insufficient to explain policy tool 
choice.  This chapter will now proceed to examine the data around the second hypothesis 
and evaluate whether a multiple model approach is superior for explaining policy tool 
choice. 
Multiple Models Have Greater Explanatory Power: 
The second hypothesis was that using multiple accountability models would have 
greater explanatory power in explaining policy tool choices.  The reasoning behind this 
was, as noted above, policy tools are complex instruments and there are often many 
reasons why they are chosen, whether political, professional, legal or performance-based.  
As a result of this complexity, it is typically the case that tool choices need to be viewed 
from the perspectives of multiple accountability models in order to explain tool choice. 
With the exception of two instances noted in the last section, the policy tools used in 
TARP and ARRA required multiple models to fully explain.   
This section will now evaluate the remaining tools where multiple model 
approaches provide greater explanatory power.  The tools used will be loan guarantees, 
direct government and direct loans for TARP and contracting, grants and public 
information for ARRA. 
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Loan Guarantees in TARP: 
One of the major ways in which TARP was designed to prevent a collapse of the 
financial system was by providing loan guarantees to those in the marketplace so as to 
calm skittish investors (Baum, 2013).  Loan guarantees were primarily given to Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac in order to shore up the housing market and make clear that 
federally backed loans were secure (Baum, 2013).  As discussed in chapter 3, this study 
found that all four accountability models played a role in this policy tool choice. 
Political accountability was present both in the choice to use loan guarantees to 
save politically important institutions such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and in the 
choice to give oversight for loan guarantees to the COP, which was a political body 
chartered by Congress to evaluate TARP (Wilkerson, 2013).  This choice to give 
oversight authority to a political body is representative of political accountability. 
Legal accountability was present in the role a special inspector general 
(SIGTARP) had in ensuring that these loan guarantees were administered in accordance 
with the law (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009d, pp. 3-8; SIGTARP, 2009b, pp. 5-
12).   These legal standards, which included, for example, whether banks had 
misrepresented their financial status to the federal government before receiving TARP 
funds, were based on both civil and criminal law (SIGTARP, 2012).  They resulted in 
SIGTARP pursuing multiple criminal and civil cases against parties that violated the law, 
as one would expect in an approach based on legal accountability (SIGTARP, 2013b).  
As a result they were representative of legal accountability. 
Professional accountability was present in this tool choice in the discretion given 
to the US Treasury in how and when to issue such guarantees as well as the established 
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federal standards by which they were evaluated by GAO and SIGTARP (Mihm & al, 
2013).  For example, GAO evaluated whether the US Treasury was properly issuing and 
monitoring these loan guarantees (Government Accountability Office, 2013, pp. 2-5).  
GAO created a list of recommendations, based on professional standards, to determine if 
Treasury was properly monitoring and issuing loan guarantees and then evaluated 
Treasury against those recommendations (Government Accountability Office, 2013, pp. 
12-17).  Since these recommendations were based on professional standards, this 
represents a usage of professional accountability as defined in chapter 2. 
Finally, performance accountability was present in the extent to which the 
performance of the market was clearly intended to be a barometer of this tool’s success 
(Baum, 2013).  Specifically, if an institution which was given a loan guarantee did better, 
it was regarded as a success, while if it failed, it was regarded as a failure (Baum, 2013).  
This market performance metric is a key way in which performance accountability can be 
invoked.  It certainly was the case here.  
To look at just any one of these models in relation to this tool choice would be to 
miss an important part of the picture.  As shown above and in chapter three, more than 
one model is needed to explain this tool choice.  Therefore, with regards to this tool, the 
second hypothesis is true. 
Direct Government in TARP 
Direct government was a key part of TARP.  As discussed in chapter three, direct 
government was a part of TARP in the money market rescue program and the creation of 
OFS within the US Treasury 
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All four models applied to the usage of the direct government tool in the case of 
TARP.  Political accountability was present in relation to TARP in the role Congress had 
in confirming OFS’s director and in the oversight hearings held in relation to the money 
market policy (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 2008; US Office of 
Financial Stability, 2012).  Political accountability was also present in relation to TARP 
in the congressional oversight hearings related to TARP (Government Accountability 
Office, 2009f). 
Legal accountability was present in relation to TARP in the oversight of 
SIGTARP in ensuring that the Treasury correctly implemented their duties under this law 
(SIGTARP, 2013b).  Specifically, SIGTARP was responsible for ensuring that 
government action was within the law and that all participants were acting legally and 
responsibly as determined by federal legal standards (SIGTARP, 2009h). 
  Professional accountability was present in relation to TARP in two ways.  First, 
OFS’s work was evaluated based on established professional standards related to tracking 
of funds (Baum, 2013).  Second, OFS had a key role in ensuring that the money market 
actions were undertaken in concert with professional standards (Baum, 2013).  OFS was 
held to account by the professional standards of those in the COP and were evaluated 
against those standards constantly, marking a usage of professional accountability in 
relation to this tool (Wilkerson, 2013).  
Performance accountability was present in relation to TARP in the money market 
actions in that performance metrics, however informal, were utilized to ensure that the 
money market was not “breaking the buck”  (Baum, 2013; Condon, 2008).  COP and 
others evaluated the success of TARP based on whether or not they were able to keep the 
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money market from “breaking the buck”.  This focus on measureable standards 
represents a usage of performance accountability. 
It would be missing part of the picture to look at only one accountability model in 
relation to this policy tool choice.  As shown above and in chapter three, more than one 
model is necessary to explain this tool choice.  Therefore, with regards to this tool, the 
second hypothesis is true. 
Direct Loans in TARP: 
Direct loans were another critical part of TARP.  As discussed in chapter 3, loans 
were given to institutions including auto manufacturers, banks and AIG.  These loans 
were at the heart of TARP, as it fed money back into a financial system that lacked 
capital flows. 
All four accountability models explain this policy tool choice to some extent.  
Political accountability explains the focus on saving politically important government-
funded institutions such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and auto manufacturers.  
Although these choices could be justified on policy grounds, saving them was also 
important because the political damage caused by their failure could have been 
significant (Baum, 2013; Green, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).  
 Legal accountability explains this tool choice with the role SIGTARP was given 
in tracking these loans and ensuring that none of the parties violated the law.  For 
example, SIGTARP ensured that banks properly accounted for the loans they received 
through TARP (SIGTARP, 2013d).  In one case, SIGTARP’s charges resulted in Fifth-
Third Bank paying a $6.5 million fine as a result of the bank’s failure to properly account 
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for TARP loans (SIGTARP, 2013d).  This represents a usage of legal accountability in 
relation to direct loans.  
Professional accountability explains this tool choice in the role that the US 
Treasury was given in deciding where and to whom to issue loans.  It was also present in 
the standards to be used by SIGTARP and GAO in evaluating such loans.  Specifically, 
these loans used professional standards from the federal government’s “green book” and 
“yellow book” to determine how and whether these loan guarantees were properly 
administered (Mihm & al, 2013).   
Performance accountability explains this policy tool choice because the success of 
this particular policy tool was, at least partially, evaluated on the basis of market 
outcomes and performance (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009).  Specifically, the 
concern was whether companies benefited as a result of these loans.  If they did, that was 
considered a success under TARP’s performance standards (Congressional Oversight 
Panel, 2009).  This is representative of performance accountability in relation to this 
policy tool. 
Once again to look at any one of these models in isolation only gets to part of the 
picture.  All four models can help explain this policy tool choice.  Once again, a multiple 
model approach is superior and this hypothesis is validated. 
Contracting in ARRA: 
Contracting was a critical part of how ARRA dispersed funds.  In order to 
undertake the actual projects authorized under ARRA, federal, state and local 
governments largely contracted out the performance of this task.  As already noted, 
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28,000 contracts were issued under ARRA as of November 2009, only seven months 
after ARRA’s passage (Government Accountability Office, 2010b, pp. 1-5). 
As noted in chapter four, this study found that although accountability in relation 
to this tool was primarily legal and professional, there was some performance and 
political accountability as well.  Political accountability existed in the specific selection 
to award contracts to those that were politically powerful (Green, 2013; Mihm & al, 
2013).  Some evidence appeared to suggest that big political contributors might have 
gotten bigger contracts under ARRA (Hoover, 2010).  However, an academic study 
argues this point, stating that there is limited evidence to suggest that contracts were 
awarded based on political factors (Boone, Dube, & Kaplan, 2014).  Nonetheless, it 
appears that politics probably played at least some role in awarding contracts. 
Legal accountability existed because of the personal responsibility of the 
organization and persons in the organization responsible for signing such contracts to 
avoid waste, fraud and abuse (Mihm & al, 2013).   Specifically, GAO evaluated whether 
those receiving contracts were administering them in concert with state law (Government 
Accountability Office, 2009d).  This type of focus on the legal procedures and rules is 
representative of legal accountability. 
Professional accountability existed in the evaluation of whom to contract, where 
to contract and evaluation of contract success.  Where to contract out was a decision 
based on exiting federal standards (Mihm & al, 2013; Office of Management and Budget, 
2009, p. Sec. 6) and the best professional judgment of those in the state or agency 
administering these contracts.  GAO evaluated whether both states and the RATB 
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followed these standards in relation to contracts (Government Accountability Office, 
2009d, pp. 5-7).  
Performance accountability was present in that, according to OMB’s ARRA 
regulations, agencies were required to produce performance plans both for ARRA 
generally and for specific contracts and to ensure that these were met (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 6).  This is a usage of performance 
accountability in relation to this tool.  
In short, the choice to utilize the contracting policy tool was based on all four 
models.  This makes sense because contracts really do draw on all aspects of 
accountability.  As a result, multiple accountability models are present in relation to the 
contracting policy tool in ARRA.  
Grants in ARRA: 
ARRA included a variety of grants in areas ranging from education to technology 
development to community health.  As already noted, this study makes a clear distinction 
between contracted services, where something tangible like a road or a direct service is to 
be delivered, and grants for research or technological development that are meant to be 
temporary and do not necessarily result in a tangible outcome (Green, 2013; Government 
Accountability Office, 2009k, pp. 3-8). 
All four accountability models explain part of this policy tool choice.  Political 
accountability existed inasmuch as grants were given to individual districts, where local 
members of Congress were able to brag about them to their constituents.   For example, 
Oregon Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) openly asserts that securing ARRA grant funds for 
the state is proof that he can deliver for his constituents  (Oregon's Senator Jeff Merkley, 
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2014).  This sort of behavior is what that would be expected for a policy predicated in 
part on political accountability.  
Legal accountability existed, as with contracts, in the tight control and 
responsibility that grant recipients had for funds (Government Accountability Office, 
2009k, pp. 3-8).  For example, USDA Inspector General Phyllis Fong stated that 
inspectors general, both independently and as a result of ARRA, would be focusing on 
monitoring all “grant planning activities (Fong, 2009, p. 7)” and would focus their efforts 
on those grants deemed high-risk given both their experience with the agency, recipient 
and the grant in question (Fong, 2009, p. 7). 
 Professional accountability explains this tool choice in the role that agencies were 
given in determining where, with whom and how to evaluate grants.  The guidelines 
under ARRA gave broad latitude to agencies to issue grants to specific recipients as they 
felt best served the public interest (Office of Management and Budget, 2009c, p. Sec. 3).  
For example, although much grant funding was designated for new renewable energy 
technologies, there was plenty of leeway for professional standards to determine which 
technologies deserved grant funds (Office of Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 5).  
As for evaluation of grants issued, professional standards as laid out by GAO and OMB 
were once again the focus for evaluation (Government Accountability Office, 2010b; 
Office of Management and Budget, 2009b, p. Sec. 5).  . 
 Performance accountability was present in this tool choice since the implementing 
regulations for grants under ARRA required that, “Agencies must adapt current 
performance evaluation and review processes to include the ability to report periodically 
on completion status of the program or activity, and program and economic outcomes, 
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consistent with Recovery Act requirements. (Office of Management and Budget, 2009b, 
p. 49).”  These plans are representative of exactly the sort of metrics used in a 
performance-accountability case. 
 If one were to consider only one accountability model, one would miss a key part 
of the picture.  Approaching this tool choice from a multi-model perspective increases 
what can be explained.  Once again, the hypothesis that a multiple model approach is 
superior is confirmed. 
Public Information in ARRA: 
As noted in the prior section, public information was utilized in relation to ARRA 
in the broad publication of all data on those sending and receiving funds.  These steps 
represented public information policy because they are intended to influence the behavior 
of decision-makers on where to send funds, contracts and grants. Political accountability 
explains this tool choice in that the map-based reporting system allowed members of 
Congress to demonstrate that funds were being spent locally (Green, 2013).  In addition, 
congressional oversight was based on this localized approach and Congress chose to 
evaluate ARRA’s public information based on this standard (Green, 2013). 
 Performance accountability explains this tool choice due to the usage of the jobs 
created/saved versus funds expended as based on the map-based localized approach.   
The focus here was on ensuring that each community got equal, or as close to equal, help 
from their share of ARRA funds in their various forms (Boone, Dube, & Kaplan, 2014, 
pp. 1-3). 
 Although the public information tool did not utilize all four models, looking at 
only one model is missing part of the picture.  It is not enough, for example, to say that 
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the map-based approach was utilized only because of political reasons when the 
reasoning behind it was performance-based as well. Once again, the hypothesis that a 
multiple model approach is superior is supported by the evidence. 
Summing Up the Results: Multiple Model Approach Superior 
As shown here, as well as in chapters three and four, a single model approach 
leaves out important factors that policy makers considered in determining which tools to 
use and therefore only gets to part of the picture.  Utilizing a multi-model approach has 
greater explanatory power in relation to tool choices in every instance except tax 
expenditures for ARRA and grants for TARP.  As a result, it is clear that the hypothesis 
that a multi model approach explains more about the tool choice than a single model 
approach is true. 
POLICY TOOL CHOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODELS: EXPLANATORY 
POWER STRONG IF UNEVEN AND STILL POSSIBLE TO LEARN MUCH 
This chapter will now consider the question “How effectively does any one of the 
four most commonly used models of accountability explain the policy tool choices 
chosen to address the accountability issues in TARP and ARRA?”  The answer differs 
between the two cases but the answers are largely the same in that accountability models 
do explain policy tool choice. 
For TARP, the definition of the policy problem has a significant impact on the 
connection between policy tools choice and accountability models.  In this case, the 
decision not to focus on economic regulation appears to have fallen victim to the 
definition of the policy problem as needing to solve the immediate causes of the crisis 
rather than the reasons the crisis happened in the first place.  Specifically, the policy 
130 
 
problem for TARP was defined as needing to solve the results of the crisis rather than the 
cause of it in the first place.   
Doubtless part of the policy problem definition was due to the speed with which 
the policy was adopted, with the policy being enacted about two and a half weeks after its 
original inception.  This speed meant that accountability was not as well-defined as many 
would have liked and arguably that it was not therefore as likely to be as well thought out 
a policy as many would have liked.  As John Taylor said in February 2009, “the 
government’s intervention plan had not been fully thought through (Taylor, 2009).”  This 
speed and lack of full policy development that Taylor and others noted meant that policy 
tool choices were not necessarily those that were originally said to be part of the bill, 
most notably in the areas noted in chapter three.   
Nonetheless, and as noted in chapter three and this chapter, accountability models 
do explain some of the tool choices and help us understand how they were both set up 
operationally and how the accountability of these tools would be determined.  If one did 
not consider the accountability models in relation to the direct loan tool, for example, the 
evidence suggest that it would not be possible to understand the role professional 
standards played in determining which companies got loans, at what rates and how they 
were tracked.   
In relation to ARRA, the link between policy tools and accountability models is 
more apparent.  This is due primarily to three factors.  First, ARRA was a more 
conventional bill than TARP and so was working with more established approaches; and 
the accountability models that are tied to the policy tools used in those approaches are 
fairly well established.  Second, GAO and others in the accountability community 
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insisted that policy tools be tied to clear accountability standards, at least when it came to 
areas other than tax expenditures (Mihm & al, 2013).  The accountability community 
asserted that it was critical that this be done because the large sums of money being 
expended under ARRA in a very public manner demanded clear standards tied to policy 
tool approaches (Mihm & al, 2013).  Third, OMB’s own regulations concerning ARRA 
break down the bill’s approaches into individual policy tools and the standards on which 
they will be evaluated relative to each are clear (Office of Management and Budget, 
2009c).  This was unusual as there does not appear to be another case in which OMB so 
clearly states the policy tool choices and ties them to accountability models.   
Policy tool choice, at least in relation to TARP and ARRA, is explained in a 
variety of significant ways by accountability models.  The extent to which it is may differ 
and its impact but this is nonetheless a clear and unique approach to connecting policy 
tools and accountability models.  
EVALUTING TARP AND ARRA: LESSONS THAT CAN BE LEARNED 
 The following section will provide some lessons that can be learned from TARP 
and ARRA.  It will evaluate how the policies were undertaken, how the circumstances in 
which they were created impacted them and what this tells us about policy design, 
accountability and policy tools.   
Lessons that can be Learned from TARP: 
 When faced with a decision on how to resolve a problem as daunting as the great 
recession, TARP was a unique policy that responded to the major problems posed by this 
crisis.  The following section will discuss and analyze this study’s three main findings 
related to TARP alone.  They are: (1) the decision to attack the results of the problems 
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cause by the economic crisis of 2008 rather than the source itself; (2) the speed of 
response impacted tool choice; and (3) the fact that accountability was not initially as 
present as had been publicly asserted prior to the bill’s passage.  This is not an exhaustive 
list of findings but they are the three most important. 
Attacking the Results of the Problem Rather than the Cause: Lack of Regulation 
 As discussed in chapter three, the economic crisis of 2008 came about in no small 
part due to decades of deregulation.  The system had been left vulnerable to abuse as 
deregulation allowed riskier and riskier investments to take place with little to no 
government oversight.  The system was indeed abused.  It was apparent to many that part 
of the solution to this crisis needed to be re-regulation of some sort so as to control and 
prevent such events from occurring again (Krugman P. , 2009; Stiglitz, 2012, pp. 22-25).  
While this would later happen in part with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010, it did not in TARP (US Congress, 2010; Krugman P. R., 2012, 
pp. 86-89). 
 Congress did  not address regulation at all in TARP except in the very limited 
sense that executive bonuses were supposedly to be limited for those receiving 
government funds (although this didn’t turn out to be the case) (Green, 2013).  Instead, 
TARP made a conscious choice to attack only the results of the problem and not the 
underlying problem itself (Green, 2013; Mihm & al, 2013).  For example, it provided 
loans to AIG and the big three auto manufacturers but did not reform the underlying 
regulations governing these industries (Mihm & al, 2013).   
 This is not an invalid policy choice by any means but it did not get at the root of 
the problem.  It was also unlike the response to the savings and loan crisis since the focus 
133 
 
there was both on saving the system and on re-regulating it (Krugman P. R., 2012; 
Stiglitz, 2012). 
 TARP’s decision to focus on the results of the crisis did not address the 
fundamental problems of the system, as Dr. Cooper points out (Cooper P. J., 2009).  This 
left the system open for future abuse.  TARP may have helped put out the fire started by 
the economic crisis of 2008 but it did little to make the financial system fire-proof for the 
future. 
Speed of Response Impacted Tool Choice: 
 There was no question that members of Congress felt that they had to respond 
quickly.  The markets agreed, with the precipitous drop after Congress failed to pass the 
first version of TARP being clear evidence of this.  Add to that looming presidential and 
congressional elections and this was a situation in which members of Congress believed 
that they had to find a way to pass a bill that provided quick and politically sellable 
benefits (Baum, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).  Treasury sensed this too, which is why its 
initial proposal was only three pages; this initial proposal was designed specifically to 
force Congress to act quickly and to give Treasury broad authority to respond quickly 
(Paulson, 2008).  Although this initial proposal was not reasonable or feasible, since few 
in Congress were prepared to turn over that much unchecked power, it was yet one more 
thing putting pressure on Congress to act quickly and not get bogged down in the details. 
 This decision to act quickly impacted the choice of tools that were in TARP in 
three primary ways.  First, in multiple cases, as demonstrated in chapter three, some of 
the tools that were originally intended for the bill, or that one would expect to find in the 
bill, were not actually in the bill. Most notably, proponents of TARP said it was going to 
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use public information and government as a corporation but TARP did not do so (Baum, 
2013; Wilkerson, 2013).  This was probably due, at least in part, to the speed with which 
the bill was put together. 
 Second, tools were often put in place without clear implementing guidelines.  In 
several cases, according to those at GAO and COP, programs were announced without 
any implementing guidance just so that Congress and the President could demonstrate 
that they had taken action (Baum, 2013; Mihm & al, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).  While this 
certainly happens in normal cases as well, those at GAO and COP believed that it 
happened far more often with TARP (Baum, 2013; Mihm & al, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).  
The agencies and the administration would then let the administration write the rules.  
Thus, it was clear that the speed with which the legislation was implemented impacted 
the tool choice. 
 In addition, the tools TARP did utilize were different than what might have been 
expected.  As discussed in chapter three, for example, there was almost no usage of 
economic regulation as a policy tool.  Instead, the focus was on fixing the results of the 
failure rather than the causes of the failure itself.  
 While there were many legitimate reasons for Congress to move with speed, there 
is no doubt that speed had an impact on the design of the bill.  The next section will 
discuss how this focus on speed of response impacted accountability. 
Accountability Missing? 
 Lack of accountability was one major reason why Secretary Paulson’s initial 
three-page bill was rejected.  Most in Congress simply did not trust him with that kind of 
power (Green, 2013).  As it emerged from Congress, TARP was inlaid with 
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accountability mechanisms but they were not as strong as many thought at the time 
(Baum, 2013; Mihm & al, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).  Some of this was likely due to the 
lack of further time for reflection. 
 Under section 125 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 or 
EESA, the act which contained TARP, Congress authorized creation of the COP 
(Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 2008, p. Sec. 125).  COP was vested 
with a broad mandate to “review the current state of the financial markets and the 
regulatory system. (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 2008, p. 125)” COP, 
however, was not vested with  real authority, as its purpose was simply to report on both 
the markets in general, and the impacts/implementation of TARP more generally (Baum, 
2013; Wilkerson, 2013).  None of its recommendations were required to be implemented 
by anyone and, in fact, due to the one-per-month speed at which COP produced reports, 
there was little time for feedback or study before the next one came along (Baum, 2013; 
Wilkerson, 2013).  Ultimately COP could do little more than sound the alarm about 
potential or real problems.  It could not enforce additional accountability as problems 
arose. 
 Further complicating COP’s work was the fact that many of TARP’s programs 
were described only in the most basic terms in the legislation, with the details to be filled 
in later (Baum, 2013; Green, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).  As noted, this happens in many 
cases, but it happened far more often here than in general (Baum, 2013; Green, 2013; 
Wilkerson, 2013).  A classic example of this, cited by multiple COP staffers as well as a 
Senate staffer in interviews, was the attempt to use TARP funds to do something about 
the home mortgage crisis (Baum, 2013; Green, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).  The Obama 
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administration pushed ahead and announced that it was going to undertake a plan to solve 
the foreclosure problem but did not have any implementing standards in place (Baum, 
2013; Green, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).  This put COP in the difficult position of trying to 
evaluate a program which, although ostensibly a key part of the policy, did not have any 
standards by which to measure it (Baum, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).  The result was that 
while COP did the best it could, COP was not as able as one might have wished to ensure 
accountability in this area.  COP was only able to report generally on this and several 
other key programs. 
Similarly, section 121 of the EESA authorized the creation of SIGTARP 
(Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 2008, p. Sec. 121).  SIGTARP was 
granted broad authority to ensure that the actions of the Secretary of the Treasury or any 
agencies or private entities receiving TARP funds followed federal law (Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 2008, p. Sec. 121).  SIGTARP was granted the same 
authority to subpoena information as any other inspector general, and its 
recommendations and reports, in theory, carried potential consequences (Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 2008, p. Sec. 121).  In fact, as of early April 2013, 
SIGTARP claimed to have successfully prosecuted 91 persons and recovered more than 
$3.8 billion in court ordered restitution (SIGTARP, 2013b).   
Nonetheless, SIGTARP got off to a slow start.  In all five of the quarterly reports 
produced during the period primarily covered by this study, SIGTARP wrote that 
Treasury was either unwilling or unable to comply with its most basic recommendation 
that recipients of TARP funds fully report on their usage (SIGTARP, 2009, pp. 97-99; 
SIGTARP, 2009i, pp. 135-137; SIGTARP, 2009c, pp. 186-189; SIGTARP, 2009g, pp. 
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165-167; SIGTARP, 2010, pp. 137-140).  The reasons behind this refusal were 
supposedly because such information was either not readily available or because the 
recipients did not want to provide it (SIGTARP, 2010, p. 139).  After much trying, 
SIGTARP declared a victory of sorts when it got Treasury to report very basic usage of 
funds information (SIGTARP, 2010, pp. 137-140).  In fact, all SIGTARP ended up 
getting was a basic report on whether or not recipients could have undertaken business as 
they did without usage of TARP funds, which although arguably important is not perhaps 
what SIGTARP was looking for (SIGTARP, 2010, pp. 139-140).   
In short, even where TARP created accountability structures, they did not have as 
much power or authority as the public or Congress may have wanted to believe (Baum, 
2013; Green, 2013; Wilkerson, 2013).  The policy’s quick design, leading to an 
undeveloped approach and a lack of full tool development, left some aspects of 
accountability lacking.  This is not entirely surprising since, as Cooper has routinely 
observed, emergency situations often result in lowered accountability because the 
perceived risk to the public of waiting to respond is seen as greater than the risk that 
funds would not be properly tracked or spent (Cooper P. J., 2003).  In a true emergency, 
the argument goes, what other choice do you really have? 
ARRA: A More Typical Stimulus Bill, Attacked the Right Problem and Multiple Models 
Used 
As described in chapter four in particular, ARRA was a broad and complex 
response to one of the worst economic crises in US history.  When faced with a decision 
on how to resolve a problem as daunting as the great recession, ARRA had to be both 
complex and broad.  The following section will discuss and analyze our five main 
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findings related to ARRA alone.  They are: (1) ARRA was a relatively typical stimulus 
bill; (2) ARRA attacked something closer to the problem it was originally intended to 
resolve; (3) accountability was clear and well defined within policy tools; and (4) yet did 
not address the long-term unemployment issues.  This is not an exhaustive list of possible 
findings but they are the four most important in this case. 
A More Typical Stimulus Bill: 
When governments respond to economic crises, they often utilize countercyclical 
policies.  These policies, perhaps most notably favored by Keynesian economics, argue 
that when the economy is weak, the government should spend more money in order to fill 
the gap created by a lack of private sector spending (Keynes, 1933).  Keynesian 
economics suggests that this spending should be as broad and as deep as practicable in 
order to counteract the effects of the downturn (Keynes, 1933). 
Although some, such as Krugman, have asserted that ARRA was too small, this is 
basically what ARRA did.  It took a large amount of money ($787 billion), injected into 
the economy and spread it around broadly.  While TARP may have been an atypical 
approach to the problem that it faced, ARRA was not.  ARRA was more of a typical 
stimulus bill and thus fits more neatly into the categories and methods of analysis applied 
to such bills. 
Attacked Something Closer to the Root of the Problem: 
Similarly, and while TARP can be criticized for attacking the outcomes of the failure 
to regulate and therefore not attacking the root cause of the crisis, ARRA more closely 
attacked the problem it was originally meant to resolve.  It did so in a number of ways.  
The following section will address how it did so in relation to each of its three major 
139 
 
components: tax policy, backfilling state budget holes and direct/indirect spending on 
new projects.  
The tax expenditures in ARRA were designed to provide economic support through 
broad-based tax benefits to most Americans.  Although accountability was lacking, the 
policy nonetheless was broad, deep and fast, as one would have hoped.  
In relation to the backfilling of state budgets, ARRA again addressed the root 
problem.  Although ARRA did not come close to filling all of the gaps created by the 
economic downturn, it nonetheless addressed a specific portion of the gaps and stopped 
more significant job loss.  Once again, the policy attacked the problem it was originally 
intended to resolve in this area and did so promptly.  
The new direct and indirect federal spending, was designed to create quick jobs, and 
fund needed infrastructure improvements.  One can quibble over how and where this 
money was spent and whether it was spent well but it did help provide new jobs and 
quickly inject money into the economy.  It certainly was designed, therefore to address 
the problem of addressing the jobs crisis that was the administration’s main concern in 
relation to ARRA.   
In sum, the data show that ARRA did in fact address the right problem, and the 
problem that it was set out to address. One can rightly quibble with ARRA’s design and 
its size but it is hard to argue that ARRA was not framed to address the right problem.  
ARRA is therefore different than TARP in this way. 
This fact is further emphasized by the fact that the policy tools used were the result of 
work with the accountability agencies.  OMB took great care to make clear how it was 
doing ARRA work, what tools it was using and how.  The tool choice, although quick, 
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was clearly intentional, based on known variables and represented a far more organized 
response than TARP. 
Accountability Generally Clear and Broad: 
There is no question that accountability is hard to achieve in an emergency.  As 
GAO’s Chris Mihm said “The only way to ensure no waste, fraud or abuse in a program 
is not to spend any money on it. (Mihm & al, 2013)” Still, unlike TARP, ARRA had clear 
accountability systems, and there are three primary reasons why. 
First was the factor of time; TARP was put together in about two weeks, while ARRA 
was designed over a period of a few months.  While many of the details of ARRA were 
up in the air until the last minute, it was no secret that President-elect Obama and 
Congressional Democrats wanted to pass the bill and, as noted in chapter four, had begun 
negotiating before Obama even took office (Obama, 2009).  There was a much more 
deliberative process for ARRA than for TARP. 
Second, the accountability community very forcefully insisted on greater tracking.  
GAO and others went to the administration before ARRA was passed and insisted on 
provisions in the law in order to ensure accountability (Mihm & al, 2013).  This led, for 
example, to the ARRA implementation guidelines being grouped by policy tools, 
something that made it easier for the accountability agencies to track spending (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2009; Office of Management and Budget, 2009b).  
Additionally, GAO was given far more funding to track ARRA than TARP, allowing it to 
set up field offices to track expenses on the ground and to do a more complete job (Mihm 
& al, 2013).  This is so even though tax expenditures, fully one third of the bill, had very 
little accountability. 
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Third, the public nature of the spending played a key role in ensuring accountability.  
While TARP raised constant concerns about how much government should intrude into 
private enterprise, there was no such concern with ARRA.  Nearly all of the spending 
was undertaken directly by or on behalf of public agencies (Mihm & al, 2013).  These 
agencies, which provided multiple filters to ensure accountability, were also used to 
tracking standard spending and thus could do so publicly and effectively (Mihm & al, 
2013).  While it is arguable that spending through contractors was harder to track, this 
spending was still done and tracked via established procedures related to contractors.  
And unlike TARP, all spending was public. 
This is not to say that accountability was always clear for ARRA.  Nonetheless, 
accountability was far more clear and present with ARRA than with TARP. 
Failure to Address Long-Term Job Challenges: 
For all that ARRA attacked the current problems of unemployment by trying to 
increase demand through government spending, it did nothing to address the long-term 
challenges revealed by the crisis.  Very little actually went to solve the jobs problem, 
either in the short-term or long-term (Krugman P. R., 2012, pp. 120-123).   For example, 
there was no 1930s style WPA program to create broad public works and directly hire the 
unemployed.  In fact, such an approach was never seriously discussed by policymakers 
and never came close to being included in the final bill (Krugman P. R., 2012, pp. 120-
123; Stiglitz, 2012, pp. 232-234). 
To be fair, it is not entirely clear what could have been done since, as Stiglitz 
observes, solving the long-term unemployment problem requires a “structural 
transformation (Stiglitz, 2012, p. 233).”  That is to say that globalization has 
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fundamentally changed what Americans should be doing in the workforce and therefore 
the changes in training and time needed to shift many in the American workforce to new 
types of work was beyond anything a policy of this size could have accomplished.  After 
all, these problems had been brewing for at least the past few decades and so the idea that 
ARRA could fix these long-term problems is highly questionable at best.  Still, it is worth 
noting that this policy was not designed to solve these challenges.   
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE AND IMPLICATION FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The primary research question led to two hypotheses: no single accountability 
model would fully explain most policy tool choices and utilizing multiple accountability 
models would result in a more complete picture.   This was particularly apt in this case as 
accountability was a chief concern with regard to both TARP and ARRA.  This concern 
makes drawing connections between accountability models and policy tools clearer.  As 
noted earlier in this chapter, except for one tool choice each in TARP and ARRA, there is 
clear evidence that a single model does not fully explain policy tool choices and there is 
equally clear evidence that a multiple models approach is superior. 
 This study offers several lessons for both accountability and policy tools 
literature.  Consider first the accountability literature.   As noted in the literature review 
in chapter two, there is a tendency by many, especially those who back performance 
accountability, to assert that their model is the best and only correct model for ensuring 
accountability.  This sort of thinking has led to policies such as the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA), which is a “one-size-fits-all, government-wide 
approach to management reform that…does not fit easily into the third hole, the reality of 
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policy design and politics (Radin, 2000, p. 127).”  Indeed, policies such as the GPRA 
oversimplify the problem of accountability by assuming that a single model provides the 
best and only way to understand and ensure it. 
 This kind of assertion is not limited to performance accountability.  Some authors 
in the political accountability literature, make similar claims for their model.  For 
example, Adsera, Boix, & Payne argue that “How well government functions hinges on 
how good citizens are at making their politicians accountable for their actions (Adsera, 
Boix, & Payne, 2003, p. 445).” While political accountability and responsiveness are 
certainly factors in accountability as a whole, they provide only a part of the overall 
picture. 
 The same is true for professional and legal accountability, although there are few 
who claim that these forms of accountability are sufficient by themselves.  As this study 
has shown, no one model of accountability insufficient to explain complex policy designs 
such as TARP and ARRA. 
 Accountability literature therefore needs to consider multiple forms of 
accountability when deciding how to create and evaluate accountable policies.  Although 
some authors such as Mulgan rightly argue that “accountability is a complex and 
chameleon-like term (Mulgan, 2000, p. 555)” that encompasses multiple different forms 
of accountability, including performance, professional and political, he and others do not 
go far enough (Mulgan, 2000, pp. 555-558).   Instead, they claim that external control is 
still a necessary part of accountability, which it may be in many cases, but it may not be 
for example in professional accountability since the standards inherit within are internal 
to the profession (Mulgan, 2000, pp. 555-557). If, instead, we were to understand policies 
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with a sensitivity for multiple accountability models this study suggests that we would 
have a more accurate and complete picture of the policy, the tools it uses, and the ways in 
which it addresses accountability.  This point is particularly relevant in these cases 
because of the stated focus on accountability in their formulation.    A focus on a multiple 
accountability model approach is therefore essential for the advancement of the literature 
and practice. 
 One other important contribution that this study suggests is that too often the 
accountability literature has focused on implementation or failures rather than paying 
attention to accountability in designing policies to be accountable in the first place 
(Romzek & Dubnik, 1987, pp. 228-230).  The accountability literature in public 
administration, like Romzek and Dubnick’s famous piece on the Challenger crisis does a 
great job describing the organizational breakdowns that lead to that disaster but does not 
describe how to make organizations accountable in the first place.  Accountability is too 
often reactive, rather than proactive.  This study asserts that knowing how to work with 
the accountability models at the front end in the policy design phase might help design 
accountable policies in the first place rather than just being reactive. 
From a practical perspective, GAO employees told me in interviews that placing 
the accountability more on the front end of the policy design in ARRA had a significant 
impact on accountability (Mihm & al, 2013).  By having it be more clearly part of the 
policy and focusing on real-time, rather than reactive accountability, GAO employees felt 
it resulted in a different perspective that they feel might be valuable (Mihm & al, 2013).  
So therefore, this proactive approach might produce different, and perhaps better, results 
for accountability in practice as well as in theory. 
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This proactive approach is arguably especially important in cases where 
accountability is a key component of the policy, such as TARP and ARRA, but it is not 
exclusive to these types of cases.  Yet more generally, accountability in policy 
formulation would seem to be something the literature, and practice, should discuss but 
does not.  This is perhaps one of the more significant contributions of this study.   
Policy Tools Literature and Practice: 
 One of the questions this study attempted to answer is how policy tools and 
accountability models were connected in terms of how the choice of one informed the 
other.  Policy tools literature in general seeks to “highlight the political consequences of 
particular tools, as well as their underlying assumptions about problems, people and 
behavior (Sidney, 2006, p. 82).”  This study provides evidence that accountability models 
played a significant part in the choice of a number of particular policy tools chosen for 
the designs of these two policies.  There was certainly consideration of these factors in 
policy tool selection for both TARP and ARRA.   For example, TARP’s choice of loans 
and loan guarantees was a direct response to the assumption that money was needed to be 
provided in the form of a loan to troubled financial and other institutions.  In the case of 
ARRA, the choice of tax expenditures was a political one grounded in the belief that such 
an approach was needed in order to get the public to accept the bill.  This is not 
something that is clearly addressed in the existing policy tools literature. 
 Second, the study suggests something about the relationship between policy tool 
choice and formulating policy in an extremely stressed policy making in the context of a 
need for accountability. That is, policy tool choice appears to be impacted by the need to 
create a policy to solve an immediate problem.  More generally, policy tool choice was 
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impacted by how the policy problem was framed.  Put another way, the way in which the 
problem definition behind a policy is defined matters.  In this case, as Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke said in late 2008, “You want to put the fire out first and then 
worry about the fire code. (Simons, 2010, p. 46)”   This clearly colored policy tool choice 
in this case.  
More generally, this point that policies created in emergency situations have 
different tool choices may be new to the literature of policy tools (as Cooper has 
highlighted for example with contracting) and is it is relatively new to the literature of 
accountability as well.  There is only limited research in this area in either field.  Indeed, 
there exists for example, ample evidence that contract accountability changes in crisis 
situations.  For example, in the case of the Hurricane Katrina response, accountability 
was a secondary concern to getting supplies and aid out to affected persons as quickly as 
possible (Koliba, Mills, & Zia, 2011, pp. 215-217).  In this case, the decision not to focus 
on economic regulation appears to have fallen victim to the definition of the policy 
problem as needing to solve the immediate causes of the crisis rather than the reasons the 
crisis happened in the first place.   
This point that policies created in emergency situations result in different tool 
choices is one that the policy tools literature has not explored but should.  While it is the 
case that in only maybe 5% of cases policy makers operate in an emergency framework, 
knowing how and why they operate in that framework as they do is important.  Learning 
how and why these decisions differ in these situations is important.  Do only the process 
and outcomes differ or do those making the decisions differ as well? This is arguably 
particularly important as Congress seems perpetually lurching from crisis to crisis in 
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major policy making, whether it is the “fiscal cliff”, the debt limit, sequestration or 
something else.  As a result of this, if the literature could examine how and why 
policymakers utilize policy tools differently in crisis situations is perhaps even more 
important than previously thought.  Regardless, if the goal of policy tools literature is to 
get at the underlying assumptions behind policy tools, knowing how this and other factors 
impact how and when these tools are utilized would be important for literature, and 
invariably practice as well. 
In addition, this study argues that incremental policymaking is not without its 
problems.  While Lindbolm and others argue that incremental policy making will slowly 
but surely solve problems, it does not necessarily do so (Lindblom, 1959, pp. 80-82).    In 
this case, incremental policy making in the area of regulation arguably led to the crisis 
itself.  Perhaps the emergency mindset, rather than the incremental one, would therefore 
be better to solving big policy problems since you can always pick around the edges once 
a major policy is in place, but if you only do things incrementally it can be hard to make 
major changes. 
In the case of ARRA, a different dynamic for policy tool choice occurred because 
GAO and others in the accountability community insisted on being involved in the design 
of ARRA’s implementing regulations (Mihm & al, 2013).  This contrasted with OMB’s 
typical role in such cases, which is to pass down regulations to GAO and others in the 
accountability community largely without consulting them (Mihm & al, 2013).  This 
focus on accountability at the front end did have at least some impact on the regulations, 
most notably in the decision to organize the implementing regulations by policy tool.  
While it remains unclear as to what impact this decision actually had on the 
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accountability design or implementation of ARRA and whether it resulted in better or 
worse outcomes, it is nonetheless a unique approach for OMB to take and is certainly 
worth noting here. 
Questions for Future Research: 
 This study began with the recognition that it presented a number of limitations.  In 
light of the findings of this study, these limitations lead to possible questions for future 
research, in particular due to concerns about case choice and policy implementation. In 
addition, this study’s findings have also presented additional questions for future research 
that could certainly prove fruitful.  
First, due to the unique nature of both the events that led to the creation of TARP 
and ARRA as well as TARP and ARRA themselves, it might well be that some of the 
policy tool choices were atypical.  It would therefore be useful in future research to 
address the question whether policy tool choices differ in cases in which the policy is 
enacted in times of stress or crisis rather than the normal course of business.  For 
example, how does policy tool choice for the Dodd Frank financial reform bill differ 
from TARP and ARRA since Dodd Frank underwent a year-long process of committee 
hearings, policy development and deliberation and what explains the differences between 
the two types of policies?  This is certainly a fertile area of research for policy tools 
literature and can answer the limitation presented by case choice.   
 This limitation also brings up two additional interesting questions.  Namely, how, 
if at all, do policy makers consider the relationship between tool choice and 
accountability models?  If so, which policy contexts are more likely to link accountability 
models and tool choice?  The answer to these questions might help us understand why 
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and how accountability plays a role in tool choice and policy design in some areas and 
not others and if it can, or should be, expanded to the areas where it is not currently as 
linked. 
Another potential imitation was the choice to focus on only four of the eight 
accountability models discussed in this literature review even though that review shows 
that they are the most widely used models.  Further research might therefore look to 
understand the role that contract, ethical, market and managerial/organizational 
accountability explain policy tool choices differently than the four models chosen for this 
study. 
A related and fourth a potential limitation of this study was that does not evaluate 
the effectiveness of the policy tools choice or the resulting policy.  This is because the 
focus of this research was on policy formulation rather than design.  Even so, it might be 
useful to look at policies over time to see how important the relationship between 
accountability and tool choice in practice during the implementation of the policy. This is 
not a question that this study can answer, or to be frank anyone can for a few more years 
at least, but is at the heart of this study to begin with.  After all, TARP and ARRA were 
created to solve the huge problems necessitated by the 2008 economic crisis and it would 
be helpful to learn how this linkage between policy tools and accountability models 
changed or did not change during implementation. 
One could also ask whether these findings can be extended beyond the American 
context.  For example, could they be applied in a system such as Canada or the UK’s that 
utilizes a parliamentary government and does not put as much trust in federalism?  Does 
legal accountability, in particular, rely on a common law legal system or could these 
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findings do just as well in a civil law system?  These questions are certainly worth 
exploring, especially as it comes to evaluating the policy design of the economic recovery 
packages proposed and implemented by other countries.  This is particularly challenging 
in non-western societies due to the different framework under which they operate.  How, 
for example, did Vietnam or Singapore or Egypt, construct policies in a similar way in 
emergencies?  They are all non-western governments and they are all significantly 
different from each other both in the formulation of their economies and governments.  
Regardless, knowing whether these findings hold up in relation to those policies is 
certainly an area worth pursuing. 
CONCLUSION: 
In sum, while there are important questions for future research, this study adds to 
the accountability and policy tools literatures.  It shows that a single model approach is 
insufficient to explain policy tool choice, that a multiple model approach is superior and 
that there is a connection, at least in these two cases, between policy tools and 
accountability models.  It highlighted the importance of making accountability more 
proactive than reactive, how the policy problem is framed in tool choice, as well as the 
important considerations related to emergency policy.  It presented many lessons that can 
be learned from TARP and ARRA, their histories and presented several questions for 
future research.  This study is but one step in the growing fields of accountability and 
policy tools literature and will hopefully serve as a platform from which much can be 
learned and future research can be done.  After all, something like the events of 2008 will 
likely occur again sometime in the future.  As Mark Twain famously said “History 
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doesn't repeat itself, but it does rhyme (Twain, 1903, p. 64)” and we had best be able to 
respond well when it does.  
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Appendix A: Coding of Documents 
 In order to evaluate which models and tools were at use in each case, this study 
coded 237 different documents based initially on 125 different codes.  These codes 
consisted of one each for case one of Salamon’s policy tools was applied without an 
apparent accountability model, one for each of the eight accountability models identified 
in this study where they were applied without regard to a specific policy tool and then 
eight each for each policy tool as it was applied in concert with the accountability 
models.  After an initial review of the documents and analysis of the trends of which 
policy tools and accountability models were being utilized, the number of codes was 
reduced to 39 as the data showed that there were seven total policy tools in play, each of 
which got one code, and four accountability models in play, each of which got one code 
and four codes for each of the seven policy tools where accountability models were 
applied in concert with policy tools.   These documents were then fully reviewed twice 
more to find all cases where these codes could be applied.  Following these reviews, an 
analysis was conducted to determine where the intersections of policy tools and 
accountability models occurred.  In cases where there were several instances where the 
two were coded together, it was determined that there was a link.  It is believed that given 
the same set of documents although others might have relied upon different codes and a 
different approach, the results of this coding could be substantially reproduced by another 
researcher and thus are repeatable as recommended by standard methodological 
standards. 
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Appendix B: Interview List 
The following is a list of the persons interviewed as part of this study, their role and 
importance in relation to the policies and the location and dates of each interview. 
 
Interviewee: Naomi Baum 
Organization and Title (former): Congressional Oversight Panel, Executive Director 
Date/Location: February 11, 2013, Washington, DC 
Role: Oversaw the Congressional Oversight Panel’s work as it evaluated various aspects 
of TARP. 
 
Interviewee: Betsy Cody 
Organization and Title: Congressional Research Service Analyst 
Date/Location: February 12, 2013, Washington, DC 
Role: Helped evaluate projects in the natural resources area in relation to ARRA. 
 
Interviewee: Andrew Green 
Organization and Title: Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs Committee Staffer 
Date/Location: February 11, 2013, Washington, DC 
Role: Helped Senator Merkley undertake accountability in relation to both TARP and 
ARRA. 
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Interviewee: Chris Mihm, et. Al. 
Organization and Title: Government Accountability Office, Managing Director for 
Strategic Issues. 
Date/Location: February 13, 2013, Washington, DC 
Role: GAO had a fundamental role in evaluating both TARP and ARRA; Mr. Mihm 
assembled a group of staffers who had worked on one or both policies in order to help me 
understand GAO’s process and role in evaluating both policies. 
 
Interviewee: Tewana Wilkerson 
Organization and Title (former): Congressional Oversight Panel, Deputy Executive 
Director 
Date/Location: February 11, 2013, Washington, DC 
Role: Helped oversee the Congressional Oversight Panel’s work as it evaluated various 
aspects of TARP. 
 
